Texte/Erastus, De medicina nova/Translation

This translation was created on 11 May 2026 using ChatGPT 5.5.

[p. 1] THE FIRST PART OF THE DISPUTATIONS ON THE NEW MEDICINE OF PHILIPP PARACELSUS, IN WHICH ESPECIALLY WHAT HE HAS SET FORTH CONCERNING REMEDIES OF SUPERSTITION AND MAGICAL CURES IS EXAMINED. By THOMAS ERASTUS, Professor of Medicine in the Heidelberg School. Interlocutors: Furnius, Erastus.

[1. On Creation]

FURNIUS. What you ordered, I have diligently done: I have carefully read through as many of Theophrastus’ books as I could obtain, more than one hundred and thirteen; I have noted down the opinions worthy of observation and arranged them into classes, so that I may recall them more correctly. I am certainly confident that, from among those books which it happened to me to read, you will not easily produce one of which I cannot remind myself without great effort. Therefore what I already asked of you some time ago, I now ask again with urgency: do not find it burdensome to explain to me why you think those things should be condemned which seem to very many to have been usefully innovated. I do not so love Paracelsus, from whom I do not deny that I have profited, that I do not love truth more, especially in this matter, in which to err is not only shameful but also pernicious.

ERASTUS. If your disposition is as you profess it to be, then come, propose the subject matter for our debate. As far as I am concerned, I truly and sincerely desire, so far as I am able, to oblige you and all others in this matter. [p. 2]

FURNIUS. First I should like to know from you what you think the reason is why, although the most celebrated and distinguished physicians cry out with almost one voice that the dogmas of Paracelsus are false and foolish, nevertheless no one has wished to take upon himself this office, namely to examine his whole doctrine and refute its falsehoods with solid arguments.

ERASTUS. I do not know the reasons for the silence and counsel of others. But this, meanwhile, I know: it does not befit good men to shut their eyes to errors that are publicly harmful. For my part, I have certainly never failed to say what I thought about these matters, praising what seemed to deserve praise and censuring what I had found to be harmful or to have been so. Now too I am prepared openly to declare to you my opinion concerning the points about which you ask. As for others, I suspect that all learned men are of the opinion that extremely absurd imaginings, such as Paracelsian ones certainly are, ought not at all to be refuted by arguments. For such fictions destroy themselves, and defenders of such things generally fall by wounds mutually inflicted.

FURNIUS. I am not anxious about this, provided I hear from you what I should follow.

ERASTUS. Then, if you please, let us first examine what is consonant with piety in those things which he has scattered here and there throughout his books concerning divine matters. Next let us consider what his philosophy was, and of what sort. After this let us examine the medical matters, first indeed generally; then also, specifically, let us weigh the causes, origins, conditions, and cures of several diseases.

FURNIUS. Even though I should chiefly wish to learn what he wrote incorrectly about medicine, and should not wish inquiry to be made into those things which he at times discussed concerning matters pertaining to piety and religion, nevertheless I will not resist your will and judgment, provided you judge that we shall engage in this dispute with profit. For I do not think that Paracelsus is not to be approved in medicine if it is shown that somewhere he thought wrongly about divine matters. For if this argument has force, neither the doctrines of Aristotle nor those of Hippocrates and Galen will be able to be held and approved, since it is certain and confessed that all of them disputed impiously about God and sacred matters. [p. 3]

ERASTUS. That is not the reason. Rather, I see that very many heads of his medicine, in which so many things are contained concerning remedies of superstition and wicked and magical cures, cannot be properly explained by us before these matters have been weighed. At the same time, the exposition of these matters will refute Paracelsus and his disciples, who contend that the aforementioned authors should not be read because they were Gentiles and wrote certain things alien to piety. For if it is shown that Paracelsus too thought and wrote impiously, no one will be able to accuse us because, on this ground, we do not prefer his writings to their monuments.

FURNIUS. It is all the same to me where our comparison begins, provided that what I desire follows. Meanwhile I ask that, in illustrating those things which do not much pertain to medical matters, you be somewhat briefer.

ERASTUS. You ask what is fair. Therefore we shall run through briefly what he wrote impiously concerning Creation, Divination and Prophecy, the power of miracles, and other similar matters, unless perhaps you wish us to say more. We shall examine at greater length what he dreamed concerning the efficiency of the heavens and the powers of characters, words, and incantations for either inflicting or averting diseases.

FURNIUS. Do you therefore criticize anything in his doctrine of creation other than what he writes in the book To the Athenians, that the creation of things is segregation?

ERASTUS. I do not merely accuse it, but utterly execrate it all. He wrote many things monstrously, and in such a way that in all his writing he seems to have aimed only at this. Yet in this book he far surpassed himself. Nothing can be imagined written so perversely, so disorderly, so monstrously, so impiously, so sacrilegiously, as what he spewed into this book from the filthiest minds. This drunken buffoon belched forth things so mutually contradictory that he compels the attentive reader not merely to wonder but to be altogether stupefied. The sacred letter teaches us that God in the beginning created heaven and earth, then light; soon afterwards that He separated light from darkness, and waters from waters by interposing the firmament; afterwards that He distinguished the elements still confused, and commanded each what, how many, and of what kind it should produce from itself. Finally, after the stars had first been created, He formed man. Since these things are so, no one among Christians will be able rightly to profess his name who is not most firmly persuaded that all things were created by God. He must also confess this same thing: that God, by His omnipotent word, by which He created all things, did not merely arrange the elements in orderly fashion, but also created from those same elements the things which we see born from them. [p. 4]

FURNIUS. Paracelsus denies none of these things.

ERASTUS. Would that it were so. We know that all things were created by God from nothing. Paracelsus says that all things came forth from the great mystery, as he calls prime matter, not by creation but by secretion. For in that mystery of his, which he asserts in the most explicit words, repeatedly in Latin and German, to be uncreated, he affirms that all things lay hidden, contained within it, and emerged through segregation. I once doubted within myself whether by “great mystery” he understood either the place of the universe or something else. But he does not allow us to take it as anything other than matter: partly because he himself openly interprets it so, partly because he so often calls it the mother of things, partly because he says that all things were made from it in the same way as butter and cheese are generated from milk, and worms from cheese. Yet he affirms that this mystery is uncreated, and that in this uncreated thing all other things were created by God. Certainly, just as this uncreated Mystery was nothing other to him than the Anaxagorean Chaos, which in several places of his writings he calls the Great Limbus, so creation is nothing other to him than separation. Moreover, he himself defines separation in the book On Baths as the secretion of two or more things joined together, so that each may be able to use its own powers. Therefore this pleased Anaxagoras. Indeed, Paracelsus is more impious than Anaxagoras in this respect: Anaxagoras writes that separation is accomplished by the most simple, most wise, and most powerful Mind, that is, the Divine Mind; Paracelsus attributes it to certain fabricated and mortal little gods.

FURNIUS. Kindly use fair words. The sayings of learned men should not be dragged into the worse sense, but interpreted in the better.

ERASTUS. Provided that either they themselves permit it, or piety allows it. For to be silent in the face of an open charge of impiety is itself a notable impiety.

FURNIUS. What then is so grave a sin?

ERASTUS. Do you judge the things I have listed to be light? Come then, let us consider them one by one. “From uncreated prime matter,” he says, “sensible and insensible things were made.” And although all things return into that which they previously were, nevertheless they are not resolved into prime matter, but into that which was before it. He repeats this in the book On the Method of Purging, saying: “Before heaven and earth were, something existed, yet not this which we now see.” [p. 5]

FURNIUS. In calling prime matter uncreated, he did not differ from the Scholastics, whom no one accuses of impiety on this account. In asserting that the other things were produced from prime matter by secretion, he did, in a way, the same as Moses. Then he declares sufficiently how he wants this to be understood, when he writes that things lay hidden in the mystery imperfectly adorned with their forms, namely potentially. When he says that all corrupt things return into that which was before the mystery, he understands nothingness itself. For in the twenty-first text, when he says that what was before the mystery remains, he warns that this is not to be understood as though we were to be something. “I am resolved into nothing,” he says, “because from nothing I am in the beginning.” For although we say that all things return into that which they formerly were, nevertheless we understand nothing other than that what is their first beginning again passes into nothing. Thus in the book On the Method of Purging: “When what is now something has returned to nothing, what was before remains.” As for the fact that he wrote that others besides God distinguished formless matter, perhaps this can be excused among fair judges.

ERASTUS. Theologians deny that prime matter was created in such a way that it lacked every form; rather, they consistently affirm that it was created together with certain forms. These two statements differ infinitely: “Prime matter was not created without every form,” and “Prime matter is uncreated.” Furthermore, creation is one thing when it is so called properly, namely when things are made from no pre-existing thing, for so I call what the Greeks call τὸ μὴ ὄν — “that which is not” — or from nothing. In this production it is altogether necessary that no change or alteration precede; this is the second condition of creation. For nothing can be changed or altered unless it first exists. Creation properly so called therefore has these two conditions: that it is the production of things from nothing, and that it comes into being suddenly, with no preceding alteration. In another sense too, creation is spoken of, perhaps less properly, yet nevertheless commonly and in agreement with Sacred Scripture, whenever something is made from some pre-existing thing, but is made in such a way that it could not have been made by any created being, but only by God. This creation too has two conditions: namely, that things are made from no seedbed from which a created power could bring forth the same thing, and that they come into existence suddenly, without motion or alteration. Indeed, things which were made in an instant without any motion at all could not have been produced otherwise than by a kind of creation. For all things which are made by generation are made through motion and succession. But if such things are, moreover, made suddenly from matter in which there was previously no aptitude for producing them, then they were much more certainly created. For the aptitude for the form, which Augustine calls the seminal reason, had to be introduced suddenly together with the form and the necessary disposition. But that seminal reasons can be bestowed upon matter by the Creator alone is as certain as it is certain that God is the maker of all things. [p. 7]

Both kinds of creation are clearly and plainly seen in the production of this world. For in the beginning God created the matter of the whole world, under the forms of heaven and of the elements, from nothing. Scripture includes the elements, still confused among themselves, under the name “earth,” as is clear from the fact that soon afterwards mention is made of water, and then in the second chapter also of air, or exhaling vapor. We also understand that fire was mixed in, since no exhalations occur without heat. From these elements, then, without any preceding alteration whatever, the same craftsman created the various species of things by His omnipotent word. He therefore did not draw forth things already actually existing, though hidden, by segregation; rather, when they did not yet exist, He suddenly commanded them to be. For it is expressly said that the earth, that is, the mass of the elements, was void and empty, that is, lacked those forms of composite things which, as soon as God commanded them to be, existed perfectly at that same moment.

FURNIUS. Not all theologians seem to speak in this way about the work of creation; most, and especially the Scholastics, say that the world was created in the beginning, but afterwards distinguished and adorned by God. Accordingly, they define creation as the production of the whole being, not of matter alone, from nothing.

ERASTUS. I am not unaware that they speak as you have said, nor do I blame those who speak otherwise, provided they do not think otherwise. At present I am not investigating how others have preferred to speak, but inquiring what is more in agreement with Sacred Scripture. Moses says that God in the beginning created heaven and earth. He says that this earth was still rude, unformed, and void, and lay hidden beneath waters, clothed with no plants. For that plants were not actually in the earth is very clearly seen from the second chapter, when Moses says: “And every shrub of the field before it was in the earth, and every herb before it grew.” Likewise Scripture asserts that for six days God was engaged in the work of creation and rested only on the seventh day. If therefore He created all things in the beginning, and did not create the things which He made on the following days, then He did nothing other than segregate confused things like the Mind of Anaxagoras, which is equally absurd and impious to say. For the earth would not have been void and empty if it had had actually within itself the plants which it afterwards brought forth. Nor would darkness have been over the abyss if light had been actually mixed in. For darkness is nothing other than the privation or absence of light. Is it not openly written that God created the fishes which He commanded to exist in the waters, and man, whom He formed from the slime of the earth? If He did not create these things, they are not creatures. The things that were created were created. For whatever, when it did not exist, afterwards came into existence, was either created or generated. What is generated is brought from potency to act from a seedbed or suitable subject through alteration. But it is agreed that the creatures of which we are speaking were not produced in this way. Therefore it follows that they were created. [p. 8]

FURNIUS. It is rightly said that He created them because He had made matter, that is, earth, from nothing, from which He then commanded other things to come forth.

ERASTUS. He is mistaken who thinks that the works of the six days are called creatures only because their matter was created from nothing. For Scripture says that Adam was created when, formed from the slime of the earth, he received the spirit of life. Thus Eve too is written to have been created when she was made from the rib of the sleeping Adam. I therefore concede that the matter of the world was created in the beginning from nothing under the forms of heaven and the elements. But I deny that the host or adornment of the world, which He afterwards made from matter, was not created. For creation is twofold, as I have said. And concerning the former kind I grant the definition brought forward by you, in which it is agreed that not only the form but also the matter was truly and simply created from nothing, that is, that the whole being of the thing was produced from nothing. In the other species of creation, matter indeed is not created absolutely, but is nevertheless created in a certain way, namely when the potency and disposition without which it cannot receive the form are suddenly created together with the form and without alteration. Therefore, as matter is created there, so here potency and disposition are created, and through them matter itself too is in some sense created, not indeed absolutely, but in a certain respect. For from these it receives the name and nature of matter.

FURNIUS. I do not understand sufficiently.

ERASTUS. Matter is called matter by comparison with form. For if some thing cannot receive a certain form, it cannot be reckoned the matter of that form. Hence no one is so insane as to think that stones are the matter of blood or bread. Therefore anyone who wishes, not with futile effort, to introduce the form of bread into stones is compelled to make the matter of bread. Now every thing is or is not the matter of some thing because of a disposition suitable or unsuitable for the form to be introduced. For it is neither possible nor intelligible that a form should be in a subject not duly disposed and prepared. But each thing can be disposed and prepared for the reception only of that form which it previously has in itself potentially, that is, whose aptitude or seminal power it has received from God. For to give a form to a subject is nothing other than to lead the subject’s potency into act. Nor is there any other reason why not anything whatsoever is made from anything whatsoever, but only a determinate thing from a determinate thing, than that not every thing has the potency of every form. But if a created agent could either introduce any potency whatever into the matter upon which it acts, or without such potency could introduce the desired form, then anything whatsoever could be made from anything whatsoever. Yet it is agreed that created powers produce from the subject upon which they act only that which this subject is naturally apt to become and that power is naturally apt to make. Therefore creatures cannot bestow upon matter a potency which it did not previously have, nor imprint a form without it. [p. 10]

It is the office of the Creator alone, almighty God, to render matter capable, according to His will, of receiving any forms whatever. Meanwhile it is not absurd, indeed it is certain and true, that the same things are affected by dissimilar causes in dissimilar ways. Bread, for example, can be reduced to ashes by fire; it cannot be changed into blood. The same bread can be transformed into blood by the heat of an animal; it cannot in the same way be transformed by that alone into ashes. Therefore bread can be changed into blood and flesh by animal heat, but cannot be transformed in this way by fiery heat, because it has a potency by which it is so changed by animal heat, not by the heat of fire. Stones, however, cannot be changed into blood either by the heat of fire or by the heat of animals, because they lack this potency in relation to both causes; bread, by contrast, when compared only with fire, is seen to lack the same potency. From these things it is clear, first, that each subject becomes the matter of some thing when it acquires the potency and disposition congruent with the form to be introduced. Secondly, it is also clear that the cause which grants this potency and disposition together to any things whatever makes them matter out of non-matter. Certainly, whoever were to grant stones the potency and aptitude by which they could be transformed into blood by human heat would rightly be judged to have made stones, which are not the matter of blood, into the matter of blood. Thus whoever transformed stones in one moment into true loaves would rightly be said to have created together the matter as well as the form of bread, since he would at the same time have implanted the necessary disposition and potency and would not have drawn it from any pre-existing natural potency. Thirdly, it is clear that only the Creator can introduce into matter the potencies He wishes, since He alone has the power to make anything whatsoever from anything whatsoever. This, certainly, is the chief and most evident difference between the action of creation and the actions of all creatures: creatures can introduce into matter only that act, that is, not without motion and alteration, which previously exists in it potentially; but the Creator, together with the act or form, without any intervening motion or alteration, suddenly makes the matter itself too, either simply or with respect to the necessary potency and dispositions. [p. 11]

The former He accomplished in the first creation of the elements and heaven; the latter in the second creation, when He created plants and animals from the earth. For at the very moment when He commanded these things to exist, He so variously mixed and tempered the parts of matter by His omnipotent Word, and distinguished and adorned them with such manifold potencies and dispositions, as the varied and manifold forms which suddenly appeared in that matter required. If you wish to call this operation of the Creator something else, I shall not quarrel, provided you distinguish it fittingly from the actions of created powers and are persuaded that things could have been so made, and were so made, by the omnipotent Word of the Creator alone.

FURNIUS. Nor shall I be further anxious by what name anyone may wish to call it, although I think it more apt and more harmonious with Scripture to call it Creation than by any other name. Indeed, the difference between this and the first creation is very slight, and both were perfected and completed by the same Word. But since the creation of all things together in one moment seems more illustrious and more glorious, how do those not seem to think less honorably who suppose that the perfected world was made by God at different times? For the former seems to indicate the weakness of the acting power, since none of us would wish to spend three days doing what he could complete in one; the latter, however, seems to indicate excellence.

ERASTUS. If God had perfected this universe in six days because He could not do it more quickly, you would seem to be saying something. But since He is wisdom itself, and could in a single moment have produced not only these created things but also infinitely many others, it is clear that not without mystery did He complete the fabric of this world in this manner rather than that. The dignity and majesty of the Creator’s power ought not to be estimated so much from instantaneous creation as from the excellence, adornment, nature, powers, duration, and other such qualities of the things made, and especially from the manner of their procreation. For He spoke, and they were made, and indeed in such a way that they could not have been made better. From these few points you see that you cannot excuse Paracelsus. First, he calls his Mystery absolutely uncreated, and does not merely deny, with the Scholastics, that it was created without any form. Add to this that he does not even concede that other things were created, but says that they were hidden in the uncreated mystery and appeared by separation. But it is agreed from Sacred Scripture that God created composite things from the elements when they were not in them, and did not merely secrete them from the same elements. For the words of Moses are very far removed from those of Paracelsus. Although he says that things were not complete in that mystery, nevertheless he says that they lay hidden in it just as, in a medicine skillfully composed from diverse things, although the matter seems to be one, diverse powers are present. Since he explains himself by this example, I do not see how I may defend him. If you contend that he also thought that they were present potentially, you will gain nothing. For that potency of matter was the most remote and most general of all potencies that can be conceived by the human mind. No part of it was more potentially a man than a stone, a plant, or anything else. Therefore it was simply and absolutely impossible for all creatures, by separation, to draw forth composite things from that matter or show them in it. No part of it was then potentially either plant, brute animal, or man, as now some seed is potentially plant, animal, or man. But what am I saying? Seeds themselves do not become what they can become by separation alone; there is needed here also varied, long, and manifold alteration and change, as everyone knows except Paracelsus. [p. 13]

From his opinion this too follows: that before that uncreated mystery there was neither something nor nothing, and accordingly that he uttered nothing but monstrosities of words when he chattered about these matters impiously and arrogantly and mocked God most good and great. Indeed, what is uncreated is eternal. Before what is eternal neither something nor nothing can be thought. For if nothing had existed after the Mystery itself, it would have been created, unless perhaps it had hidden itself in nothing while Paracelsus was drawing it forth. Thus when he sometimes says that it was created, he clearly shows us that he wrote such things drunk or insane. In the printed book On Meteorology we read these words: “We have said that God created the elements from nothing. Now therefore we shall inquire what that was which occupied the place which the elements occupy. But it was thrust down to hell, together with what adhered to it, from heaven and from the place of the elements; and what was not driven from here is in the place of Paradise.” A little later: “Thus the beginning of the four elements was created from nothing. For the place in which they now are previously contained nothing corruptible from which, namely, the corruptible could be created. Therefore it was fitting that the incorruptible should withdraw into Paradise, and that in its place the corruptible should be created by God, namely heaven or chaos, that is, air, and afterwards the other elements.” Did I not rightly say that these are portents and monsters of words, containing nothing sound or certain? This is clear: he did not think that before the created elements there was nothing in their place. For from the words cited it appears clearly enough that he did not understand only a vacuum. For this cannot be transferred elsewhere. He speaks as if he thought that Lucifer with his angels was relegated to the lower regions, but the good angels to the place of Paradise. Writing on gout, he says: “In the second creation, out of angels were made the heavens, water, earth, air. What they had in angelic nature was distributed into this globe.” In the same work he writes that men, demons, and angels were made from the Limbus. But what he thought is difficult to say, since everything clashes so foully with everything else. And since it is of little concern to us, I do not think it should be investigated more diligently. [p. 14]

FURNIUS. In the places cited he says that the elements were created by God. How then do you not accuse him unjustly of the contrary?

ERASTUS. I do him no injury when I candidly recount his words and opinions and draw correct conclusions from them. But that he himself very rarely remains in the same opinion, and in almost all things disputes with himself, need not even be mentioned. For we shall see that in his whole doctrine there are scarcely a very few opinions which he does not somewhere refute by manifest contradiction. But what would you reply to these things, when they argue thus? “The place in which the elements are contained embraced nothing subject to corruption. Therefore the beginning of the elements was created from nothing.”

FURNIUS. I do not wish to deal with those matters now. Indeed, I freely grant you even this: that God created not only the matter of the universe under the forms of heaven and of the elements, but also stones, metals, plants, animals, and finally man, since Scripture so often and so manifestly calls God the creator of all these things. For although it is certain that they were made from the elements, they are nevertheless called created because they arose with no intervening seedbed and no preceding alteration, through which natural things are now generated, but existed suddenly and in no time when the omnipotent Word of God commanded them to be so.

ERASTUS. What do you think of the fact that he says that from the great Mystery, that is, from prime matter, even insensible creatures, that is, creatures without matter, were made? For he seems to approve the madness of those fanatics who thought that all creatures besides God were corporeal, an insanity which Sacred Scripture gravely refutes. Indeed, what will you say on his behalf when he says that the Elements were made from Angels, affirming the contrary of his earlier statement?

FURNIUS. By “insensible” [p. 15] he understands things unformed and imperfect, which were sensible not actually but only potentially.

ERASTUS. But in this way all things besides the elements were insensible. For it has already been declared that in prime matter there were no forms of composite things potentially in such a way as they are now in it, and as they could have been brought into act by a created agent. For the potency which it alone then had was most general, by which it was equally suitable for the creation of all things, no more apt for one thing than for any other. In short, such was the potency that it could be perfected only by the power of the Creator. What of the fact that philosophers too denied that remote matter is potentially this or that? On this matter you may read Aristotle in the seventh chapter of the ninth book of the Metaphysics, where he writes that it is not rightly asserted that earth is potentially a chest or a cup. For many changes must intervene before a chest or a cup is made, and these changes cannot be initiated and carried through to completion by one mover. But the potency of which we are speaking here was far more remote than the potency which earth now has for a wooden chest or a silver cup. For it was pure or absolute potency, which could receive no one act more than any other. From such potency it is agreed that diverse things can be made only by that agent which has full dominion over matter and all its potency. Therefore in matter there was the potency called by the Scholastics “of obedience,” not the natural potency which was afterwards implanted in it when He commanded it to bring forth from itself what He wished. It is therefore false that things were created in matter in the same way as in a compounded medicine, in which, though the matter seems one, different powers and faculties are present; or as the four elements are present in human urine; or as Mercury is present in a tree-trunk; or as whey, cheese, and butter are present in milk. He uses these examples, except that he denies that anything cut away was useless, because it was of use in the production of Mercury. It is absurd that he asserts that all things came forth by separation if he denies that they existed actually. Yet I do not see how he will deny it, since he writes that things created from his Mystery emerged by separation in the same way as, from milk by the injection of various vinegar, cheese, butter, and whey come forth, and in the same way as metals contained together in some lump are separated from one another in the fire. Add that he himself writes that in separation one part withdrew into the elements, one part was secreted into vegetative things, one part was distinguished into invisible things. Likewise, in the eleventh text of the second book, he openly affirms that invisible spirits dwelling in darkness were in the great Mystery. The same is understood from the fact that he assigns such substances to each element, as we shall soon hear. But if you object that he does not always speak in the same way, I shall reply the same as I touched on above: such monstrous contradictions are found in his writings that one who reads with judgment cannot think otherwise than that either the man was the most monstrous of all men, or that he was driven by the worst demon to write things which hardly any pious person can read. He writes that he doubts whether to call natural or divine that separative force drawing all things forth from that Mystery, which he calls Magic; and on this point not even any Gentiles, except the Epicureans and certain atheists, are read to have doubted. [p. 16]

FURNIUS. Let us now finish these things and proceed to others.

ERASTUS. Something further remains to be examined. For, contrary to Sacred Scripture, he contends that the elements were not immediately created by God, but arose from the great Mystery through the first secretion. In this segregation he says that Fire, heaven, or the containing vessel and, as it were, the womb of the firmament; Air, the empty receptacle of invisible and fatal creatures; Water, the couch of the Nymphs; and finally Earth, coagulation, a certain lodging of I know not what spectres, were made. Since these things plainly oppose the sacred books and conflict with the opinions of all philosophers, they need no refutation, as is the case also with what follows. For no intelligent man will expect a refutation of such things. Therefore in the second separation he writes that from fire were generated heaven and the stars, which were in fire as leaves, flowers, and fruits are in a tree in winter. From air, he says, were born Fates, Impressions, Incantations, Superstitions, Poisonings, Visions, Sortileges, Divinations, Melusines, Dicemeae, Drudales, Neusarenes, Spirits, etc.; of these the Dicemea dwells in stones, the Drudales in trees, the Neusarenes in the pores of the earth, the Spirits in the air itself. From water, he says, were born fishes, Salts, Metals, Corals, Trina, Citrons, aquatic monsters, Nymphs, Sirens, Drames, Lorintes, Nefderi, and other creatures sharing in reason; some of these enjoy perpetual life, some die intermittently, some are yet to be born. For separation in this element is not yet complete. From earth he asserts that there arose sensible and insensible things, mortal and immortal, Gnomes, wild men, Lamiae, Giants, etc. In sum, in the eighth text of the second book he writes these words: “Each of the elements contains things generated from itself, both those endowed with reason and those lacking reason. For heaven has creatures partaking of reason no less than earth. The same holds for air and water. And who will make us certain to the creatures of which element true faith has been given, or the way to salvation revealed, or which of these four genera possess blessedness?” This I now pass over. “Meanwhile it cannot be otherwise than that in all four there are men, as there are on earth.” These are Paracelsus’ words. Elsewhere he adds to these that aerial animals can unite with earthly men and generate offspring from them, as happened to a certain Melusina in France, and can acquire through marriage a human soul, which they previously lacked. He says that they have flesh and bones and are animals, yet lack a soul, by which they differ from Adam’s descendants. [p. 18] He says that they have flesh so subtle that it penetrates all solid things; yet that, like men, they are subject to diseases and even to death, although he had earlier said that not even fire could harm them. Likewise, he says that they speak, eat, drink, and seek their sustenance for themselves by their own labor. He does not judge it unsuitable or impossible that two bodies should be in the same place at the same time. For he openly writes that the species of Pygmies, whom the ancients called Sylphs, is besieged by devils and introduced into walls and trees without perforation, so that two bodies are in one. He says that these Sylphs, when trees are cut into, pour forth blood, because, although they are spirits, they have flesh and bones. Although these creatures lack a soul, nevertheless they partake of every kind of reason and human wisdom. Indeed, they not only perceive present things, but also foresee future things and disclose to men whatever is hidden. To these, in the present place, he also attaches the generation of Fate, as he calls a certain spirit; although its generation is manifold, nevertheless Fate is incorporeal, just as air itself is incorporeal. Whoever wishes to refute these monsters, I say, will gain nothing except to expose himself to ridicule before those who are not altogether dull-witted. It is enough, I think, merely to have listed them, since they are sufficiently refuted by the very recitation.

FURNIUS. So it is. Yet not everything is to be rejected on that account, because certain things were said by him with too little elegance. We must think that he wished to be understood otherwise than his words seem to sound.

ERASTUS. If he had wished to be understood otherwise, he would have spoken otherwise. But if he did not wish to be understood, I too do not wish to understand him. Certainly words are the signs of thoughts of the mind. Since they signify only by human convention, we are compelled to judge each person’s opinion as he sets it forth in words. Thus no one who has carefully read his books doubts that Paracelsus can be counted in both of the two classes of men which Galen most instructively describes. One class is made up of those who in most matters flee to hidden and ineffable properties. The other is made up of those who indeed express in words what they think, but do not use those words as others do. [p. 19] Those who do this either cannot, because of childishness and crudeness, use a better mode of interpretation; or they cover wicked things under customary words; or they pretend to know things which they never learned. For some are so foolish that they think things they do not understand contain some hidden wisdom. But these things are aside from our plan, to which we must now return. We said that those things are created which are produced from no pre-existing thing, or from nothing. We also said that those things are created, though perhaps less properly, which, although made ἐκ προϋπάρχοντος — “from something pre-existing” — nevertheless come into existence suddenly, with no preceding alteration, especially if the subject either had in itself no determinate potency for the thing to be produced, or one so remote that the act could have been elicited by no power besides God. And we have clearly shown that the matter of the whole universe was created by God from nothing under the forms of heaven and earth, or of the elements, or created together with those same forms. Then we demonstrated that from this all other things were created by the same power without any intervening alteration and without any potency of forms existing in the matter. For plants, fishes, birds, and all the rest of the animals were procreated by a simple command. And that there existed beforehand in matter no seedbed of any of these things by reason of which it could be judged more or less apt for the production of one definite thing rather than any other, is abundantly manifest. For the omnipotent Lord subsequently inserted this power into matter when He commanded that each thing should thereafter be born such as it had been in the first creation. From what has been said before, it is clear how foully Paracelsus conflicts with these things. Now I very much desire to hear how you wish to excuse the fact that he devised separators other than God. “Because there was something,” he says, “from whose secretion all things were distinguished, before all things there is a distinction of the darknesses of the gods, and this in the following way. Created things are divided into eternal and flowing things, because the creator of the mysteries was another, not that supreme God.” His reason is that, since God is the judge and chastiser of all creatures to whom it has been permitted to do evil, such creatures could not have been made by Him. Then, since created things are enticed, driven, and compelled to evil by the stars, Fate, and the lower regions, but this does not befit God, who created us freely, another maker must be sought. Finally, because many are born foolish and witless, and scarcely one in a thousand is wise, it is probable that we are the finished works not of the most perfect craftsman, but of mortal little gods, subject to us at the last judgment and having authority over that Mystery. [p. 20]

FURNIUS. I remember very clearly reading those things at the beginning of the second book To the Athenians. They call to my mind what he wrote about the origin of fools in the little book devoted to this matter. “It is to be noted,” he says, “that fools were made by the craftsmen of heaven, the masters, and their disciples. From a craftsman perfect in his art nothing imperfect is made; but what is made by disciples, who must become craftsmen by working, is often ridiculous. Therefore man, by sowing man, furnishes as it were wood or matter to Vulcan; for man no more generates or makes man than a farmer makes the wheat which he has sown. In his absence the disciples sometimes spoil the image and generate fools, as the disordered and depraved structure of the body and the distorted face generally indicate. This occurs because they are subject to Vulcanic changes, and when they have scarcely learned perfectly the art of forming, they die; because there are few accurate and perfect masters, but very many youths and disciples, insufficiently practiced in the art, succeed one another from time to time. And since each has his own peculiar idea and uses his own hammer, it is no wonder that there is such variety among men in figures, minds, talents, and inclinations. For it changes more quickly than the moon is renewed. Therefore the nature of fools is incomprehensible; and for this reason all astrology concerning this matter is false and mendacious. For those who cannot define fools will still less be able to define wise men or their natures. But no one can do the former, because the Vulcanic art is unknown, and up to the present time no diviners have been able to comprehend with understanding its disciples and craftsmen. Who, therefore, will truly predict astrologically that this or that man will have this or that fortune, who has never sat at the workshop and anvil of the craftsmen, nor knows what form is to be poured into each? Certainly he who is ignorant of any art can report nothing but lies.” This is the substance of the things which he often repeats in the cited place. [p. 21]

ERASTUS. You have indeed correctly inferred it. All those things pertain altogether to this place, except what he incidentally inserts about prophecies; and I should very much like you to remember those. For they will have to be repeated later in their proper place, and they demonstrate plainly enough what or what kind he thought those mortal gods, the separators, were, whom the followers of Avicenna call “givers of forms.” Here, in passing, I should like you to consider how imprudently some prefer Paracelsus to Galen because Galen denied the omnipotent God. Yet Galen was never so senseless as to think that nature errs in fabricating man in the way Paracelsus asserts that his craftsmen blunder. Galen places the opinion of Moses before the opinion of Epicurus; Paracelsus defends one still more absurd than Epicurus’ opinion. Galen preserves, in general matters, the principle of generation which is derived from the Creator, adding only the aptitude of matter. Paracelsus entrusts this whole work to foolish craftsmen who, on account of their inexperience, have not even learned how to form suitable matter properly. Galen taught that God made in all things what was best, and what could not be made better, and that He chose matter suitable for making it. Paracelsus taught that others supply matter to the craftsmen, matter which they do not even know perfectly. Galen writes that God does not even attempt those things which nature cannot do. Paracelsus excludes God from production and attributes nothing to nature. Which of the two, then, is more blasphemous toward God? If Galen had known that God is the author and maker of matter, and that He implanted the potency which He wished, and still today implants it, he would have sinned in nothing. Paracelsus learned these things from the cradle, and out of mere insolence recoils from them, knowingly defecting from God the Creator to the evil demon. He contends that his craftsmen not only cannot do all things, but do not even know all things.

But I return to the matter proposed. The fantasy of Paracelsus has kinship with Plato’s opinion, which fashioned lesser little gods, as it were subordinate and auxiliary gods, shaping things according to a model set before them by God. For Plato thought that material forms exist by participation in Ideas sent from substances devoid of matter. It is similarly akin to the imagination of the impious Arab Avicenna, who dreamed of a giver of forms other than God, namely a certain barbarous intelligence, barbarously named by him Cholcodea. He thought that this intelligence formed and created forms in itself by conception, and then infused them into prepared matter; and that corporeal agents accomplished nothing else than the disposition of matter. Paracelsus plainly shows that this pleased him by the example of sown wheat and the farmer. His view is also similar to the opinion of astrologers, who create things here below by means of the stars, which he confirms elsewhere in these words: “Every formation,” he says, “is first in the stars in the way the form of iron is in the imagination of the smith; then it is in the earth, insofar as all the stars become earth.” It also agrees in some respect with the dream of more recent Peripatetics, who attribute to the moving powers of the planetary spheres the power of creating and producing miracles. [p. 23]

As it has something in common with all these, so it again differs variously, first from itself, then also from the others. For Plato makes his creators of lesser rank immortal; Paracelsus makes them mortal. Avicenna grants this power to one eternal Intelligence; Paracelsus imposes it upon innumerable craftsmen, who die and are born almost every day. Astrologers ascribe the same power to the properties of the stars; Paracelsus assigns it to certain demons wandering about the stars and forging the forms of things. The new Peripatetics grant this faculty to the movers of the celestial spheres, whom they regard as ingenerable and immortal; Paracelsus communicates it to devils infinite in number, arising and perishing almost hourly, yet in such a way that they differ greatly among themselves in age, industry, skill, and experience, and some far surpass others. In the same way they disagree with the Platonists, who adorn the souls of the stars with properties. Indeed, they do not concede that the stars, which they think are certain divine animals, perish. They all err because they think forms are something made per se, subsisting separately, and finally proceeding from another principle, always excepting the rational soul, which they suppose to be drawn out from the potency of matter. By “the potency of matter” I mean that command of God by which, in creation, He gave matter the aptitude to pass from potency into act through the action of a definite agent. I would be amazed that he chose the most stupid fantasy of all, did I not know that in all things he aimed at this: always to follow the most absurd opinions and smear them with his foul saliva, so that he might set them before us still more deformed. Certainly the Prince of evil demons seems to have wished, with great pleasure, to laugh at God together with all creatures through that buffoon. For what did that prodigiously impious man not dare to affirm? But see what a fine fellow that rogue of yours is. In his Great Philosophy he writes these words: “No star makes man. For God alone is the Craftsman, needing no vicars, as false Astronomy and pseudophilosophy teach.” Here, as always elsewhere, he manifestly declares himself guilty of profane and impious falsehood, so that nowhere and never is he consistent with himself. [p. 24]

Then consider the horrible and unspeakable blasphemies which this sacrilegious man vomits forth from his filthiest Tartarean mouth, if indeed he was a man. First, with Arius and Photinus, he imagines that the Word by which God created the universe has an essence other than God, that it was created and subject to corruption, and subject to God by the judgment of God. Then he posits several such gods, through whom the supreme God architected this world, so that he might speak even more impiously, though silently, about Christ, since he did not dare openly to spew out his Tartarean thoughts. Third, he plainly denies that Christ is the creator, since he makes Him a separator, and one to whom several associates are added. Fourth, he denies that Adam was created perfect by God in the beginning; rather, in the book On Worms, he asserts that Adam was consummated by eating the apple, that is, by the Devil. For he thinks that Satan poured all his wisdom, and indeed himself spiritually, into that apple, and in this way then passed into Adam. In the book On the Epileptic Disease he has these words: “When Adam was driven from Paradise, the light of nature first arose in him. For previously he did not have the knowledge necessary for man, nor did he receive it all at once, but acquired it gradually.” Fifth, he contends that man was not created with freedom of will, but with cognition from those creators toward evils and crimes; in this way he makes God the author of evils. Sixth, he takes away from Christ the power of judging, which all Scripture so clearly attributes to Him. If he had not even read the fifth chapter of John, he at least knew that the contrary is contained in the Apostles’ Creed, which he had learned from his mother. [p. 25] Finally, he makes Christ a sinner who is compelled with us to await the sentence of God at that last judgment. Is this not to overthrow religion and piety from the foundations? Is this not to snatch away the hope of salvation from all? Is this not to mock confidence in Christ crucified? Is this not to declare war on Christ and attempt to drag Him down from the throne of His majesty and divinity? Who, then, will dare deny that Paracelsus is a more pestilential heretic than all Arians, Mohammedans, Turks, and heretics? He seems to have wished to surpass the evil demon himself in blasphemies against God. What therefore shall we think of those who dare to praise, thrust upon others, propagate, and defend insults against God and piety unheard of in all ages? There has been found, if indeed the name is not fictitious, someone who wrote that he made no mistake in any word. By public edict of emperors, kings, princes, and all magistrates, provision ought to be made under penalty of death that such horrendous blasphemies against God not be disseminated. Who would not be utterly astonished, if he considered that men born in this light of truth and educated among Christians while all good arts flourish, were not ashamed to scatter those blasphemous trifles among the common people? Our fathers were certainly far better and more prudent than we in piety, for they did not allow this beast to spew forth that poison through printers, which now, once published, is most audaciously drunk in by some, to the great harm of very many.

But leaving these things aside, I return to the matter. Since the falsity of this execrable fantasy about auxiliary gods in creation has been clearly demonstrated from Sacred Scripture, I prove the same by the testimony of Aristotle, so that you may see that it was held as certain even by the Gentiles. Aristotle says in the book On the World to Alexander, chapter 6: ἀρχαῖος μὲν τίς λόγος καὶ πάτριός ἐστι πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις, ὡς ἐκ θεοῦ τὰ πάντα καὶ διὰ θεοῦ ἡμῖν συνέστηκεν. οὐδεμία δὲ φύσις αὐτὴ καθ’ ἑαυτὴν αὐτάρκης, ἐρημωθεῖσα τῆς [p. 26] ἐκ τούτου σωτηρίας — “There is an ancient saying, ancestral to all human beings, that all things have been constituted for us from God and through God; and no nature is sufficient in itself when deprived of the preservation that comes from Him.” And a little later: σωτὴρ μὲν γὰρ ὄντως ἁπάντων ἐστὶ καὶ γενέτωρ τῶν ὅπως δήποτε κατὰ τόνδε τὸν κόσμον συντελουμένων ὁ θεός — “For God is truly the savior of all things and the begetter of all things that in any way are brought to completion in this world.” Afterwards he adds also these words: οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐπιτεχνήσεως αὐτῷ δεῖ καὶ ὑπηρεσίας τῆς παρ’ ἑτέρων, ὥσπερ τοῖς παρ’ ἡμῖν ἄρχουσι τῆς πολυχειρίας διὰ τὴν ἀσθένειαν — “For He has no need of contrivance or of service from others, as rulers among us need many hands because of their weakness.” You see how much more augustly, gravely, holily, and divinely the Gentile Aristotle speaks about God and creation than that Paracelsus of yours.

FURNIUS. You are mistaken. For this is not Aristotle’s legitimate offspring, but a supposititious one, as almost all Peripatetics have judged.

ERASTUS. I am not troubled about this matter, so long as the author writes that this report is ancient, vernacular, or proper and innate to all human beings. Whoever, therefore, the author is thought to be, he wrote what the greatest part of mankind in all ages and places believed and held. And since from the writing it is so evident that it cannot be denied that the author was a most distinguished and learned philosopher, that he was a Gentile, and that he speaks from the opinion of the Gentiles, we ought rightly to be ashamed of Paracelsian impiety and blasphemy. But what if the greatest men have testified that it is a genuine work of Aristotle? Certainly, apart from the fact that the book itself has the majesty, dignity, and learning of Aristotle, the most learned men have recognized Aristotle as its author. Among the ancients Justin Martyr cites testimonies from it against the Gentiles as from a legitimate work, from which it is clear enough that it was then regarded as Aristotle’s offspring. For he would not have alleged Aristotle as the author in disputing against the Gentiles if he had known that they considered the authorship doubtful. Themistius too seems to have recognized it as genuine in the Physics. Apuleius made almost the whole work Latin when writing to Faustina. Among more recent writers, both others and Bessarion, the Greek Cardinal, as well as Giovanni Pico, prince of Mirandola, men learned almost to the point of wonder, regarded it as a work of Aristotle. But, as I said before, it matters little whether we make Aristotle or another the author, provided it is agreed that he was very ancient, a Gentile, and finally a man of most excellent learning. The Scholastics make no mention of it, perhaps because it does not approve their fiction about Intelligences. Indeed, in open and often repeated statements it attributes to God alone all power of creating and of preserving created things. [p. 27]

FURNIUS. You anticipated my thoughts. For I was going to ask why you had said that the new Peripatetics had assigned to the Intelligences the faculties of which we are speaking. Now I understand that they did this without Aristotle’s authority and seem to have followed Plato rather than Aristotle in this matter. Yet I should like you to answer me why Aristotle, in his own philosophy, spoke otherwise about God, and whether in that philosophy he denied to the Intelligences the power of creating.

ERASTUS. In the books which no one today doubts are genuine, no mention at all is made of this power. Only the office of moving their spheres is granted to the Intelligences; since they cannot touch these lower things otherwise than by light and heat, they can effect nothing here except insofar as it can be accomplished through light and heat. These indeed vary according to the motion of the spheres and the variety in the emission of rays, yet they perpetually remain common and general causes; nor do they change the aptitude and nature of matter, but move it in such a way as it is apt to be changed in any particular thing. Therefore the Intelligences can do nothing other than, through the motions of their spheres and by light and heat varying in different ways, affect sublunary things differently, and move the nature of each thing also according to time in the way it is capable of being moved. Aristotle explains this matter and faculty most elegantly in the same place by two examples: a vessel or fold from which animals of diverse kinds are poured forth together, and the sound of a trumpet in warfare, by which individual soldiers, although that song or sound is one and simple, are aroused to do what they have been assigned to do. On this matter we shall perhaps say more later in its proper place. Now it is enough to have shown briefly that Aristotle nowhere conceded to the Intelligences the faculty of creating or of producing miracles. As for the fact that in other books he does not seem to have spoken with equal magnificence about God, the reason is that in those books he ought to affirm nothing that could not be demonstrated from the principles laid down. For this reason, in the book On the World he soared higher, and he argued not from those principles, but from the notion implanted in the minds of all. He does not say that it can be demonstrated, but that this opinion is ancient and innate in all: namely, that God created all things and now governs and preserves them. And lest anyone wrongly suspect that, like the great king of the Persians, He governs the world through ministers, he added that He is present to all things by His power, that He does not grow weary, and that He needs the help and work of no one for this matter. [p. 28]

Indeed, this manner of speaking is very common among us. In almost every discourse we are accustomed to say: “if we speak naturally,” “if we judge according to the custom of men or in a human manner,” “if we examine the matter philosophically,” “if we dispute according to Aristotle’s opinion,” etc. By this kind of expression we wish to show that we speak one way when we imitate Sacred Scripture, and another way when we follow human opinions and customs or the habits of our own intellect. But, to conclude this whole disputation at last, Paracelsus did nothing other than renew the error of Simon Magus, that most pestilential heretic, who denied that the world was created by God. Yet if you consider more closely, you will judge that he rather followed Menander, that disciple, and Saturninus, Basilides, Carpocrates, Cerinthus, those wicked heretics, all of whom affirmed that the world was created by angels. Nor is he far from the dogma of Marcion, who posited three principles. For as Marcion posits first an unknown God, then the visible founder of the world, and finally the Devil, so Paracelsus too seems to have thought almost the same. Nor is he far from the frenzy of Cerdo and Manes, who said that God emitted a dynamis, which Manes calls the mother of life, by whom all things were made. Finally, he surpasses all heretics and Gentile philosophers in this: that he architects those innumerable craftsmen and very short-lived little gods of his, and that he most wickedly lies when he imagines that men are driven and compelled to crimes and shameful deeds by such craftsmen. In this lie he comes closest to the madness of Valentinus the Egyptian, that most impure heretic. Since the insanity of these men has always rightly been condemned by all the pious, the madness of Paracelsus will most deservedly have to be execrated. Truly worthy of Athenians who are Mohammedans is the book into which he cast such monsters.

FURNIUS. Yet someone has been found who writes that the author was approved by them and was regarded and praised as the conqueror of all errors and the best guide to true medicine. Indeed that same man even dares to affirm that there is no error or stain in any word.

ERASTUS. If by “Athenian” he means those barbarous Turks who now dwell and rule in Athens, or himself and those like him, one may believe that they are no less execrable. How, I ask you, did the Athenians read the writings of Paracelsus, composed in the German idiom so barbarously and disorderly that not even Germans understand them without effort? The reader is compelled rather to divine what the man, monstrous in all his speech, thought, life, morals, and actions, meant. But perhaps that man translated the author’s splendid works into the Greek language, namely splendid works fit for Apagi with Lucians and those buffoons.

[2. On the Power That Effects Miracles]

FURNIUS. I have never approved impious things, but, as the saying goes, I have tried to gather gold from dung. Yet although we may seem to have said enough about creation, indeed perhaps too much, nevertheless, because from this comparison I now seem to myself to have understood certain things much more correctly than before, and because one scruple still remains [p. 30] which troubles me somewhat, I ask you to remove it for me before you pass on to other matters. You said that it is called creation when things are produced from nothing, or from no pre-existing thing, or when they are suddenly produced without any preceding alteration, contrary to the nature and aptitude of the underlying matter. But I thought that it was a miraculous production, not creation, when something was made from some thing beyond and contrary to the order and power of nature, as if a stone were suddenly transformed either into a man or into bread or into some such thing. From what you have brought forward, however, if it is firm and true, it follows, unless I am mistaken, that there is no distinction between miracles and a certain kind of creation. For in most miracles the last two conditions concur no less than in creation that produces something from a subject.

ERASTUS. You raise this question at the right time, since in the same operation we shall see how far Paracelsus has departed from true piety in this part as well. I take it as beyond controversy that the sudden change of a stone into bread or a man is a certain kind of creation. Would not Christ have created bread if by His word He had made bread from stones, when the Devil urged Him to do this in Matthew chapter 4? “If you are the Son of God,” he says, “command that these stones become loaves,” as though he were saying: if you are the Son of God, you can create as God Himself could. From these words of the Tempter it is clear that suddenly to make bread from stone is not the work of created power, but of the Creator. For if he had known that stones could be changed into bread by any power other than that of the Creator, he would have tried in vain by this means to discover whether Christ was the true Son of God. Therefore, when God produces plants and animals from the elements by His word, did He not also create them? Certainly Scripture says that He created Adam, whose body He formed from the slime of the earth. Nor was Eve created, if every creation is made from no pre-existing thing. For the Lord formed her from Adam’s rib; [p. 31] hence Adam soon afterwards says that she is bone of his bones and flesh of his flesh.

FURNIUS. Since I have no doubt about this matter, I was asking whether all miracles should be called creations.

ERASTUS. We sometimes call any thing unknown and unusual to us, possessing in itself some special wondrousness, a miracle. In this way miracles are performed by art, by Nature, by Magi; but we are not dealing with these here. More properly, moreover, we call a miracle some thing done beyond and above the order and power of nature. By Nature I understand not only the potency by which things are apt to be moved, in which sense Aristotle defined Nature in the second book of the Physics, but also the power of acting implanted in things by God in the first creation. Miracles that are made in this way have God alone as their author; I take your question to concern these alone. Yet these too are not all of one mode and kind. For sometimes the thing itself is such that it could not have been made by any created power. Sometimes it is not the thing itself, but the mode of generation or production that exceeds the efficiency and powers of creatures. Indeed, in creation God imparted to all things as much potency of acting and suffering as He wished. This alone is the reason why not every thing can change whatever it encounters, nor can every thing be changed by any agent whatever; rather, only a determinate thing suffers from a determinate agent, and that in a definite time and mode. To the omnipotent word and power of God alone, by which He made all things from nothing, all things obey in such a way that whatever He wills must immediately come into existence.

Miracles of the former kind include the universal Flood; the conversion of Lot’s wife into a pillar of salt; the division of the Red Sea so that the waters stood upright on each side like a wall; the fall of manna in the desert on each day except the Sabbath; the water called forth from the rock by the striking of the rod; the preservation of the three boys in the burning furnace; the halting of the sun’s course; the raising of the dead; the giving of sight to the blind; the multiplication of the loaves and fishes, so that they sufficed to feed so many thousands and, moreover, so many remnants remained; and many other things of this kind. [p. 32]

Of the other kind are the unexpected rain falling from a clear sky in 1 Kings 18; the preservation of the Israelites’ garments, so that through the whole forty years they were not worn out by constant use; the sudden cure of a fever; the immediate removal without medicines of other diseases which nevertheless could have been cured gradually by natural remedies. For if they are posited as incurable, they belong to the first order. Meanwhile it must be known that these orders and, as it were, grades of miracles are not so distinguished that one is not often found in the other. For frequently what could not be done by any created power was also produced by an unusual mode.

With these things explained, the answer to your question is not difficult. For although in miracles there is no creation of the first mode, according to which all things are made from nothing, nevertheless in the first order some creation is always perceived, namely insofar as something is suddenly made from a subject or in a subject, without antecedent alteration, for which that subject was not naturally suited. For a rock is just as unfitted to pour forth water from itself when struck by a rod as created earth was unfitted, because of any command or mandate of created power, to produce from itself plants and animals in the way it produced them when God commanded. What difference, I ask, was there between the creation by which God formed from one rib of Adam the whole and entire body of Eve, and the multiplication of flour and oil in 1 Kings 17, and finally the multiplication of the substance of loaves by which Christ, in Matthew 14, fed about five thousand men besides women, and fed them in such a way that twelve baskets of fragments were also gathered? Certainly in this bread there was no more natural potency for this increase than there was in Adam’s rib a potency from which created power could have fashioned Eve’s body. Nor is the matter otherwise [p. 33] in the rest, although perhaps we do not always understand it with equal ease. A corpse is no more apt to receive life from natural power than Adam’s body, fashioned from the slime of the earth, was fit to be endowed with life by created power.

In the other kind the notion of creation is not equally manifest, although in these too the power of divine potency shines forth brilliantly. Whether therefore we grant that in these there is creation, or express this operation of God by another name, this will always remain established: that these are works of divine power, not of any created power. The reason was set out: created powers cannot move matter except in the way in which it is naturally apt to be moved, namely by alteration and succession, and by no means suddenly. For a limited and finite cause cannot do anything whatsoever, but necessarily produces only a determinate and finite effect. Hence it cannot move matter at will, but only according to its aptitude; just as matter too receives the action of the agent not according to the nature of the agent, but according to its own innate aptitude.

FURNIUS. What you say is indeed plausible. Yet two things hold me back from full assent. The first is that Scripture says that God completed the whole work of creation in six days, and therefore created nothing afterwards. The other is that Scripture and the theologians call the production of wondrous things miracles, but do not call them creation.

ERASTUS. God completed the creation of this visible world, with all its adornment and perfection, in six days; nor did He need afterwards to add anything, as though the work had been defective and mutilated. Nevertheless, He creates daily, as Christ affirms in John 5: “My Father works even today,” He says, “and I too work.” Does God not work the conversion and, as it were, recreation of us in His own without interruption? Indeed, He still always creates faith, charity, and the gifts of the Holy Spirit in the elect. I pass over now the fact that He has never ceased to create human souls. These things, therefore, do not conflict. For He perfected the whole visible and corporeal world at the beginning; but the spiritual kingdom will be perfected when the Son of God descends for judgment. [p. 34]

FURNIUS. As though miracles were not sensible and often corporeal things.

ERASTUS. I do not deny that, but I deny that they belong to the perfection of the world as parts of it. For they are certain extraordinary things which serve God only for some time; after that they do not arise or propagate themselves like things founded from the beginning. But this does not prevent us from thinking and saying that such things were created by God. Nor should it trouble you more that they are called miracles and not new creatures. For many things differing in reason, although in reality they are the same, have received different names. To remain with our proposed subject: are not the creation of things and the preservation of those same things the same in reality, and do they not depend on the same omnipotent power of God? Certainly this is so. For preservation is nothing other than, as it were, the perpetuation or continuation of creation, something St. Augustine skillfully and elegantly explained by the example of illumination. For just as air is illuminated by the sun and remains illuminated by the same power of the sun, so the world is preserved by that same power of God by which it suddenly came into existence from nothing, lest it relapse into nothing. Therefore it was rightly said by the Scholastics that true being is preserved by God in no other way than by His continually giving being, since, if He were to withdraw this action from created things, they would in a moment be nothing.

What distinction, then, is there between other created things and miraculous things? In the thing and in the production there is none, but there is a distinction in us. First, because we are accustomed to the order of nature, we call what occurs outside this order a miracle; the things that were made in the beginning we could not wonder at, since we neither existed nor had seen anything different. For miracles occur beyond and above the order of things. Secondly, other creatures are preserved by propagation and return more often from certain seedbeds; miraculous things do not return in this way. Finally, God created the universe of things alone; He often performs miracles through creatures or in creatures. [p. 35]

FURNIUS. How then, if creating belongs to God alone, can the productions of miracles be called certain creations? Indeed, he who makes something by means of an instrument makes it through the διάθεσις, that is, the form and disposition, of the instrument. He who cuts bread cuts by the edge of the knife. Likewise, a person making a cup from silver will either not achieve what he wants without a hammer, or will not achieve it conveniently. Therefore the miracles which God works through creatures as His instruments are not produced by God alone, but are accomplished by God through the disposition that is present in those instruments. For although God is the principal cause, the creature is nevertheless, as it were, a certain concause. For this reason it is most evident that there is a very great distinction between miraculous works and creation.

ERASTUS. You truly say that the things which are done through the disposition of an instrument are not perfected by the primary agent alone, but that the quality of the instrument too contributes something to the effect. But God by no means creates miracles through men or other created substances in this way. For He does not need the work and ministry of anyone; rather, all other things need Him. Therefore He performs miracles alone, as we read in the prophet and king David, Psalm 136; but He performs them through men, or rather in men, not because their action contributes anything to the production of the thing, but so that He may secure authority and trust for them and show others that He is present with them, holds them dear, and has chosen them for this office which they discharge. Thus in Exodus 4 He says to Moses: “So that they may believe you, that Jehovah has truly appeared to you.” Christ uses the same argument to prove that He is the true Son of God, of the same power as His omnipotent Father, in Matthew 11 and John 5, 10, and 15. For this reason they are generally called signs in Sacred Scripture, because they signify and testify that God is present in those men and does those things. “These signs,” says Christ at the end of Mark, “will follow those who believe,” etc. Therefore men through whom, or in whom, it pleased God to declare His power and goodness contribute nothing [p. 36] to the production of miracles, which are the works of God alone. And that men do not contribute anything to the perfection of these works in the way instruments contribute to the production of works of Nature or Art, without which the effect either cannot be accomplished by the principal cause or cannot be accomplished so fittingly, this one thing will plainly prove: that God has often been efficacious in the garments, words, and even the shadow of His own. But who would believe that a shadow or a buried corpse could have cooperated with God in the production of miracles in the way instruments cooperate with an artisan in the production of a work?

FURNIUS. If what we have discussed so far is true, God alone truly performs miracles, and neither Magi nor demons are to be reckoned authors and effectors of miracles.

ERASTUS. So it is, when the discussion concerns true miracles. For Magi or demons sometimes do marvelous things; we take these for miracles because we do not know the causes of what has been done. But from what has been said, it is agreed that it can in no way happen that any form is introduced into matter by a created agent which that matter did not previously have in itself potentially, that is, for which it did not receive aptitude from God. Indeed, it cannot even bring this potency existing in matter into act otherwise than through natural motion and change, although this occurs more slowly or more quickly according to the powers of the agent and the greater or lesser aptitude of the matter. In order to explain this matter more carefully and fully in the schools, they posited a twofold potency in matter. One they called natural, which is nothing other than the divine ordination, called by St. Augustine the Seminal Reason, by which God willed that from matter mixed in a certain way, by a determinate agent, through motion made in time, a definite effect should be produced. The other they named obedientiary potency, or the potency of obedience, by which matter obeys the will of God absolutely, without any determination. [p. 37]

Both are seen in almost all things. For from fertile eggs, by incubation, a hen hatches chicks, because they are furnished with natural potency, so that chicks can be generated from them by temperate heat if they are warmed for a sufficiently long time. The same heat hatches no chicks from infertile eggs or from small stones, but makes the former rot and does not change the latter in any respect, because they lack the natural potency to be changed in this way by a created agent. Likewise, the earth will not by its heat received from heaven change sown silver or gold into plants, because they lack the potency implanted by God in the seeds of plants. But all these things obey God far more than seeds submit to suitable heat. Therefore philosophers deny, and rightly deny, as I showed above from Aristotle, that gold is potentially wheat, or that a stone is potentially bread, since nature has denied them such potencies. Therefore, since every natural potency is related to some definite natural agent, which in a certain time, by suitable motion, changes potency into act, whereas the potency of obedience obeys God alone, created powers will labor in vain to introduce into matter a form whose seedbed, or natural potency, or a kind of beginning, it does not have implanted in itself at creation. This is what the ancient theologians, and those who later followed them, meant when with constant and highest agreement they asserted that neither good nor evil angels can change matter otherwise than as it is naturally apt to be changed, and this by suitably joining agents to patients. The sum is this: creatures can make no more from any given thing than the Creator willed to be made from it. But He willed that of which He granted the natural potency. Therefore created [p. 38] powers can change this matter only according to natural or proximate potency, not according to obedientiary or remote potency. Nor can they change it in any other way than it is naturally apt to be changed. But God willed that it should be changed by motion and alteration, which occurs in some time. Therefore they cannot change it suddenly without this. Yet I do not deny that angels surpass other natural causes insofar as they act more swiftly and more effectively, and can in a shorter time join seeds which had been far apart. We believe that what can be accomplished by local motion can be performed more quickly by them, if they are not prohibited by God. But that by their own power they suddenly change matter, so that no alteration and motion made through succession precedes, I unhesitatingly deny, and I know it to be utterly false.

FURNIUS. It is agreed from Exodus chapter 7 that the Magi changed their rods into serpents and produced frogs; this plainly conflicts with your opinion.

ERASTUS. Scripture often speaks as men are accustomed to speak and judge. The same Scripture says that Samuel was raised by the Pythoness, although it is certain that nothing came forth except a shadow, an image lying about the prophet. For no Magus or evil demon ever truly raised the dead, although they have frequently called forth spectres. Concerning such a spectre I have read these words in Giovanni Francesco Pico: “But in this very year, namely 1503, in Germany, as Matthaeus Lang, provost of Augsburg, secretary of Caesar and participant in all his counsels, reported to me, a certain woman, dead for many months, appeared after assuming an aerial body. When asked many things, she replied, and she spoke at different times before almost a thousand witnesses. He told me that he himself, together with a certain bishop, by Caesar’s command, recorded the order of the event and the responses of the witnesses. Moreover Caesar himself confirmed the same to me most emphatically.” These are Pico’s words. This Lang was an Augsburg patrician by rank, later made Archbishop of Salzburg. The woman of whom he speaks was the abbess of Edelstetten, which is five miles distant from Augsburg. Her name was Margareta von Roth, from a family of high birth in those regions, as Dr. Wilhelm Xylander, a man most richly adorned with learning and piety, reported to me. Such also were the Lamiae of the ancients, and all spectres falsely pretending to be the souls of the dead. Such a shadow appeared to Saul. Just as Scripture calls it Samuel because Saul and the Pythoness thought it was Samuel, so the serpents and frogs are said to have been made by the Magi, although demons were fashioning certain likenesses of these things and dazzling the eyes of those standing by, so that they thought them true frogs. A sign of this is that the serpent of Moses is written to have devoured the serpents of the Magi. But if you insist altogether that they were true serpents, one must think that they were made by God. Nor do we say this absurdly, since we read similar things elsewhere too. Who, versed in Sacred Scripture, can deny that foreknowledge of future contingent things belongs so properly to God that it belongs to no creature? Yet God sometimes exercised this among the wicked, as the histories of Balaam and Caiaphas alone may testify. As far as miracles are concerned, the matter is less doubtful. For it is agreed that Judas too produced signs, as did the other Apostles, and we read that many other wicked men performed miracles by the name and power of Christ, Matthew chapter 6. To this pertain the things written in Matthew 24, Mark 13, and 2 Thessalonians chapter 2. There is some sign that the same thing occurred in those Magi, because although they had made serpents and frogs, they could not imitate the remaining miracles, which certainly do not seem to have been less difficult to perform. But one who can now accomplish something of this kind and soon afterwards can no longer do so does not act by his own powers, but by another’s. Therefore it is necessary that we confess that the divine power assisting them created the serpents; when that power was withdrawn, they could do nothing further.

But which of the two you say does not concern me here, provided you firmly hold this: that no one can deny without crime and most grave injury against God that God alone can create and change matter beyond and [p. 40] above its nature. Indeed, if matter obeyed the nod and will of either good or evil angels, God could not have proved by produced signs that He is the true Jehovah. For whatever He did, demons too could have done. But they cannot change matter otherwise than according to the potency implanted in it, which we call natural. Therefore if they ever seemed to produce a true miracle, it must be judged to have been perfected by God, who sometimes also reveals future things among the wicked, and in them declares His power in the way that seemed good to Him.

FURNIUS. I should like to hear which opinion is more approved by you. St. Augustine, in the book On the Trinity, thinks that they were true serpents, moved by this reason: that in the other signs the Magi afterwards failed.

ERASTUS. It has been demonstrated more clearly than the midday sun that the Magi could not produce miracles. But whether God wished to perform those wonders among them can rightly be doubted. Certainly I find no probable reason. For although I am not unaware that God sometimes tests His own people through false prophets, so that it may appear how steadfast they are, as we read in express words in Deuteronomy 13, and therefore permits them to predict some future things or even to perform miracles, nevertheless, since among the Egyptians, ignorant of the true God, Satan’s illusions could have had as much effect as true miracles, I do not see why true miracles had to be produced among the Magi. Therefore my mind inclines more to the other opinion.

And besides the things already said, first this moves me: that I see the same opinion pleased certain ancient theologians and most recent ones. “The Magi seemed rather to produce signs than actually produced them,” writes Clement. Tertullian wrote to the same effect in On the Soul, namely that it was an illusion of the eyes. Secondly, we read that the Magi suffered the same things that the other Egyptians experienced. For they too suffered ulcers and were afflicted by the other plagues. But it seems easier [p. 41] for someone to defend himself from the injury of a thing already made than to produce the same thing contrary to and above the powers of nature. Thirdly, if they could have called true frogs out of the waters, they would also have been able to drive them away. For it is agreed that Magi drive away shadows with less trouble than they call them forth. Certainly Moses, with the help of God, by whose aid he had introduced them, drove them away no less easily. Fourthly, we read that the dragon of Moses devoured the dragons of the Magi, that is, declared that they were not true serpents. Thus we know that the frogs made by God were gathered into heaps and rotted away; we hear that nothing of the sort happened to the frogs of the Magi. But we also see that the water turned into blood by Moses became foul-smelling and unfit for drinking, so that even the fish died in it; Scripture narrates nothing of this kind concerning that water which the Magi are written to have changed. Finally, the author of the Book of Wisdom openly confirms our opinion, writing thus in chapter 17: “There were present the mockeries of magical art, and a contemptuous reproach of that arrogance by which they had made use of wisdom.” And in chapter 18: “And thus those who, because of the tricks of magic, had believed nothing,” etc. This author clearly names them tricks and mockeries of magical art; he would not rightly do so if the things which appeared true to the Egyptians had in fact been true. Josephus affirms this same thing most openly in book 2, chapter 5, of the Antiquities, writing that the dragons of the Magi were not true dragons, but only seemed so to the Egyptians.

To all these things one may now add that all theologians consistently assert that demons, when God permits, can do only those things which can be accomplished by local motion and by the suitable application of agents and patients. For this reason the miracles of Simon Magus and of other enchanters, as the ancients testify, consisted almost entirely in tricks, and in the walking, speaking, laughing, and other similar actions of statues. The demon accomplished these either by local motion, or performed them through himself, or pretended to do them by deceiving the eyes and senses. For that the miracles which Satan performs are not true, although the unwary suppose them to be true, is clear from 2 Thessalonians 2, where the Apostle openly calls the prodigies and signs produced through him lies. [p. 42]

Although I know that those true miracles of Moses and the fictitious ones of the Magi were performed over the space of not a few days, nevertheless I would not dare affirm that true frogs or serpents were hatched by the Devil from the eggs or seeds of these animals. For they do not seem able to have grown to proper size in so short a time. For this reason I think they were tricks and mockeries. Nor does the fact that they could not imitate the lice and the other miracles prove Augustine’s opinion more than ours. For demons can indeed place tricks before the eyes, but only so far as it pleases God. Therefore, after they saw that they could no longer produce even the shadows of those things which Moses was producing, they were compelled to confess that they were far surpassed by Moses.

Now let us consider how consonant the Paracelsian teachings are with the truth.

[3. On the Powers of Imagination]

FURNIUS. I remember reading in the book On Imagination that demons by themselves can change no thing otherwise than as it is apt to be changed, and therefore that they do not possess the faculty of making even a hair white or black. He affirms almost the same thing in the book On Occult Philosophy: that demons cannot cure either fever or toothache, indeed cannot even break a pot, even if each is assisted as much as possible by all his companions. Elsewhere too he asserts that demons are not driven out without the divine power handed down to the Apostles. These things certainly teach that he attributes miracles to God and does not grant them to demons.

ERASTUS. I wish he had remained constant in this opinion. But here he is consistent with himself as he always is elsewhere. To demonstrate this matter, I do not wish to adduce the fact that he ascribes to Imagination the power and faculty of accomplishing in reality all those things which can be conceived by imagination. For we shall discuss this in its proper place when we dispute about the powers of Imagination. [p. 43] I shall say only what he writes in the book On the Causes of Invisible Diseases: that faith was not taken away from the devils in their fall, and that therefore they have the power of moving mountains and doing other similar things. “They can,” he says, “heal and afflict, and exercise their power toward human beings equally for good and evil, like the sun shining alike upon the bad and the good; they can do good and evil signs.” “They can do these things,” he says, “so long as they retain faith, which is their strength.”

More closely pertaining to our purpose is the fact that we know of no miracle made by God which he did not think could be produced by human beings or other creatures. Moreover, in five different places he lists the modes or methods and, as it were, instruments through which human beings perform miracles: faith, Nature, celestial things, the medical art and remedies, and Magic. But by faith he does not understand that faith by which we are certain that we have been reconciled to God through the death of Jesus Christ, but an innate credulity or a certain persuasion which we share with demons, as is clear from the book On the Causes of Invisible Diseases. This he sometimes calls natural faith, and in the book On the Plague even incantatory faith. He thinks that Christ spoke of this in Luke chapter 17. I am reluctant to report how absurdly, following certain Platonists, he everywhere explains these words of Christ. Therefore, by this faith, in the cited place, he writes that we can create all species of herbs, though invisible ones; that we can inflict all diseases, indeed death itself, upon anyone we please, more easily than kill him with a cannon or gun. If someone heals himself by this faith, he says it happens by an abuse of faith, because the Lord wishes faith to lie hidden and diseases to be driven away by remedies. He asserts that by this faith Apollo performed miracles, and that demons perform them, as I noted a little above; indeed that Samson received his strength from it, and that we act above the powers of nature and command spirits at our pleasure.

Discussing his astronomy, he writes these words: “Since Christ, when performing miracles, affirms that the disciples, if they held faith, would do greater things, why should we not through the same [p. 44] accomplish more than nature, which was founded for our sake? Since through faith Holy Scripture can do more than Christ in charity toward one’s neighbor, why should we not be more powerful than the stars, since Christ speaks not about these but about us?” In brief, to this faith or constant desire, which in the little book just cited he says is nothing other than a power acting upon the word that raises the dead, he attributes the power of accomplishing any miracles whatsoever.

That he also thinks miracles occur through a property of nature is clearly perceived from the end of the fourth book On the Causes of Invisible Diseases. For, when about to give the reason why corpses sometimes do wondrous things, he says that they have in themselves the powers of heaven and earth, which, like a magnet, they draw to themselves from heaven and earth. According to the variety of the powers drawn in, any bodies also act in different ways. Finally, concluding, he says: “Whoever is endowed with this property of nature, even if it were a dog, produces miracles and good signs by believing in this way.” And powers are born in us in the maternal womb, just as roses carry their scent with them from the earth. Thus witches and Magi are born; they do not become such by art. Not all things proceed from devils. Nor does Christ produce them either. Thus in the book On Gout he says: “There are found human beings who produce miracles and command good spirits as well as evil ones.” And not long afterwards: “Human beings,” he says, “produce signs and perform miracles, so that those who lack such an influx are almost compelled to regard them as gods and saints. They do such things, however, not in the name of the Lord, but by the virtue of their nativity, in which they triumph.” Likewise, “to stir up storms, thunder, etc., occurs by natural power, not magical power.”

I shall soon show that he attributes the same power also to those beings he calls Evestra, and I shall indicate what he seems to have understood by “Evestrum.” In the second book To the Athenians he babbles many things about these, by which he gives rise to the suspicion that he so named spectres falsely assuming the appearance and name of the dead. [p. 45] Yet the things he writes about these shades are so prodigious, confused, and contradictory that he seems to have wished to surpass himself in the imagination of absurd things. He writes that this Evestrum grants human beings the faculty of prophesying; and soon afterwards he ascribes this power to I know not what evil demon, which he calls the Great Crowd. “From this,” he says, “all prophets have spoken, and from it all signs. Comets and signifying stars have their origin not from the firmament. For the Most High does not converse with mortals, nor does He send angels to them from heaven, but things are foreknown from the Great Crowd, which among Jews and Gentiles was worshipped as God.” Then, returning to the Evestrum, he says: “The Evestrum produces miracles. For the saints perform miracles only through Evestra, just as the sun exercises its nature and heat through its rays. They rule sleep and dreams that show future things; they teach astronomy. In brief, from these the Sibyls and Prophets prophesied.”

As for the power of the medical art, he all but places it before the power of Christ. For in the Paramirum he openly writes that we have had medicine from the founding of the world and shall have it until the end, endowed with that same virtue, power, and efficacy by which the Apostles healed diseases; and that the same command to heal was given to physicians and to the Apostles. For in the earth, he says, there is power and there are forces by which sight can be restored to the blind and health to lepers. “For God,” he says, “wished no disease to be incurable, but created its own remedy for all.” For medicine removes not only accidental diseases, but also heals those lame and blind from birth. In order to persuade us of this, the madman adduces the example of lions conferring life by their roar upon their cubs, whom they had brought forth dead. Moreover, he strives to adapt the words of Christ to his own madness, not only in the present passage but also in his defenses. “It is foolish,” he says, “to think that a non-lethal disease, such as epilepsy, gout, or blindness, is incurable, [p. 46] since Christ said that the sick need a physician. Are these not sick? Do they not need a physician?” In John chapter 9 it is written that from all ages it had been unheard of for anyone to restore sight to a man born blind; but those people had not been nourished in the school of Paracelsus.

In the Paragranum he is still more blasphemous. “In order that the sick may be completely cured by physicians,” he says, “they must be better suited for them than those whom Christ completely healed; for no one unfit was restored to health by Him. Since therefore the physician has less power, those whom he is to cure must be more suitable.” Thus he assigns to remedies the power of warding off storms, lightning bolts, hail, spectres, and devils. And he says that they not only ward off those that intend to occupy a place, but that besieging ones are also driven out by medicines. Among these he counts coral, St. John’s wort, and I know not what else. “The heavens,” he says in his defenses, “produce diseases; the physician drives them away. If therefore heaven is compelled to yield to the physician, devils too are compelled to yield.” The Mercury of life makes a decrepit old man young, if we believe him, and restores the menses of a barren old woman. Thus herbs, roots, and stones render people invulnerable and unconquerable. Demons know the art of transforming gold and silver into coals and snails. It is also possible by art for true blood to be generated from any thing that can be eaten, such as is generated within bodies. These things, I say, he consistently affirms to be done by art, partly in the book On Occult Philosophy, partly in the Archidoxes, partly elsewhere, although it is agreed that they can be accomplished by God alone.

I pass over now that he writes that dead wood grows green again, and that the small bird called lispida, after its skin has been removed, produces new feathers for several years after casting off the former ones. I pass over that he thinks it by no means contrary to nature, indeed that he judges it impious to believe that it is not in our power to live as long as we wish, or at least until the renewal of the world or the day of the Last Judgment, just as we are able by art to preserve fire. For it is falsely believed, he says, that the term of life is predefined for us by God. [p. 47] If he had not read other passages of Scripture, he should at least have read chapter 37 of Ecclesiasticus, or chapters 17 and 18 of the same author. Elsewhere he says that Adam lived so long neither by God’s benefit, or creation, nor by any property of nature and the body, but by the aid of Medicine; elsewhere he says by Magic, of which Adam was most knowledgeable. Nor was it enough for him to pour out these impure lies unless, in addition, he vomited blasphemy from his filthiest mouth, asserting not only once that we should not so much lament Adam’s fall as the loss of this art of prolonging life in the Flood. Likewise, he says that Venus, Saturn, and Mercury endowed many human beings with immortality. He also narrates that Siconius and Hildonius, and I know not what others, lived an almost immortal life, so that nothing could be learned either of their birth or their death. Perhaps because they were never born. Likewise, he says that the perpetual life of Paradise is not miraculous, but is conferred by the nature of the place. For even here there are regions and medicines in which death has no powers; and so that you do not think this escaped him accidentally, he wrote it twice. Elsewhere, more tolerably, he writes that the inhabitants of the Valtellina suffer neither from gout, nor colic pains, nor stone, nor any tartareous disease; and he is very sorry to have lied so shamelessly about them.

The monster of a man complains that this art perished through the Flood, although it is agreed that Noah lived twenty years longer than Adam. Therefore Noah too knew the art; nor was it difficult for him to teach it to his sons, with whom he lived before the Flood and for three hundred and fifty years survived after it. But we shall conclude this narration about prolonging life with the same words with which he himself concluded it. “Since,” he says, “I cannot write without contempt from the idiots what I have experienced concerning the labor of Sophia, I shall inscribe it in my own mind and shall predefine for myself a life without term.” Who would not laugh at the folly, or rather be amazed at the prodigious insanity, of a man who could not bring a robust body to [p. 48] its fiftieth year? For he died before he had completed forty-seven years.

Equally absurd, false, impossible, and monstrous are the things he writes in the Archidoxes, On the Method of Purging, and elsewhere concerning the digestion of foods in the mouth and life without food, which he thinks by no means necessary if we do not labor. He says that he saw someone who lived for sixteen months without food, while he had his feet buried in the earth and frequently placed and renewed a clod of earth upon the mouth of his stomach. He also says that digestion is accomplished just as perfectly in the mouth by the palate, gums, and uvula as in the stomach, and that the body is no less nourished from food so prepared; that it is drawn by the liver without sensation and without swallowing. Thus, he says, the hermits lived, John the Baptist, and all those who collected no excrements in the intestines. But let us leave these futile trifles.

Now, that he wanted miracles to be produced through Magic is clear from all his writings, from which I shall transcribe one or two passages. “True blood,” he says, “is generated from herbs, bread, and similar things by the force of incantation.” Likewise: “Witches milk true and natural milk, not fictitious milk, from dry wood or from a wall.” Likewise: “An old woman can in one hour render sterile a year which had seemed fertile.” Likewise: “All demons can be driven away by two characters.” Likewise: “We know rings, images, and similar things that preserve all things from death.” He teaches that diseases originating from incantation are cured by contrary incantation. Indeed, when babbling about astronomical science, he affirms that there is no other distinction between the miracles of Magi and those of holy men than that the latter proceed from God, the former from Nature. Concerning himself, in a certain book on surgery written and published in German, he writes that he produced miracles, Thaten, by Magic. In the book On Epilepsy too he by no means denies that he was a student of Magic and that he had made no slight progress in it.

To all these he adds yet another cause of miracles, namely heaven. “Prodigies,” he says in the Paragranum, “and prophecies are made by heaven, which [p. 49] generates wars, battles, diseases, and plagues; and therefore also indicates them.” Accordingly, great wonders are not performed by God alone, as the Psalm testifies, but the same things are also effected by the faith or Imagination of Paracelsus and of demons; then by Nature; afterwards by spectres; soon by the medical art; finally by Magic; and last of all by heaven.

Although above we have refuted these portents generally and shown them not only to be false and impious but also blasphemous, as things which wondrously obscure the power of the divine majesty, nevertheless to refute certain points individually may seem worthwhile, while to wish to dissolve all of them could be judged superstitious. For who would believe that miracles can be produced by a property of nature, when they occur beyond and above the powers and order of nature? We are therefore compelled to posit as the cause of miracles not nature itself, but a power greater and higher than it.

FURNIUS. Yet we see that there are very different properties in human beings, since some recoil from cats, some from cheese, some from wine, while others are wonderfully delighted by certain things which most others abominate. Indeed, Albertus writes that two brothers were found who, whenever they carried closed doors, soon opened them by a certain wonderful power flowing from their sides.

ERASTUS. I am not greatly surprised that you, who attribute so much to Paracelsus, put faith in the fabulous Albertus. But I tell you that in him I have read almost more lies, and impious ones at that, and by no means to be tolerated, than among the Magi and Platonists. If human beings could perform such things by an innate natural power, how, I ask you, would Christ have demonstrated by His miracles that He was the true Son of the true God, of the same essence and power as the Father? The Apostles too performed miracles, but in the power and name of Christ, not from their own powers. This was the reason why they could not do what they wished, where they wished, when they wished, and how they wished, as we know Christ did, but only as much, where, and how it seemed good to God. For He, being present with them, [p. 50] worked such things, needing nothing that was in them, but securing authority and trust for them, as we said earlier. Whoever can do something by nature can generally do it whenever he wishes. Thus those who hate cats always hate them; those who loathe cheese or wine always loathe them. Therefore those who produce miracles by the powers of their own nature can produce them whenever they please. For if they cannot effect what they wish unless the matter is suitable, it will not be a miracle. Therefore Christ truly demonstrated that He was God by nature, since always and everywhere He performed as many, as great, and as frequent miracles as He wished. “The works that I do,” says Christ, “no one can do.”

Meanwhile, certain peculiar qualities can exist in certain human beings, following the proper mixture of matter, whether they are thought to be present in the whole body or are found in one part, such as the stomach, brain, etc.; but these are such as do not exceed the nature of the species. Yet it exceeds human powers, indeed conflicts with the faculty of man, for him to change matter otherwise than it is apt to be changed. For the powers of natural things are limited and destined to produce a definite effect, and that only if the matter is suitably disposed and fit to undergo action from a power acting in that way. What happens beyond these things is miraculous and is so called. Bread, for example, is indeed apt to be cut, crushed by hands, turned into powder, toasted by fire, and burned; only by the stomach and the veins is it fit to be changed into chyle and blood. Now if fire generates true blood or flesh from bread, the change will be miraculous, because it changes in this way contrary to the aptitude and nature of the matter.

FURNIUS. If it can be turned into blood in the stomach and liver or veins, how does this change conflict with its nature?

ERASTUS. It can be changed in that way by these parts, but it cannot be altered in this way by fire. Therefore it both conflicts and does not conflict with the nature of bread that it should become blood, according as it is compared with different acting causes. [p. 51] And this is what philosophers say: that natural things act definitely and within limits, and that not anything can be moved in any way by anything. Thus an iron bolt is apt to be moved from its place by the strong hands of a man; it is not apt to be moved in this way by a spiritual and hidden force flowing from the body of a man. Therefore it would have been a true miracle if what Albertus impiously fables were true. For if anything of this sort was ever done, it is more certain than certain that the doors were opened not by a natural power of the body, but either by good or by evil spirits.

FURNIUS. I shall not fight further here, especially because I see that the more elegant and sounder philosophers thought and taught the same as you, and above all because these things agree with the most holy Scriptures, which know not how to deceive.

ERASTUS. Much less, I think, will you expect me to prove at length that physicians cannot produce miracles. Certainly true physicians do what they do through natural remedies, and it is agreed that these, by altering bodies according to the great powers they possess, preserve or repair health. What Paracelsus narrates about the wondrous powers of coral, St. John’s wort, and other things is worthy of its author, to say nothing else. Who would be so dull as to hold it certain that so great a force as that of lightning and demons can be warded off by such a little plant or half-plant? Do our own eyes not teach us, and do the remaining senses not demonstrate, that all these things are false? It is almost an abuse and irreverence to refute such witless and disgraceful lies by testimonies of Sacred Scripture. When he affirms, contrary to the belief and experience of all ages, that all diseases can be treated by physicians, he is worthy of the gallows rather than refutation. If he did not wish to look to the sacred Scriptures and the honor of God, he ought at least to have looked at himself, lest he fight so foully and shamefully with himself. For in several places he confesses that many diseases are incurable. Even if he did not confess this in words, nevertheless he would demonstrate by the thing itself that it is true, since he either killed or left uncured more sick people [p. 52] than he thoroughly cured. Therefore what that buffoon babbles about the miracles of medicine and remedies is nothing other than wicked lies.

That those things called Evestra by him lack the powers of miracles is known in itself. For they are nothing other than shades or demons, or the Lares and Genii of the Platonists, that is, true devils; and we have shown most firmly above that these cannot perform miracles. If they sometimes seem to do something, they either accomplish it by joining agents to patients or by applying seeds; or they deceive and present shadows to the eyes in place of things; or the things which God does through them by some divine counsel are thought to have been done by them.

It remains, therefore, that first we declare that his faith of which he speaks, that is, imagination, does not possess the power which he, together with certain others, foolishly, stupidly, and impiously thought it possessed. Then we must show that nothing of this kind can be accomplished even through Magic and its species. Finally, if we have leisure and the matter seems to require it, we shall add something about the efficiency and proximity of heaven, and so impose an end on the first part of our skirmish, unless perhaps something meanwhile comes to mind that needs explanation.

FURNIUS. I wholly approve the plan. Nor do I desire that it be demonstrated to me at length that in herbs and stones, and therefore in medicines which we use profitably to overcome diseases, there is no power of producing miracles. For since these occur outside the order of nature, while medicines and all created things are subject to the order of Nature, it would be absurd to attribute to them a power greater and more excellent than natural power. Certainly I have always laughed to myself at Albertus, Pliny, and others when, from the carrying of certain stones and herbs, they promised me victory, foreknowledge of future things, safety from lightning and the violence of cannons, the favor of princes, and I know not what else of this [p. 53] kind. But I dared to promise myself greater things concerning the powers of demons and the power of man. For I considered how great the power of reason is, how many, how various, how difficult, and finally how wondrous were the things perfected by both; and I hoped that other things too could be added to these. Certainly many things were judged impossible which the stubborn labor of mortals has shown to be possible and not altogether difficult to do. Therefore I shall gladly hear what you think should be held concerning Imagination and its powers. It will also be pleasant to learn how much magical incantations can do.

ERASTUS. My purpose is to show that miracles cannot be produced by the power of Imagination, as Paracelsus and others besides him impiously and boldly affirmed. To do this more conveniently, certain other matters will also have to be treated, which will make the disputation somewhat longer. If you wish such things to be omitted, we shall finish more quickly.

FURNIUS. I should like nothing to be omitted that can contribute to the explanation of the matter.

ERASTUS. Therefore, so that not only may that point be clear which we principally have in view, but it may also be evident how alien from truth and piety, indeed from all sense, are the things Paracelsus asserts with such confidence about the power of Phantasy, we shall incidentally bring forward, when occasion helps, certain things learnedly and correctly said by Aristotle concerning the nature, power, and use of this part of our soul. It is agreed that Paracelsus despised what most philosophers very skillfully disputed about Phantasy and preferred to follow Avicenna, Algazel, Alkindus, the Arabs, and finally Pomponazzi and the impure Magi. I do not know the reason, unless, led by ignorance of these matters or persuaded by zeal for innovation, he preferred false things to true ones. I would think he departed from the opinion of Aristotle and Galen by certain judgment if he himself retained anything certain. But since now he approves Avicenna, soon follows Pomponazzi and the unspeakable Magi, a little later seems to embrace the ravings of Alkindus, and frequently places his own dreams before the rest, [p. 54] I can scarcely find what else I should conclude.

FURNIUS. What was the opinion of those men?

ERASTUS. The first two hold that the Soul, because it is a form devoid of matter and very close to the Intelligences, as philosophers call the movers of the celestial spheres, can be so elevated by the power of Imagination that it can act not only upon its own body, but also upon any other body without medium or instrument. Thus ennobled souls, they say, cast a camel into a cauldron, a man into a well; heal or weaken those whom they wish; change the elements so that fire does not burn and water does not moisten; prophesy, produce miracles, and finally have dominion over all matter. They judged that these powers are infused by the celestial Intelligences, under whose benevolent aspect such souls were produced, if by intense Imagination they had conceived the Idea or Image of Saturn, Jupiter, and the other Intelligence. For then such a Soul is two things, namely a soul or form of the body and an image of the Intelligence; and therefore all mutable matter obeys it, as it were, as an Intelligence in a certain manner.

Alkindus accomplishes all the aforesaid things by rays. For he holds that things conceived in imagination subsist in reality there, and can also be produced externally through rays issuing in every direction, if vehement desire is joined to them. Pomponazzi, thinking almost the same thing, makes spirits, not rays, the makers of affections, although in the course of the disputation he holds that the effectors of such things are either hidden properties of human beings or celestial Intelligences. Certain others assert that the air is infected and corrupted by Imagination, and that afterwards those who are fascinated suffer from it.

FURNIUS. If I remember correctly, Paracelsus and the authors just named do not disagree. For what else can he seem to have thought when, in his little book On Imagination, he writes that whatever is received into the Phantasy can be expressed by it in other things no differently than if it were formed by the hands? “The spirit serving imagination,” he says, “is that star [p. 55] which forms and impresses according to its pleasure.” Likewise: “Imagination is the sun in man, acting upon its own body and upon other things toward which its ray is directed, no otherwise than the sun diffusing its rays into the air.” Nor does he think it remarkable that corporeal things are produced by imagination, and likewise fevers, indeed plague, are aroused by the same intention alone without instruments. Indeed, he says, “Whatever a man imagines, that very thing exists. If he thinks fire, it is fire; if war, this too exists.” But if vehement and intense appetite is joined to fixed imagination, the effect follows, as happens in pregnant women.

Likewise, women inflamed by hatred and desire, like a pregnant woman with more intense imagination, in which they usually surpass men, generate a spirit by which the impression is lifted above the middle heaven. When it has taken a body there from menstrual blood, crosses flow down onto human clothing. For from imagination a similar species is born, and from menstrual blood the body of the work, by which plague is produced for some whole region. He thinks that our imaginations are lifted upward and brought upon the stars, just as they affect us by their rays. In what way this happens he explains at greater length in the book On the Plague, saying that all our affections and imaginations are transformed into bodies, made volatile, and elevated each to its own planet: envy to Saturn, fraud, lies, and deceits to Mars and Mercury. In these planets they are, as it were, cooked into punishments, which the planets are then ordered to pour back upon human beings. Therefore, when someone who venerates heaven by his imagination and has subjected it to his own command like a little dog, for he asserts that the wisdom of any human being can rule heaven and compel it to obedience just as we turn the earth with our hands and compel beasts of burden to do what they are commanded, thinks of harming someone, he uses the service of his planet for that purpose, as a farmer uses horses for cultivating the earth. From this wax images, words, characters, letters, and all Magic have their origin. For those who have learned to compel heaven [p. 56] so that it pours its power into characters, wax, and so on, in such a way that they have Saturnian, Jovial, and other powers, have been called Magi.

From imaginations of this kind various sects of human beings, differing among themselves by the name of uprightness and holiness, have also been born and are still born today, while one follows this rule of life and another that. Indeed, he who can lead human beings to the imagination of heaven is a Great Prophet, for he does and sees great and wondrous things. From this, he affirms, good and evil proceed; from this most diseases arise, while the various and discrepant imaginations of human beings, lifted up to the highest heaven, compel it to spit down upon us evils of every kind. Universal plague, however, invades whenever almost all people together venerate the pathless way of heaven. He also affirms in the book On Long Life that Venus, Saturn, Mars, and Mercury, with imaginations intervening and without any human work, endowed several mortals with immortality. Quintilianus tells of a certain Syrus, some copies have Styrus, who, when dying, by imagining a robust young man standing beside him by chance, transferred into himself the young man’s nature, powers, senses, life, and thoughts. By a similar Imagination, some Archasus, I do not know who, drew into himself erudition and prudence from others who had possessed them. But some also, through imagination in sleep, drew to themselves the Euessera of philosophers who had died fifty or one hundred years earlier, for this is what he calls the spectres of the dead, and were taught wondrous things by them. This is the substance of the things I noted while reading concerning the powers of Phantasy.

ERASTUS. From the things you have listed it can very easily be understood that I said correctly above that he agrees with all of them and has peculiar doctrines besides. For when he says that the spirit serves Imagination, fashions and forms the affections, and carries them up as far as heaven, he does this with Pomponazzi. When he contends that Phantasy generates bodies, [p. 57] and manufactures fevers and plagues without instruments, he holds the same opinion as Avicenna. Indeed, in the book On Occult Philosophy he writes that the power of Phantasy is chiefly seen in plague, since it generates a poison more harmful than any poisoned air. “If someone in France,” he says, “hears that his brother has died of plague in Italy, he can summon plague to himself by imagination, and this then invades others without infection of the air.” For the ignorant are mistaken, he says, when they think that air is corrupted by such things. He also has this in common with Avicenna: that he ascribes foreknowledge of future things to Imagination. For although he denies that prophecies ascend from man to the heavens in the same way in which he thinks anger, hatred, and other affections are elevated, nevertheless he expressly affirms that the origin of certain worms and of similar unusual things, and finally of certain portents, has Imagination as its chief cause. “By the most intense imagination,” he says, “laying the foundation of presaging and accurately examining all circumstances, one renders one’s spirit so purified and sublime that it is able to foresee future things.” Thus, while he thinks that Imagination emits rays like the sun, and asserts that affections and the forces of Phantasy become bodies, that is, things themselves, he embraces the insanity of Alkindus. While he supposes that what a man imagines within himself exists externally by the power of that same imagination, he errs with them all.

His own peculiar doctrines are these: that he attributes to Imagination the power of compelling heaven and the stars, and of abusing them at will for the most wicked purposes; that he thinks menstruating women lift blood into heaven or the air, from which the stars construct bloody crosses and plagues for us; that he thinks, if indeed he or any other man of sound mind ever thought this, that through Imagination someone can transfer powers, senses, thoughts, nature, life, and erudition from others into himself; that he supposes the stars to be armed with reason, prudence, cunning, tricks, and frauds just like human beings. [p. 58] For he openly contends that all these things are present in the stars, because we received them from the stars. “If we received them from them,” he says, “it is necessary that they had them first.” The only difference lies in this: that we act visibly according to these things, whereas the stars operate invisibly and spiritually. He also holds that the stars, poisoned by imaginations, vomit this plague upon human beings rather than upon other things, because they desire to destroy these people, not other things.

And what in the cited places he says Imagination accomplishes, elsewhere he asserts is accomplished by faith, not that by which we trust in Christ, but innate faith, as he writes in the book On Tartareous Invisible Diseases. Since I have already cited this, I shall add very few testimonies here. “If a man,” he says in the book On the Causes of Invisible Diseases, “can kill another with a cannon, much more can he kill him by faith. For he has two bodies, and what the external body does visibly, that is, with a cannon, the internal or invisible body does invisibly, that is, by faith.” Likewise: “What one firmly believes often happens because of credulity. Hence the French disease has been rendered incurable. Hence plague arose. By this faith some venerate heaven, which afterwards sends plagues upon the earth according to their will or faith.” From these testimonies adduced it is manifest that in these places he called the same thing faith which above he called fixed Imagination.

I believe no one will want these most portentous monsters to be refuted by me, since they abundantly refute themselves among all intelligent people. Nor is it obscure how much it fights against true piety when he attributes to Imagination the things that belong to divine majesty alone.

FURNIUS. I do not deny that certain things seem too absurd for me to approve them, unless perhaps they are explained otherwise. But the things he has in common with Avicenna and Pomponazzi do not seem to lack arguments; I shall bring these forward next, once I have seen what is contradicted in them.

ERASTUS. Aristotle defines Imagination as a motion [p. 59] excited by sense in act, through which not only brute animals but also human beings do and suffer very many things. Learned interpreters aptly observe that by this statement he explained not a power of the soul, but its act. Then they command us to observe that the faculty which some call estimative and others cogitative, the Latins also distinguish these, and which they grant even to brute animals, is included by him under Phantasy. Its office is to receive into itself the images of things from the senses and to offer them to the Mind for contemplation. For imagination is to the mind what the eyes and the other senses are to imagination, and what a suitable and fitting lens is to weaker eyes. Since our intellect, while the Soul lives in this body, cannot contemplate without a phantasm, this part or power of the soul was altogether necessary. For although our mind does not always judge singular things, but for the most part contemplates universals, nevertheless it needs the presence of phantasms even for the consideration of these. For just as someone who thinks to demonstrate a property of a figure of indefinite quantity or of an infinite line draws on a tablet a figure of determinate quantity and a finite line, in which he may declare his proportion, so the intellect, says Aristotle, needs a singular phantasm, although it does not consider it as singular, but as it indicates a universal species beneath it.

Therefore, in human beings Imagination serves the Intellect by supplying phantasms received from the senses. In brute animals it is so connected with appetite that, when a pleasing or sad species has been perceived, they cannot help immediately either desiring or rejecting it. This also happens to human beings whenever reason is bound and impeded by disease, sleep, or affections and disturbances of the mind. For this reason Aristotle said that many things are done through phantasy even by human beings. For animals do nothing before appetite is stirred by a species inhering in phantasy. [p. 60] I am speaking of animal appetite, not of a purely natural appetite, which seems to exist without an expressed species in the soul. Appetite is immediately obeyed by the moving and executing power, which carries out its commands.

FURNIUS. I do not yet see what you mean.

ERASTUS. I was heading toward this: that you might understand how the species in phantasy move an animal. For they move in no other way than by representation and presentation. Just as a mirror, if it were animate, would perceive and judge the things placed opposite it through the species of those things which it has within itself; or just as the Soul perceives and judges present things through the senses affected by the species of sensible things, so it perceives and judges almost in the same way those same things when absent through phantasy, which is, as it were, variously painted by the images of the senses. If it has judged something suitable, it immediately desires it; if it senses something unsuitable, it flees from it. On account of this inclination and flight of the Soul, the spirits, the first instruments of the Soul, are moved in various ways together with heat; and from their different movements very different disturbances arise in the bodies of animals. For they are quickly contracted, poured forth, recalled again, thinned, thickened, dispersed, collected, dissolved, made more mobile, and suddenly again rendered as though sluggish. From this arise sudden heats, abrupt chills, frequent changes of color, trembling, torpor, loosening of the bowels, dizziness, fainting of the mind, and sometimes sudden death, and innumerable other such things, altogether wondrous. I shall say it in one word: whatever good or evil the motion of heat, spirits, and humors can bring to the body, all this a sad or pleasant Imagination can effect in us. If you think these things true, since they are consonant with nature, truth, experience, and finally agree with the opinions of all learned men, I shall continue; but if anything seems false, I should like you to indicate it.

FURNIUS. I concede that the eyes, like a mirror, receive species from things placed opposite them, and that, because they are at the same time animated, they see. Thus I also confess that phantasy receives [p. 61] from the senses the species first drawn in by them, and that, according as they have seemed suitable or unsuitable, things are either sought or avoided, by which means it happens that spirits and heat, together with the humors, are moved in various ways. Nor am I ignorant of this either: that powers are distinguished by acts and offices, and acts by objects. But I do not know to what end these things tend, since we assign these same things to Imagination, yet not these alone.

ERASTUS. It is agreed that Imagination was made for these purposes: that it may preserve the images of sensible things received from the senses in the absence of those things, and represent them to the intellect when there is need. Therefore it does not move except insofar as, by the presentation of images representing something good or evil, the appetite is stirred toward pursuit or flight. Nor does it exist in any other way as a cause of the affections and appetites by which the soul, struck, excites such varied motions by affecting the animal spirits that obey its appetitions. How much importance a rightly composed mind has for health, and how much harm a disturbed mind brings in diseases, and how much the spirits and humors, agitated and moved beyond nature, bring about, physicians who have often attended the sick with some judgment know very well. Therefore we do not say that Imagination has no efficiency either in the healthy or in the sick; but that it moves either its own body or another’s in another way is neither true nor easily imaginable.

FURNIUS. This is what you should know you must prove.

ERASTUS. The name “imagination” is not always used in the same way. Sometimes it signifies the power of the soul by which an animal can imagine, even if it is not then imagining, that is, even if it is not actually painted by any species. Sometimes it is used for the imagined species, as when we say that the Chimera is nothing other than an Imagination. But most often we find it used for the action itself of this faculty, just as we say that vision is the act of the eye. Therefore you must grant either that this power produces those miracles, [p. 62] or that the species fashioned in it does so, or that the very act of the power does so. But that a potency lacking act cannot change or move another body requires no proof. For to move is to act. But nothing can act insofar as it is potency, which is what it is. Now Imagination, when it lacks a species and the animal imagines nothing, is no more said to act than a closed eye, while the animal sleeps, can be thought to see anything. Add that those who ascribe those wondrous productions to imagination do not refer them to a power ceasing from action, but to the act itself, and that a very intense one.

But neither will such efficiency be able to be attributed to the image, since those images are no things, but, as it were, certain shadows of things, such as appear in mirrors. If they were true forms, they would be drawn out by an efficient cause from the potency of their subject; but this by no means occurs. For phantasms arise no more from the potency of the brain or from its spirits, in which they are expressed as in a subject, than the images of opposite things shining in a mirror are generated from the matter of the mirror. Just as these appear from things placed opposite them without any preceding alteration made in the mirror, and are multiplied only when the objects are multiplied, so Imagination receives those images from the senses, preserves them, and, by composing them in various ways, offers them to the soul to be known.

Every subject is usually named from true forms. For we say that the air is warm, cold, dark, clear, because, of course, it is endowed with these qualities. But we do not say that it is red, white, yellow, wooden, stone, etc., insofar as it merely contains within itself the species of these things diffused through it. Thus we call a mirror polished or rough; but no one calls it white, black, blue, watery, fiery, because of the species of these things appearing in it. In exactly the same way, we do not think that the brain or its spirits are white, black, red, stony, or wooden because of the species expressed in them. For [p. 63] the brain of a physician is not diseased or fiery when he imagines a disease or fire; nor are those healthy who conceive health in imagination, or burned who imagine burnings. I pass over the fact that in no way could the forms of so many and such great, even contrary, things be received in so narrow a pupil and from there be conveyed to the inner senses, if they were indeed real forms, as they call them. And since every true form cannot but be extended together with its subject, whereas these representations are wholly present in the smallest part of the pupil, they differ very greatly from forms inhering in matter and drawn out from it. So slight and tenuous is their nature, and so far are they removed from true forms inhering in their own matter, that although things are sensed through them, they themselves cannot properly be sensed. For this reason they have been skillfully called notional and intentional, because through them the mind tends toward the things themselves. Aristotle held the same view when he said that not stones, but the forms of stones, are received into the senses and come to Phantasy.

Therefore, if every thing acts according to the mode of its essence, and no natural thing can produce anything above its nature, for all things generate either things similar in species or inferior to themselves in univocal generation, in which the efficient cause must always be similar in species to what is made, whereas these images or appearances are not any things, but notions, effigies, signs, and, as it were, shadows of things, then they too can do only this: namely, figure, signify, and represent. The image of Caesar, insofar as it is the image of Caesar, can exercise none of Caesar’s functions, such as arranging armies, leading them against the enemy, or bringing aid to the distressed; but, as an image, it can only represent Caesar’s features. The same reasoning applies to the images and notions that are fashioned in both the external and internal senses. For since no form truly existing has been granted by nature the ability by itself to generate anything beyond and above its own species, how can this be believed to have been given to these slight shadows? [p. 64] Will an incorporeal thing, not subsisting by itself, generate something corporeal and subsistent? It is impossible, I shall say again, for a notion, image, or representation to do anything other than signify and represent, since it was made by God for nothing else. The species that are diffused in the air and shine in mirrors declare this sufficiently. For they do not truly alter the air, waters, or mirrors in any way, but come and go with the things whose species they are, without any real change of the mirrors or waters. But if mirrors were animate, those species would serve them for comprehension and notion. Since mirrors are unfit for this motion, they are not moved by them, because those species cannot move otherwise.

This was most skillfully handed down to us by Aristotle in the second book On the Soul, where he shows that things lacking sense cannot be affected by sensibles. Odor, he says, moves smell and is odoriferous because it is perceived by smell. Therefore what lacks smell can suffer nothing from odor insofar as it is odor. The same reasoning applies to all sensibles insofar as they are sensibles. For sensibles can move only the senses. If they move other things, they do not move them insofar as they are sensibles, but insofar as they are present in some determinate subject. Therefore, if either denser darkness, or too much light, or more violent thunder harms the eyes and ears, it must not be thought that this was done by the sensible species insofar as it is sensible and without matter, but by air that is hot, cold, struck, excessively illuminated, and moved. What Aristotle most truly said about the sensible species is equally well and truly said about the imaginable species, which participates in matter not more, but perhaps less, than the sensible species. But the images of imagination, through which it actually imagines, are nothing else in their own nature than effigies, species, notions, and spiritual representations, not real ones. Therefore they can do nothing except make an impression upon either the external or internal senses for cognition. If, therefore, they do nothing in the body in which they are present, [p. 65] by what reasoning will they act in another’s body? Or in what way will they move a soul to which they are not offered? This is as if you were to say that the eyes of an absent person see someone whom I alone, shut up in a chamber, inspect, and whom no one except me can behold. Certainly no one of sound mind will think that the image fashioned in the spirit of phantasy goes out from my brain and enters into the head of another man. But even if this could especially happen, it would nevertheless not have to be painted in the same way in another spirit. For just as the same thing is fashioned more expressly, distinctly, and beautifully in one mirror, and more obscurely, confusedly, and uglily in another, so the same effigy too is not painted in the same way in one spirit as in another. Hence it happens in practice that what one person thinks beautiful another judges deformed, and what seems terrible to one person another lightly despises.

FURNIUS. The objections I was about to make here, concerning sensible species corrupting sense, you have anticipated from Aristotle, and at the same time you have recalled to my memory what I had almost forgotten reading in the same author: that pieces of wood are not split by thunder insofar as it is sound, but insofar as it is accompanied by a violent motion of the air. Certainly I would not strongly oppose what you have just said, since I think that our Theophrastus assigned such powers neither to the potency nor to the species separately, but attributed them to intense action, as I also heard you affirming a little earlier.

ERASTUS. But he errs no less here than if he affirmed any of the preceding points. For just as the act of a sensible thing is numerically one and the same with the sense in act, so the act of the imaginable thing must necessarily be numerically one and the same with the act of Imagination. For from agent and patient there is always made one act in number. Therefore, just as the sensible joined to sense produces sensation, so the imaginable joined to phantasy produces the act of imagining. But it has been shown that the imaginable species has no other act than representation, and therefore cannot give more to Phantasy than the image of color gives to the eyes. [p. 66] If you think something beyond this act is excited in Imagination, this will be in the organ of phantasy as the faculty of harming is in an inflamed eye, not as it is an instrument of sight, but as it is affected contrary to nature.

You will understand this more clearly if you consider with yourself what is true: that the act of Imagination remains in the one imagining and is transferred to no other thing. Who would think that an action remaining in a human being can change something outside the human being? This belongs to God alone and to no creature. Certainly every action occurs through contact, and for this reason a determinate space or interval is required by which the agent can reach the patient with its power. Therefore all learned men of all ages, together with Aristotle in book 9 of the Metaphysics, have most skillfully and truly judged that a transitive action is not in the agent but in the patient. From this it necessarily follows that only those actions constitute something outside the effector which do not remain in the effector but pass into the patient. But every Imagination is an act remaining in the one imagining. For it is a kind of sensing. Indeed, no one, I think, is so crude and absurd as to suppose that the vision of my eyes or the hearing of my ears is at the same time in another person besides me. For how would my hearing and vision be the hearing of another? Thus neither can my imagination be thought to be someone else’s imagination, although just as nothing prevents two people from seeing the same thing, so too nothing forbids them from imagining the same thing. Nevertheless there are two imaginations, since there are two imaginers.

Furthermore, no comprehension or perception can be taken as a transitive action. For just as vision is not outside the eyes, nor do the eyes, by seeing, insofar as they see, change colors, so neither can Imagination alter any external thing whose species it actually contemplates and judges within itself. Certainly things that appear white, for example, suffer no more if they are looked upon by a thousand people than if they are seen by [p. 67] no one at all. For a sensible thing is not changed by the action of sense, through which an animal is accustomed to suffer and receive, not to act, unless perhaps the organ is endowed with some bad condition, which nevertheless is accidental to sense and does not belong to it per se. For what changes and acts differs most widely from what receives and knows. Therefore no learned person seeks the affections of the mind that cause motion in a receptive power, but in an active potency equipped with instruments suitable for motion. But Imagination is an act of the soul receiving, judging, and representing to the intellect the images impressed upon the senses, in the way the senses received, judged, and transmitted the same images from the objects placed before them to Phantasy. Therefore Phantasy can no more move imagined things by its act than the eye can move things seen, or the Intellect things known. If the things themselves could be changed by the faculties of knowing, then each thing would now be such as each person had judged it either by sense, Imagination, or intellect. Nothing more alien to truth can even be imagined.

FURNIUS. Those men did not mean this, as far as I judge, as is clear even from the fact that they assert that imagination can do nothing of this kind without an accompanying vehement appetite. But because nothing can be desired without prior apprehension, they said that Imagination does what the joined desire accomplishes, as happens in pregnant women. For they imprint something on the fetus not because they imagined it, but because at the same time they anxiously desired it.

ERASTUS. Then they wrongly posit imagination as the cause if appetite accomplishes those things. For just as no one will rightly assign to the Intellect what belongs to the will, so the things that pertain to appetite neither should nor can be attributed to imagination. For just as the understood good is the object of the will, by which it is moved as by an end, so the good comprehended by imagination is the object of Appetite. Therefore the office of Imagination is to conceive the appearances supplied by the senses, to judge them, and to represent them to the Intellect, [p. 68] not to move toward having or doing. Imagination is to the desire of having or fleeing something what the intellect is to the will. For in each case the apprehension of the good and pleasant is followed by the appetition of that same thing, which is utterly different from perception or cognition. Thus Imagination is so far from possessing any power of changing, moving, or effecting anything in another body that it cannot even be called the effective principle of any true motion in its own body. For it does not move by commanding or effecting, but by representing and judging, as we said about the Intellect.

FURNIUS. I am surprised that you do not notice that you are gradually deserting from the camp of your Aristotle. For he thought and wrote very differently, both elsewhere and in the book On the Motion of Animals, chapter 7, saying as follows: “Imaginations, sensations, and thoughts alter. For sensations are immediately certain alterations. Phantasy and Intellect, however, have the faculty of things. Τρόπον γάρ τινα τὸ εἶδος τὸ νοούμενον τὸ τοῦ θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ ἢ ἡδέος ἢ φοβεροῦ τοιοῦτον τυγχάνει ὄν, οἷόνπερ καὶ τῶν πραγμάτων ἕκαστον· διὸ καὶ φρίττουσιν καὶ φοβοῦνται καὶ νοήσαντες μόνον. ταῦτα δὲ πάντα πάθη καὶ ἀλλοιώσεις εἰσίν — ‘For in a certain way the intelligible form of what is hot or cold, pleasant or fearful, happens to be such as each of the things themselves is; therefore people also shudder and fear merely by thinking. And all these are affections and alterations.’”

In these words many things are worthy of consideration. First, he says that Imaginations and senses alter, which you deny. Second, concerning sensibles he sets this down as certain; but concerning imagination and Intellect he proves it by this argument: that although they do not have the things themselves, they nevertheless retain the power of those things. This again he shows from the fact that a species perceived by Phantasy or mind becomes similar to the things themselves. For, he says, merely thinking about cold and a terrifying thing, people become cold and afraid. Since these are alterations, it is agreed that Images and thoughts alter. Near the end of the book he repeats almost the same things. For after he had said that the natural motions of the parts, and those made beyond reason, occur ἀλλοιώσεως [p. 69] συμπεσούσης — “when an alteration has occurred” — he adds the cause, saying: “For Imagination and Intellect, as was said before, τὰ ποιητικὰ τῶν πραγμάτων προσφέρουσι· τὰ γὰρ εἴδη τῶν ποιητικῶν προσφέρουσι — ‘bring forward the efficient principles of the things; for they bring forward the forms of the efficient causes.’”

ERASTUS. If Aristotle had said anything in the present passage alien to truth, I would not hesitate to abandon him and cling to truth, which must be more ancient for us than the authority of any man, however great and distinguished. Indeed, I am not one of those partisan men who would rather betray truth than depart from the man whom they have chosen as the leader of their studies. I showed that the species received in imagination are nothing other than effigies and images of things, and therefore can have no power other than that of representing or figuring. For just as someone who seals wax with a ring, Aristotle says in the second book On the Soul and in the book On Memory and Recollection, leaves only the sign in the wax, without any quality or power of gold, silver, or iron, so sensible things imprint species or images upon the senses, especially upon sight and hearing, which lack every real quality and nature of the objects. By what reasoning, then, are they thought to do anything other than represent the things of which they are images?

FURNIUS. How then did Aristotle say that Imagination alters?

ERASTUS. Insofar as the species offer things that are efficient causes, that is, pleasant or sad things, as is very clear from the last words of his which you cited. For whenever Imagination judges the thing whose species it has conceived to be pleasant and suitable, the appetite pursues it, using the spirits as its instrument; from their motion the body is altered. Therefore Phantasy is said to alter because it has within itself the species of a desirable thing, which moves like an end and is itself a mover not moved. Aristotle explains this whole matter expressly in the second book On the Soul, where in chapter 10, among other things, he says that τὸ ὀρεκτόν — “the object of desire” — first moves without being moved τῷ νοηθῆναι ἢ φαντασθῆναι — “by being understood or imagined.” Therefore Phantasy moves insofar as it judges some thing sweet or [p. 70] unpleasant; but in itself it is not a principle of motion in any other way. Aristotle explained this by the example of the medical art, saying that a person possessing medical art does not heal insofar as he possesses the art, as though the principle of motion, that is, of medication, were something else. For the physician is impelled to heal either by hope of gain, or by pity for the sick person, or by some other similar cause; he is not stirred to the work by his art. For art is a rule of acting rightly. According to its prescription the physician indeed acts when aroused by some desirable object, but the art is not that principle by which he is moved to operate according to the precept of the art he possesses.

The matter is almost the same in Imagination, which neither itself flees nor pursues anything, but proposes and shows what things should be fled or sought. Aristotle taught this most skillfully in these words: ὅλως μὲν οὖν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ᾗ ὀρεκτικὸν τὸ ζῷον, ταύτῃ ἑαυτοῦ κινητικόν· ὀρεκτικὸν δὲ οὐκ ἄνευ φαντασίας — “In general, then, as has been said, insofar as the animal is appetitive, in this respect it is self-moving; but it is not appetitive without imagination.” Nothing, I think, could be said that more clearly declares and more firmly proves our proposition. Certainly Phantasy moves without appetite no more than the medical art moves without the desire to heal. Therefore Aristotle truly affirmed that the opinion of a terrifying thing terrifies us, but that Imagination of such things affects us no differently than if we were looking at a painting, whenever we are persuaded that the horrifying things we imagine in this way do not pertain to us. From these points it is clearly evident that Imagination does not move by itself alone, but only represents the species of things that move; yet, when joined with appetite, it moves to this extent, insofar as it has judged the imagined things either pleasant and to be sought, or sad and to be fled.

Nor did Aristotle say or think anything else in the passage cited by you. “Phantasy and Intellect,” he says, “have the δύναμις — the power or capacity — of things.” He does not say that the things themselves are present in Phantasy, but a certain faculty of them. He proves this as follows: species that have in themselves, in some way, the same efficient causes that the things whose species they are can produce [p. 71] have in themselves, in some way, the powers of those things. But the species of Imagination do in some way the same thing which the things themselves are accustomed to do. For those who merely understand or imagine cold and terrifying things become cold or afraid as if the things themselves were present. Therefore Imagination also possesses the δύναμις, or faculty, of those same things. Thus Imagination and Intellect have within themselves, not indeed the things themselves, but the species of things representing the cold and terror which the thing itself brings; and in this respect they are said to retain the power of those things. Therefore at the end of the book he said that Imagination offers efficient things insofar as it offers the species of things.

FURNIUS. Aristotle says in explicit words that senses, Phantasy, and Intellect are alterations, and therefore he did not think that the species expressed in Imagination were merely bare representations.

ERASTUS. If you wish this to be understood of spiritual and perfective alteration, we could easily agree. But when you think that the species of cold received in Imagination is not only representationally but also actually cold, we shall never be able to agree, since it has been demonstrated that those species are not real and therefore cannot by themselves induce material alteration. They alter accidentally, however, because, by representing something pleasant or sad, they move the appetite, and through this the spirits that have been moved produce different motions in the spirits and humors.

FURNIUS. Will you then deny that sensations too are material alterations? Certainly Aristotle, in the words cited earlier, clearly says that sensations are immediately and without a medium alterations: αἱ γὰρ αἰσθήσεις, he says, ἄνευ μέσου ἀλλοιώσεις τινές εἰσι — “for sensations are certain alterations without a medium.”

ERASTUS. Even if I granted you this concerning all the external senses, nevertheless it cannot be conceded concerning the internal senses, about which we are now disputing between ourselves. For when at the beginning he had said that sense, Phantasy, and Intellect alter, he soon says that the external senses are immediately certain alterations; but as for the internal senses, such as Phantasy, he by no means affirms that they are alteration in the same way, [p. 72] but asserts only that they have the faculty or δύναμις of things. And lest anyone think that those images truly have the power of the things whose images they are, he explains himself, saying: “For the species is similar in a certain way,” that is, it has a faculty similar to the things themselves. But if you ask what that way is, he replies that it is representation. For they represent and signify whether the things they represent are to be sought or avoided. This cannot happen unless it has first been known whether the thing is congruent or incongruent with the animal. Therefore, he says, when the animal merely understands or imagines something terrible, it shudders and grows cold. Accordingly, the imagined species does not introduce cold and shuddering insofar as it is a species existing in Imagination, for in this way mirrors too would be heated and cooled by such things, but insofar as it has been judged pleasant or sad, that is, insofar as it seems either to be sought or to be rejected. For, as I noted above from Aristotle, when we imagine the most absurd terrors, from which we know that no evil can befall us, we are affected just as if we were looking at an empty and fictitious painting. Therefore the imagined species alters not per se, but accidentally, namely insofar as it represents a convenient or inconvenient thing, and through appetite the spirits, once moved, induce alterations.

FURNIUS. But I do not see why, if the species of sensible things have the power of altering, which you seem to concede with Aristotle, the images or species of imagination should not also retain the same power.

ERASTUS. I do not concede that all species of sensible things induce real, or material, or passive alteration, but only those of taste and especially of touch, about which Aristotle speaks chiefly in the passage cited by you. Sight and Hearing receive only the species of things situated at a distance. Taste and Touch receive the sensible qualities themselves, not only their spiritual species. For taste does not sense [p. 73] flavors, nor touch tangible qualities, unless they touch the instruments of these senses. Since animals are nourished not by the species of foods and drinks, but by foods and drinks themselves, and since these must penetrate inside the bodies, it was rightly brought about that taste perceive the flavors themselves, by no means separated from the subject things. For this reason it dwells in that one part of the body through which nature has prepared the path for foods into the stomach. Touch, however, since it had to sense the kinds of things by which an animal is destroyed or preserved, nature extended through the whole body. The parts of animals do not suffer from the spiritual species of tangible qualities, but from the qualities themselves, which they encounter from time to time. Since these qualities are also present in the foods themselves by which each thing is nourished, they deservedly had to sense the qualities themselves. We are nourished by the same things from which we consist. But the parts of animals consist of things that have tangible qualities in themselves, not of things that would possess only species. From this it follows that we are also nourished by things endowed with those qualities. It was not necessary, however, that colors and perfumed air enter our bodies, but it was enough that these be perceived. For these senses serve first and principally cognition; they are not necessary to the being of animals in the same way as taste and touch. It was therefore enough if species were received by sight and hearing.

FURNIUS. If what you say, and indeed plausibly, is true, then what Aristotle affirmed must be false: that a sensible placed upon the sense is not sensed. For flavor and heat are sensed when placed upon the instruments of these senses themselves; and not every sensation occurs through a medium.

ERASTUS. It does not follow that, if there is a medium, only the spiritual species is received in the sense and not also the sensible quality. For Aristotle posits a twofold medium: external or alien, and connatural. The former he attributes to sight and hearing, the latter to taste and touch. Olfaction, just as it is intermediate, is also almost akin to both. [p. 74] He says that the former is first changed by the object of sense, and that the sense is then affected by it. But he asserts that the latter is struck together with the sense. He explains this by the example of a man being struck through a shield that has been thrust forward or struck. Just as, he says, the shield is not struck first and then the man by it, but both at once, so the matter stands in the sensation of flavors and tangible qualities. For the medium and the sense are affected at the same time. And just as a man can be knocked down when struck without a shield, so tangible things can be perceived by touch without a medium.

But I candidly confess that here I disagree with Aristotle, compelled by the very evidence of things. For although in taste there is a medium, namely moisture, nevertheless it does not move taste, even according to Aristotle himself, except insofar as it has flavor actually mixed in. In touch, however, no such medium at all may be imagined as is required for vision. For even if you posit the ἐπιδερμίς — the epidermis, or outer skin — you will have gained nothing. For when this has been removed, the skin senses more accurately and quickly the fire, water, and other things placed upon it. And if you strip the flesh bare of skin, it is more harmed and senses more sharply. If you also separate this from the nerve, the nerve will sense whatever is applied most sharply and most quickly. Certainly our Galen seems to have thought some things much more correctly than Aristotle.

FURNIUS. Then you deny that it is true that all senses receive species without the things whose species they are?

ERASTUS. I deny it if by “things” you understand sensible qualities and are speaking of the instruments of the external senses. For concerning the internal senses, such as common sense, which is the chief sense, and Phantasy, it is most true. For Phantasy or common sense is not heated or cooled by the species of heat or cold in the same way as skin, flesh, nerves, and so on. From this it is clearly perceived that the distinction is altogether very great. From what has been said, it is evident that Phantasy, neither when it lacks a species nor when it actually considers one, is the effecting cause of imagined things. But that the species themselves painted in Imagination do nothing per se other than represent has been most clearly demonstrated. [p. 75] So that even the most uneducated may understand this, I must refute the incredible negligence, or ignorance, or error, or whatever else one may wish to call it, of Pietro Pomponazzi, before we pass to other matters, unless something else seems good to you.

FURNIUS. Although I am not much concerned with what Pomponazzi wrote, nevertheless, since you judge the explanation of this matter useful to our disputation, I shall gladly hear it.

ERASTUS. Pomponazzi, in his book On Incantations, a thoroughly impious and wicked work, foully and disgracefully abuses Aristotle’s testimony, which he cites for his own purpose, in order to excuse and even establish the tricks of fraudulent Magi. For from those words he attempts to show that the spiritual species of a thing produces the thing itself of which it is the species, provided both that the agent is strong and that the patient is duly disposed. Scarcely any greater madness could befall a man professing himself a disciple of Aristotle. For who, versed in Aristotle’s writings, does not know that each thing acts in the way and to the extent that it is? But the species existing in Imagination has a very slight being, namely a spiritual one; nor are these species anything other than spectres or appearances and images. Therefore they can do nothing other than represent and figure, and that in a spiritual mode. If you think that they do anything more, they will act above their own act, above their own nature and powers.

That they do nothing other than represent the things of which they are certain images is very plainly perceived from this: that an animal neither embraces nor flees such phantasms within itself, but pursues and avoids the things themselves placed outside itself, which those phantasms represent. Nature herself has taught that these are neither to be fled nor sought, since they are nothing other than images of things to be fled or sought and certain representations of them. Certainly Aristotle thought that objects are movers unmoved, and that they move as ends. He never and nowhere affirmed that the images of the object move otherwise than by representing. Who has ever feared the image of the Turkish prince [p. 76] as an enemy, or thought that danger was being created for him by it? Yet who, looking at it, does not think within himself how great is the cruelty and power of that prince or tyrant? But the species of any thing has no more power than the image of the Turkish Emperor possesses that power by which the Turk, supported by it, terrifies his neighbors. As the image represents the Turk to us and possesses no other power, so those species set before us things to be known; and this is all and only their power.

Let us also consider from what matter that species produces the things themselves. For whatever comes to be is not only something that comes to be, but also comes to be from something, by something, and in something. We have as architect the species impressed in imagination. We know what is made, for now we posit that things outside us are made which we have imagined within us, namely the things represented by the species. But from what matter those things are produced, and in what place they are generated, has not yet been declared. Yet this too is most worthy of wonder: that he makes a species, which is nothing real, as they say in the Schools, the maker of things, as though the image of gold were the producer of true gold. If Pomponazzi knew this to be true, he acted very inhumanely in not teaching the Chymists, so that they would not henceforth blow into poisonous ashes in vain, at such great danger to themselves. He sinned still more gravely in not showing this golden Medusa to those most unhappy men who think of nothing but gold, whether awake or asleep, so that by gazing upon her more fixedly they might all be turned into gold and at last satisfy that sacred hunger of theirs.

This is still more admirable: that it fashions gold from no matter. I suppose the species itself is not transformed into gold, since it is nothing real. Nor will it transform itself, since there is in it no diversity of nature. But neither, I think, will it construct gold from spirit, since the spirits are not present in such quantity in the brain that from them, once condensed, a grain of gold could be made. Will it therefore create gold from the humors [p. 77] or from the brain itself? Then the former would become unfit for nourishment, the latter unfit for the actions of life. But if someone who imagines intently and fixedly can obtain what he desires without matter, then both physicians and patients are very foolish, because the former wish to cure, and the latter to recover, not rather by the powers of imagination, but by the powers of remedies, many of them most unpleasant. Indeed, all arts are useless and foolish, all human studies vain; riches, knowledge, and virtues are sought through labors and dangers in vain, since fixed and intense imagination can provide all these things. If this is posited, Phantasy will be not only the noblest among natural things, but plainly divine, and indeed a certain god. For to make bodies from a non-body is the action of creative power, which God has communicated to no creature.

Meanwhile it is certain that, although he posits spirits as instruments and blood as the matter from which things are brought forth through the instruments just mentioned, he remembers none of this. Most astonishing is that, when Aristotle says that species are τρόπον τινά — “in a certain way” — similar to things, Pomponazzi asserts that the things themselves can be generated by them, especially since Aristotle explains in what respect they are similar, namely insofar as they represent known things, τὰ πράγματα — “the things.” If they could produce the things they represent, appetite would never seek anything beyond the species themselves. But appetite does not seek the phantasms it has within itself, but those things placed outside, which the images conceived in phantasy only signify.

FURNIUS. Nevertheless he proves his opinion by experiments, and additionally by reason. Aristotle, he says, in the ninth book of the History of Animals, in the penultimate chapter, says that victorious hens raise their combs and tails, become similar to cocks, and attempt to mate with hens coming upon them, so that it is difficult to know whether they are cocks or hens. But he says that certain cocks have also been observed to perform the office of mothers, and some from birth came forth so feminized that they suffered other cocks [p. 78] mounting them. Soon afterwards he transcribes many things from Marsilio Ficino about the four affections of the mind; among these, those things he recounts concerning the desires of pregnant women, fascinations, and the appetite of gluttons do not seem contemptible. Finally he proves it by this reason: Ideas are in the divine mind, in the Intelligences, and in our Soul κατ᾽ ἀναλογίαν — “by analogy.” Therefore, just as God created the world through Ideas without instruments, and the Ideas of the Intelligences execute their operations through the heavens as perpetual instruments, so the Ideas of our Soul execute their operations through corruptible instruments, spirit and blood.

ERASTUS. That is certainly a splendid and plainly Peripatetic argument, of course. Who has ever conceded that an Idea, insofar as it is an Idea or exemplar, is an efficient cause? Certainly all philosophers, even the Platonists who defend the exemplary cause, have distinguished it from the efficient cause. For it is not an effecting cause, but an exemplar according to which the efficient cause fashions something. Above, from Aristotle, I taught that the medical art is not the principle of medication, but a norm and rule; just as the image of a house in the mind of the builder is not the efficient cause of building or of the house, but is the exemplar according to whose likeness the builder constructs the house. But if Ideas in God create, they differ most widely from the Ideas of our souls, which are nothing other than images of things perceived by the senses. Therefore they cannot be compared. For the Idea in God, concerning the Intelligences and their Ideas we shall say something later in its proper place, is not an accident in God; but in us it is an accident, and indeed a spiritual, not a real one, which is present and absent infinitely often. This argument, therefore, is not only sophistical, but utterly tasteless and most worthy of Pomponazzi the enchanter.

FURNIUS. You deny that an Idea or exemplar acts, although experience itself, the teacher of things, shows us the contrary. What then? Do you not daily seal letters with your ring, impressing the image of the engraving upon wax? Here certainly the image of the ring fashions a similar image in the wax. [p. 79]

ERASTUS. I was right to say that no image, insofar as it is only an image, effects anything other than representation. For to be an image is to be a representation. If it does anything besides this, it is no longer merely an image, but has another nature joined with the essence of an image. Thus in a gold or iron ring there is not only an image, but inequality and hardness of parts. For some parts are raised, others depressed. From these, not from the image insofar as it is an image, some parts of the wax are depressed more, others less, so that they may render an image similar to the one in the ring. You will understand plainly that the matter is so if you impress the image either in water or in the softest wax, and then wish to seal another piece of wax with it. You will labor in vain, as is evident. The reason is that the parts of water and wax are not hard, as are those of iron, gold, and stones. But if the impression on wax were made not by the hardness of the matter in which the image is, but by the image insofar as it is an image, then, the same image existing in matter however soft, you would be able to engrave a similar image into any matter whatever.

FURNIUS. I do not deny it.

ERASTUS. The experiments he brings forward prove just as much. For because some hen fought and won, do the species of Phantasy therefore produce the things imagined? Who told Pomponazzi that that hen imagined victory and the nature of a cock? Hens often win, indeed some win every day, and yet they do not change their natures as a result. If this ever happened, it happened not because of an imagination of triumph produced by victory, but because of the masculine nature of the hen, which was the cause of the victory; victory, however, did not finally produce such a nature. Nor would it have been impossible, even if it has happened rarely, for a hen to be changed into a cock, or to acquire an affinity with the nature of a cock, if what Hippocrates in book 6 of the Epidemics, Pliny in book 7, chapter 4, Livy in book 4 of the Punic War, and Amatus Lusitanus, century 2, cure 39, wrote about women changed into men or viragos is true. Certainly many viragos are born in all times and places. [p. 80] There is no reason why this could not also happen sometimes by analogy in other kinds. What he cites from Marsilio about affections of the mind moves me little. For the things he says that are true I have already shown in what respect they arise from Phantasy. The false things he recounts can be reckoned among his other fables. For that man was, as of the Platonists, so also of all Platonic superstition more than sufficiently zealous and too credulous.

FURNIUS. I myself too do not greatly value such things; but what is commonly believed and ascertained about the desire of pregnant women, about gluttons, and about fascinations at least renders Pomponazzi’s cause probable. Indeed, that we should persuade ourselves that Imagination, insofar as it is Imagination, is efficacious in conceptions, or at least is, as it were, an exemplar and a certain Idea, according to whose likeness the formative power fashions the fetus, we are moved not only by those things which are commonly reported and written, and which someone could deny with plausible reason, but much more by the example of Sacred Scripture, about whose truth and certainty no one may doubt. For in Genesis chapter 30 we read that Jacob increased his own flock by this method, having placed varicolored rods in those troughs to which the sheep were led for drinking. From the same cause most people derive the likeness of children. Indeed, by this reasoning they think that hens and peahens sitting on eggs hatch white chicks or chicks colored otherwise when white cloths or cloths painted with another color have been stretched before them, upon which they continually look during the time of incubation.

ERASTUS. As far as hens and peahens are concerned, what is written is false. Nor is it necessary for me to bid you test it, since many, when they tried it, were extremely amazed at the carelessness and drowsiness of writers who copy anything from others without examination; and you can perceive the matter by reason, endowed as you are with a happy intellect. For the heat of the incubating animal does not give form [p. 81] to the egg, but merely strengthens the innate heat of the eggs, so that according to its own nature it may fashion what it was made to fashion. If it gave form and nature, a hen, goose, duck, or peahen would never hatch from eggs placed beneath it any chicks other than those of its own kind. But it is agreed that by their brooding hens and other birds hatch chickens, ducklings, goslings, peacocks, and other young, if eggs of those different kinds are placed beneath them to be warmed. Thus also the heats of our stomachs, aided by external heat, digest ingested foods more successfully, each according to its own nature, not according to the nature of the heat that approaches. For external heat only strengthens the internal heats of eggs and stomachs when sluggish and torpid, and arouses them to act; it does not confer the nature of acting. Therefore the heat that arouses and increases the heat of a goose egg hatches a goose, that of a duck egg a duck, that of a hen’s egg a chicken; by itself alone it does nothing other than heat.

You will understand this most plainly if you weigh these two things with yourself. First, the same heat which from fertile eggs of different kinds generates such different offspring generates nothing from sterile eggs, but by the same warming by which it renders the former, so to speak, living, it makes the latter rot. Secondly, the same can be done by the heat of fire, of the sun, of dung, and of ovens. For the heat of the sun, fire, and dung matures the eggs of many animals; the warmth of ovens, corresponding to the heat of hens, hatches chicks anywhere just as successfully.

Concerning the likeness of offspring, the matter is very ambiguous. If imagination can do anything here by its own powers, it does so at the time of formation rather than conception. For not only imagination, but also the other faculties of the soul then seem so impeded and languid, as if the animal suffered something epileptic; this I have read was noted by Aristotle and by certain writers even older than he. Indeed, the more prudent writers referred it chiefly to the property of the seed, and everything [p. 82] agrees with their opinion. For animals that possess imagination, even if they conceive while blind and are unable to see and imagine the male, such as mares and dogs, nevertheless generate foals and puppies similar to males. The same also happens in those animals which almost entirely lack imagination. Add that among birds males almost always come forth like males and females like females, which certainly would not happen if imagination changed anything in them. But in human beings, when a sober person abstains from wine, or someone recoiling from cheese or onions or some other thing abstains from it, or when someone generates a child either recoiling from the same thing as the parent, or similar neither to the mother nor to himself, but to some ancestor whom the woman perhaps never saw, such as a grandfather or great-grandfather, this must be ascribed not to the mother’s imagination, to whom perhaps such things never came to mind, but to the seed. Thus those suffering from stone, gout, and so on, are born because of the quality of the seed, not because of the mother’s imagination, since she wishes such diseases neither for herself nor for her children.

As far as the deed of the patriarch Jacob is concerned, this was a miracle; it did not happen naturally, as is clear from chapter 31. Indeed, if Pomponazzi’s imagination were true, the species of the variegated rods engraved in the Phantasy of the sheep ought to have produced not variegated sheep, but variegated rods. Yet that species did not generate sheep; rather, the skin of the sheep was varied according to the variety of the rods. That this was a divine rather than a natural work is also shown sufficiently by the fact that neither Jacob nor anyone else either before or after that time attempted the same thing with equal success, even though it is altogether credible that very many wished to try it. Nor would the various rods placed by Laban in the watering troughs have had the same effect, because God had decreed to take the flock from him and hand it over to Jacob. But what need is there of words? Let the marks of things expressly present in Phantasy have this power, namely that they are exemplars according to whose figure conceptions are formed, although it has been demonstrated that they are not causes; nevertheless the architect will have to be sought. [p. 83]

FURNIUS. The effector is the formative power.

ERASTUS. But this power has no need of an exemplar. Just as, existing in the seed of lettuce, it generates and fashions lettuce without an exemplar, so too in human seed it completes its work, so that it has no need to look upon an exemplar. Then it has no efficiency outside its own body, indeed outside the seed in which it is present. For just as the power found in lettuce seed has no powers in another seed, such as fennel, so the formative faculty present in one woman can neither be present nor act in another. For as one soul informs one body and cannot even be conceived outside it insofar as it is a form, so neither can the formative potency, which is the proper power of each soul, be imagined outside its own body. Therefore nothing else will be proved by all these examples, even if they are granted to be as true as possible, than that the soul, aroused by a rather vehement appetition, stirs diverse motions in its own body. I have never doubted this, nor have I known anyone else to doubt it. Certainly, if we were lacking other arguments, melancholic persons alone would splendidly teach us what should be thought about this matter. The question is not whether the mind, disturbed in various ways, affects the spirits and humors in various ways, and according to their varied motion excites varied diseases in the body, but whether what an animal thinks or imagines it can, by imagining, generate outside itself and impress upon another body, often even one far distant. As far as pregnant women are concerned, it is more certain than certain that none has ever, by her desire and appetition, however intense, changed another body. If it were in the power of women to mark others’ fetuses rather than their own with the marks of things desired, none would mark their own; all would mark others’. But lest you object to us the images of beautiful things, know that we are speaking of ugly ones. And certainly infants more often bear marks of terrifying things [p. 84] than figures of things desired.

FURNIUS. Nor do I think that pregnant women mark others’ conceptions by imagining the things they desire; but that they impress upon their own fetuses the figures of all sorts of things is too manifest to be denied. Yet the fetus is not part of the body, but, as it were, a certain alien body; and therefore it by no means seems that one should deny that vehement appetition can act upon an alien body.

ERASTUS. No one denies that by the more vehement affections of the soul the spirits and blood are moved turbulently, and that by their turbulent motion the body is gravely affected. This happens because the spirits serve and obey the appetitions of the soul, since they are its first instrument. Imagination moves appetite without a bodily instrument, but appetite moves the body through a bodily instrument: ὅδε κινεί ὄρεξιν, ἡ δὲ σωματικόν ἐστίν — “this moves desire, and that is bodily.” But it moves its own spirits, not absent and foreign ones; and therefore another person does not go or run when I will it, even if I will it most vehemently. For my soul has its own spirits as its instrument, and commands them when they are present; it cannot move those existing under the rule of another soul, since it does not touch them and has no agreement with them. For the soul generates its own instruments for itself within its own body, which it informs, and outside which it has no power. What of the fact that even its own spirits, when somewhat disturbed by heat, cold, exercise, and other things, it does not have obedient to it? And since all the actions of which we are speaking occur through spirits, not any spirits whatsoever, but fitting ones, which are moved by the will in voluntary motions and by imagination in venereal and other such matters, as was said above, the soul, if it is posited to move an alien body, will move it either through its own spirits or through others. But it can do so through neither. It remains, therefore, that it cannot even move alien bodies. [p. 85]

Moreover, that it cannot move alien bodies through alien spirits needs no proof; indeed, it has now been proved abundantly enough. This opinion refutes itself by its own absurdity and injustice. For it would be just as if I abused your goods and your household servants against your will for your own destruction. But that it cannot move any body outside that of which it is the form, even through its own spirits, I remember that we have demonstrated clearly enough above. For they ought not to go out; and once they have advanced beyond the skin, they are not subject to the soul’s governance, nor do they have a director, nor can they be preserved in the air, since they are often dissolved within the body and bring sudden death to the animal.

Then, since there must be agreement and proportion between mover, moved, and instruments, the spirit that is in me will not be able to move my body unless the same cause that made the whole body such and so great also created so many and such spirits. For it was not one cause that formed the body in the beginning and another that afterwards inserted spirits into it; but both were made by this one craftsman, and are also preserved until the end, life being from one and the same cause, each in its own natural manner. Indeed, if we must speak accurately, the spirits were the effectors of the members. For through their ministry the formative power fashioned from the underlying matter, as far as it could, members suited to its instrument, according to their quality and abundance. It is agreed, moreover, that it can scarcely, indeed hardly at all, happen that we find two human beings entirely similar in temperament; this is splendidly demonstrated by the incredible variety of talents, thoughts, plans, actions, and morals, the unlike figures of bodies, and dissimilar inclinations. Therefore, even if I were especially to grant you that spirits pass unharmed from my body to yours and wish to carry out the commands of their soul, it would nevertheless remain uncertain whether there were between your body [p. 86] and my spirits the agreement required for exciting motion. For just as not any soul can animate any body, nor can it fittingly use a spirit affected in any way whatsoever, for no one would be insane, no one would be afflicted by diseases at all, and no one would die, if the soul could inhabit any body whatever and conveniently use the operation of any spirits whatever, so neither is the spirit of any body suitable for moving that body; rather, the body and the spirits must have been preserved from the same matter.

Aristotle explains this matter divinely in the first book On the Soul, chapter 3, reproving the ancients who fitted the soul to the body but did not teach in what kind of body it is fit to dwell, since it is agreed that each matter has its own form; and ἄλλως τῶν κοινωνιῶν τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν, τὸ δὲ πάσχειν· καὶ τὸ μὲν κινεῖν, τὸ δὲ κινεῖσθαι — “moreover, in associations one thing must act and another suffer; one must move and another be moved.” Nor can any thing move any other thing whatsoever that happens to meet it, as the Pythagoreans fabled. Finally, in conclusion, he says: ὡς ἄρα πλησίον δὲ λέγουσιν, ὥσπερ εἴ τις φαίη τὴν τεχνικὴν εἰς αὐλοὺς ἐνδύεσθαι. δεῖ γὰρ τῶν μὲν τεχνῶν χρῆσθαι τοῖς ὀργάνοις, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν τῷ σώματι — “They speak almost as absurdly as if someone were to say that the art of flute-playing clothes itself in flutes. For arts must use their instruments, and the soul must use the body.”

You are also mistaken when you think that the embryo is, as it were, an alien body. Since it is nourished by the same blood as the rest of the body, and since the same spirits are poured into it through the arteries and veins by which it is continuous with the body, it rightly suffers together with the body. And it suffers so much the more easily, and senses the motions of the spirits so much the more quickly, the more tender that mass is than the other members. Let this be an argument for you: that a fetus already grown and formed is very rarely, not to say never, marked. For the greatest danger is at the time when the formative power is occupied in the production of parts and members. Since at that time it uses not only the heat and spirit existing in the seed, but also those flowing in through the arteries, veins, and nerves, it is no wonder if motions made in the mother’s spirit are derived all the way into the fetus. Hence it happens that infants more frequently receive marks of sudden fear [p. 87] and terror than signs of things desired. For the spirits serving irrational appetition are often the causes of accidents of this kind. Hence the animal is shaken and trembles almost at the same moment at which the sense is struck unexpectedly either by noise or by a terrifying sight, before it is possible to reason to what extent what thus presents itself should be fled. Hence it happens that, once the thing is known, we are often ashamed of our trembling. Aristotle explains the cause of this sudden motion most elegantly in the book On the Motion of Animals, chapter 8, and near the end of the book he calls them παρὰ τὸν λόγον γενομένας κινήσεις — “motions occurring apart from reason.” Nor will you have difficulty perceiving Aristotle’s meaning and the weight of his arguments if you remember that all the powers of the soul are faculties of one and the same substance, and if you carefully observe what he says there.

To this belong the motion of certain parts in the imagination of venereal things, and the disgust of the stomach at the mention or sight of food that causes nausea. I mention this so that you do not think with many people that such marks are the offspring of desire rather than of sudden fear and terror. From this you will also perceive a second point: that those signs appearing in infants rarely arise from more intense imagination, more often from a sudden accident, about which the woman has hardly ever thought either before or afterwards. To these you may also add that no woman would give birth to her infant shamefully marked if she impressed the mark by imagining. For no woman desires that her son come into this light marked by an ugly sign; rather, she fears the contrary, lest something of this sort happen against her will. Therefore it is clearer than the midday light that the spirits do not then serve imagination and do something wholly other than appetite has commanded. From this everyone understands that it is not a work of imagination that one person is born more inclined to music, another to philosophy, another to medicine, civic life, or military service, although Paracelsus boldly affirms this. But if, therefore, the spirits existing within the woman’s own body do not obey appetite, [p. 88] how do you wish me to believe that they will carry out commands outside the body? These things happen in almost the same way as unexpected consternation, of which we have spoken, and fainting of the mind occur; these would happen to no one if the spirits simply obeyed our will.

From what has just been said, it is manifest that these things are true. First, pregnant women mark no children other than their own with those marks of which we are speaking. Secondly, they unwillingly impress those figures, especially ugly ones, upon their fetuses, unless perhaps some woman, more savage than a beast, has cast off all humanity, and they uniquely desire to give birth to children free from every ugliness. Therefore what Paracelsus affirms in the book On Tartar, that the lame, hunchbacked, distorted, and others are generated as such by the imagination of the inner man, is fabulous. For neither the outer nor the inner woman, if there is any such human being, desires a malformed infant. Thirdly, it is much more frequently and more easily through sudden terrors from seeing an ugly and terrifying species that fetuses still tender are marked. Fourthly, it follows from what has been recounted that the spirits in this respect by no means obey imagination and will, since they deform the fetus beyond and contrary to the mother’s desire. Fifthly, such signs are generally engraved on the embryo while it is being formed in the womb, because then the matter is still full of spirits that easily receive impressions. Indeed, when the fetus has been perfectly formed and made larger, it receives a new form not much less reluctantly than the mother’s body does. For then it is rather affected by some disease from a vehement and sudden disturbance, or is altogether killed, or is born before the appointed time. But while it is still formless, any figure whatever is very easily impressed upon it without other harm. Sixthly, these impressions are made by spirits suddenly struck and moved disorderly before reason measures the danger; and therefore this motion is more natural than voluntary. [p. 89] Finally, this example does nothing to help your cause, in which it is said that imagination changes alien bodies; this has been declared impossible. But even if this were conceded absolutely, it would prove nothing more than that by intense appetitions the spirits are moved in a disorderly manner and the humors disturbed, from which various diseases of body and mind arise.

FURNIUS. Pomponazzi too admits that agreement is required between agent, patient, and instrument. But he denies what you affirm, namely that an alien body cannot be so disposed that it obeys the action of alien spirits. Once this is posited, his opinion is not so absurd as it seems to you.

ERASTUS. Even if this could be especially demonstrated, though we have shown it to be impossible, this thesis would nevertheless be absurd. First, it is agreed that my soul does not rule spirits existing in an alien body, nor does another’s soul move spirits contained within my skin. For the rule of each soul is confined within the boundaries of its own body, unless perhaps, with Pliny, book 7, chapter 52, you think that our souls also wander abroad after deserting their bodies. Therefore each soul moves the spirits contained within its own body and proper to it. How, then, will it move an alien body by these spirits of its own? Indeed, the connate spirits do not go out, or at least ought not to go out. Then, by the surrounding air they are soon altered, corrupted, dissipated, once they have slipped out of the body. Thirdly, they do not have in themselves the powers of the soul as permanent things; rather, the soul uses them almost as a craftsman uses a hammer. For just as the power of the sunlight that is in animals departs and withdraws when the sun is absent, so the powers of the soul are present in the spirits and members while the soul is present, and are withdrawn when it is absent. But it is agreed that my soul imparts nothing to spirits that have slipped outside the body. Therefore, even if they are thought to have received some power while they were still in the body, nevertheless they cannot retain it outside the body any more than air can retain [p. 90] the light of the sun when the sun withdraws, or a hammer the art of the smith when the smith departs.

Finally, nothing is more certain than that only those spirits and only that body are ruled by the soul which it informs and vivifies. Certainly whenever some member is rendered unfit to receive life from the soul, it can never be moved and ruled by that soul. The soul cannot move, inform, and rule a dead body, an alien body, or a very ill-tempered body, but only a living body, its own, and one suitable to it, which it has fashioned and vivified for itself. Thus it suitably moves only those spirits which it has itself generated as suitable to itself; and it does not rightly use even these when they have been rendered unfit by any occasion. Therefore no spirits can be suited to its motions and actions except those which it has generated for itself from the congruent and familiar matter of the body informed by it. And even if we especially imagine that the spirits of others migrate to us, or ours pass to others, nevertheless they will not be able to move the soul to which they have come unless they at the same time transport the species to the intellect or phantasy which they received elsewhere. Nor can the soul use those foreign spirits any more than it can use any air entering the body. Therefore Aristotle, moved by a most serious argument, one that has far more weight than it seems to have, reproved the ancients for defining nothing about the body that receives the soul. Consequently Pomponazzi’s fantasy is in every way tasteless, empty, stupid, false, and foolish; it should not only be driven out with whips, but expelled with dire curses.

FURNIUS. I ask nothing further here. I should like to know briefly what you think about the appetite of gluttons.

ERASTUS. Concerning the saliva of gluttons, there is no reason for me to say anything other than to warn you not to allow that saliva to adulterate for you the taste of truth. If something of this kind ever happens, it was certainly such as Aristotle recounts in the book On Divination through Sleep in these words: “We think lightning falls and thunder occurs because of small [p. 91] sounds in the ears, and that the tongue is suffused with honey and sweet flavors when a thin phlegm trickles down.” For those who imagine something with such vehemence can easily be deceived, like people sleeping.

FURNIUS. What then? Will you also deny that menstruating women, if they look more closely into polished mirrors, sprinkle the mirrors with a bloody cloud by spirits emitted from their eyes?

ERASTUS. Entirely. For the spirits in the eyes cannot be so dyed by vapors raised from menstrual blood that they paint even the brightest mirrors with a bloody color. These spirits must be most pure and remain so. Then who would believe that spirits burst forth so immediately from the eyes that they cover mirrors as with a kind of cloud? An animal could not live long, and our mind would often abandon us when we inspect something intently, if so many spirits flew out at once, without which the soul can in no way dwell in the body. How many would exit through the other bodily passages, which are more open and more numerous, if so great a quantity is poured out from the eyes? I tell you: vision occurs by the reception of species, not by the ejection of spirits. In an animal rightly disposed these spirits do not go outside the body, but within it serve the soul for so long as they are thinned and dissolved. When they go out, this motion of theirs is no more congruent with nature than the outflow of blood through the nostrils or other parts.

I therefore deny that mirrors are stained by passing spirits. Then, if they are stained by spirits proceeding either from the eyes or from other parts, I deny that they are stained in that way. If it happens, it happens by vapors coming out from the nostrils, mouth, or other parts. You will be able to test it, if you please, since you have both a wife and marriageable daughters. Order them during menstruation to look intently and closely at themselves in the cleanest mirrors for as long as you wish, only take care that they do not breathe upon them through mouth or nostrils, and you will soon see what not clouds but trifles otherwise eminent men pour out upon us in a matter most clear and very easy to test. Indeed, you will see plainly that a mirror is sometimes stained by breath when one does not hold in the breath; but you will not see it dyed with red color. [p. 92] But how would the breath itself stain if it is not stained? Yet suppose that the breath paints the mirror with a red color, as bloody breath raised from stirred blood. Just as no one wonders that fire, having heat in itself, heats, and that putrid and poisonous exhalations putrefy and poison, since they contain these qualities in themselves, so no one should wonder that red vapors infect something with a red color. What is wondrous is that spirits painted with species alone, which is nothing real, produce things whose powers they do not have within themselves, but only a species or spiritual image, and this in a foreign body and often one far distant, when they deny that the breath of menstruating women contaminates the brightest mirrors by a real quality unless the women breathe very closely upon the mirrors. I candidly confess that I do not see why, if blood is posited to be stirred at some particular time, it must necessarily stain mirrors more when stirred by menstrual flow than when disturbed by other causes. For I do not perceive that in menstrual blood, from which some hold it certain that the fetus is almost entirely formed, there is so much malignity as some falsely ascribe to it, and with them your Paracelsus, who in the book On the Matrix writes that it is the most harmful of all venereal things.

FURNIUS. Nevertheless, since it is agreed that those with ophthalmia and bleary eyes infect the eyes of those who look fixedly at them, what is written about the infection of mirrors does not seem discordant with truth. But they also report that basilisks kill anyone whatsoever by sight, through poisonous rays emitted from the eyes.

ERASTUS. As for basilisks, you yourself will see whether you do not regard as fables the things circulated about them. I think you know what happened in previous years in a distinguished imperial city concerning this matter. If these serpents exist in nature, a matter about which I see that all prudent and not overly credulous people of all ages have doubted, they can produce their species like other visible things. If they harm the eyes, they harm them by poisonous breaths going out, not by spirits. Although [p. 93] it would be more plausible to say that they harm mortally by hissing and exhalation from the mouth. The whole story, or rather fable, is, I think, just as true as the additional claim is credible: that if they see themselves in a mirror or in glass placed before them, they die. For they see nothing in the glass except the species, which can do nothing other than represent. And even if we conceded that it was poisonous, it would nevertheless not be deadly to the basilisk, since it would contain a familiar poison which a little earlier had gone out from its eyes. Therefore the things that not ignoble authors have imprudently handed down about these matters are notable fables and inventions of ignorant men.

Those suffering from ophthalmia have much putrid blood packed into the membranes of the eyes; this must be dissolved by exhalation, since it has been collected in that place contrary to nature. Therefore those putrid spirits exhaling from the eye can harm a weaker eye by contagion, as can the eyes of the bleary, since they seem full of mucus and putrid humors. But in menstruating women there is no blood heaped up in the eyes contrary to nature. Nor during that time is blood poured into the ventricles of the brain, which would then dye the spirits flowing through the eyes. Much rather it seeks the lowest parts of the body and is carried toward the region of the uterus. Add that blood dissolved into vapor is so subtle and tenuous that, though it can be mixed without hindrance with the spirits destined for vision, it is no longer so red that it stains objects with a purple color.

[4. On Fascination and Affections Related to It]

FURNIUS. I do not wish to labor here. For even if you deny all other things, I am fully persuaded that you will nevertheless not deny fascination.

ERASTUS. If to fascinate is to harm someone outside oneself by looking at him or by cursing him, through the mere vehemence of imagination joined with intense desire to injure, then I unhesitatingly deny to you that a human being can be fascinated by another human being. I think this was sufficiently demonstrated when we showed that imagination can do nothing outside the animal, and when we likewise explained what [p. 94] its office is within its own body.

FURNIUS. A strange thing! As I see, you have no trust in Pliny, nor Gellius, nor Solinus, nor Heliodorus, nor Plutarch, nor others. For these authors manifestly affirm fascination. Gellius, together with Solinus, writes in book 9, chapter 4, that there existed in Africa human beings who, if they praised crops, trees, cattle, or human beings rather earnestly, these certainly died, even though no other cause of death was present. Heliodorus says that the cause is the surrounding air, which conveys the qualities with which it is imbued to the inner organs hidden within. Thus many have been seized by the contagion of plague who were not present with the sick person. The same author, together with Plutarch, reports that the bird Charadrius, which some think is our icterus or golden oriole, when seen by a jaundiced person, draws the yellow bile to itself and frees the sufferer from the disease. Moreover, Plutarch contends that envy wastes away by this means, by which it contaminates its own body, from which effluvia then reach others and harm them. As for the fascinum of the herb of the hedgehog, if a goat holds it in its mouth, I do not even dare report what the same author narrates, and not only once. I know you are not ignorant of what Pliny writes in book 7, chapter 2, about the Triballi, the Scythian women, and others inhabiting Pontus, whom, together with Plutarch, he calls Thebias, and whom he denies can be drowned even when weighed down by clothing.

ERASTUS. There is no reason for me to say anything about Heliodorus’ fables. And even he himself, when he refers the cause to the surrounding air, which contains within itself the seeds of plague and other contagious diseases and conveys them through the organs of the senses to the viscera, does not conflict with our opinion. I think you too laugh at the fables of Gellius. For who could conceive in his mind that crops, trees, and animals that are praised by someone die? There is somewhat more plausibility when they say that something evil flows out from angry eyes. For my part, I cannot even imagine how they could be excused by any plausible interpretation. If you say that it was done through the assisting power of God, who willed to chastise certain people in this way, this will stand in the way: they report that it was proper and perpetual to certain families. But God does not bestow His gifts in this manner; neither the Apostles nor other holy people were able to produce miracles as often as they wished, but only as often, when, and how it pleased God. If we say that certain people were terrified by a cruel and savage gaze, namely rather tender little children and those inclined and disposed to disease, and that they were seized by disease, for it does not seem impossible that some little child might be terrified by the ugly and savage, intensely angry look of a hideous old woman and, on this occasion, begin to fall ill, especially if he had previously been disposed to disease, there will stand in the way not only the fact that they also thought adults were infected, but especially this: that they say plants are corrupted, upon which no fear or terror can fall. Aristotle too seems to have thought that some can be fascinated in this way in the twentieth Problem, when he asks why rue is thought to ward off fascinations. The things we see happening in time of plague also show this.

FURNIUS. But what if we say that harmful and deadly spirits breaking forth from their eyes are the effectors of the evils?

ERASTUS. We shall deal with this matter shortly; now let us assess the remaining points. If we wished to put faith in Pliny when he copies wagons full of lies from the most lying little Greeks, we would be forced to judge that nothing so false and ugly was ever devised either by God or by Greek men, from which Pliny did not copy more lies, and which we would not be compelled to consider true and beautiful. We would have to believe that dead and dried pennyroyal, suspended from a beam, receives life and puts forth flowers around the winter solstice. Likewise, that the herb called Balam by a certain Xanthus restored to life a slain young dragon, and that by the same herb a certain Tillo, killed by a dragon, was brought back from Orcus to the upper world. Indeed, that another herb restored life to a man already dead. But these and other lies still crasser and more absurd than these I now ask you to set aside, [p. 96] and only weigh what sort the things are which we read in the passage cited by you, so that you may see that they are unworthy of our spending longer effort in refuting them, since they are excellently overthrown by themselves.

It is fitting for us to remember that God made man unarmed and naked, and therefore political and social, not wild, savage, cruel, breathing threats and slaughter against his neighbor. Indeed, He not only implanted this in our minds and willed it to be born with us, but also provided by the severest laws that no one should harm others. What madness, then, would it be to believe that some people were made by God who bring from their eyes the most present poison, and even by tongue and voice bring death to others? Believe me, this is a great and detestable superstition, still having roots in the minds of many.

FURNIUS. Pliny’s opinion seems to be made probable by the fact that those poisonous women had double pupils in their eyes; Cicero too asserted this.

ERASTUS. A double pupil can do nothing more than a single simple one, except that it receives a double species, just as both eyes in a human being receive two species, namely each eye one species, which nevertheless the soul judges as, so to speak, one species of one thing. It has been said and demonstrated by Aristotle and his followers that vision occurs by the reception of species, not by the emission of spirits or rays. Even if this occurred, however, it would not follow from this that more spirits fly out from two pupils contained in one eye than from one. For spirits are not generated in the eyes, but are poured in through the optic nerve. Therefore an eye can consist of a double pupil, while the optic nerve reaching that eye is neither doubled nor larger than usual. This is more plausible: because such eyes are horrible and ugly, especially in an angry and ugly little old woman, some tender little children, prepared for disease, were terrified by the sight of such eyes and fell into a disease [p. 97] into which, perhaps, they would have fallen a little later by some other occasion. Who does not know that cross-eyed people, especially those having terrible and, as it were, flashing eyes, if they look angrily and intently at a little child or other faint-hearted persons, strike terror into them? I know that the shining eyes of cats, owls, and certain other animals have terrified even stout-hearted men in darkness. Who would wonder that in a sickly and fearful person consternation becomes the προκαταρκτική cause and πρόφασις, as Hippocrates calls it — the “preliminary cause” and “occasion” — of some disease? Indeed, our common people hardly admit other causes of diseases than anger, grief, fear, terror, and other similar sudden disturbances of the mind. Certainly you will scarcely find a woman of mature age who has not noticed at some time that little children terrified in the way described burst into crying, and sometimes tremble.

FURNIUS. No one can deny that this happens to many; and therefore I shall not deny that those old women too fascinated some people in this way, if indeed any such women ever lived in nature. But what do you reply to Plutarch?

ERASTUS. Plutarch, in his usual way, recounts both his own opinion and those of others. When he comes to proof, he refers the causes to ἀπορρίαι, that is, “effluences,” although he does not establish that these are animate and act by counsel and will. Because this is in itself ridiculous and was most firmly refuted by us above, we rightly neglect it now. Certainly he will be able to bring forward no reason why he should prefer his imaginations to the images of Democritus. In what way, and through what effluvia, is bile drawn from our bodies to the bird? And even if this were granted, the disease is still not removed, since it is an intemperies or obstruction of the liver. What thing sends or conveys those effluvia to us, if the Charadrius does not look at the sick person? For they say it must avert its eyes. How also does bile retained beneath the skin of the whole body pass to the eyes?

Now what he reports about the mutual gaze of lovers can in no way be applied here. For we are not disputing about affections of the mind that produce change in one’s own body, but are asking [p. 98] whether they disturb and harm another’s body per se. The sight of the beloved does not affect the bodies and minds of lovers, but their own love, or rather madness. For imagine that the beloved looks at the lover, while the lover does not know he is being looked at: then he will suffer nothing. If he sees that he is being looked at, he is affected not because he is seen, but because he himself sees; and he suffers because he does not rightly judge what he sees. For many others see the same person and are also seen by that person, yet they are not moved, because they judge otherwise than that fool does. Each person himself is the cause of his own error and disease, not another. For he does not receive the love by which the beloved perhaps loves, but only the species of the form, which he thinks more charming than others. For this reason neither the blind, nor infants, nor others who recoil from such things are changed in any respect, whether they look upon others or are looked upon by others.

FURNIUS. But Plutarch, together with very many others, seems to posit as causes ἀπόρροιαι, or certain effluences participating in a deadly quality, by whose contact the spirits and humors of other bodies are corrupted.

ERASTUS. I have never denied that something harmful exhales from the bodies of certain people and pollutes foreign bodies. If one pleases to call this fascination, the quarrel will be not about the thing, but about the name. Such infection is indeed akin to fascination; yet that former kind just recently explained comes closer to it. When something contagious exhales from bodies affected by scabies, leprosy, elephantiasis, consumption, or plague, we call it contagion; we by no means call it fascination. For people are generally thought to be fascinated when some disease is inflicted upon them by another person who nevertheless does not suffer from that same evil, by cursing or wishing, by imagination, and especially by the inspection of the eyes. But a disease is said to arise from contagion when someone suffering from a putrid and contagious disease affects others with a similar disease by harmful breaths. And those who fascinate are believed to harm only those whom they have first marked out by their eyes and their contagion, while generally harming others not at all. [p. 99]

By contrast, those seized by a contagious disease pollute anyone they meet, upon whom a putrid exhalation either falls externally or clings internally, and especially those dearest to them, spouse, children, brothers, friends, household members, namely all those to whose temperament each person is most similar. Both agree in this, that neither harms by offering poison or a deadly drug. But they differ in that fascinators, knowingly, prudently, and willingly, as is commonly believed, bring destruction only upon certain persons, namely those for whom they have destined the evil; whereas the others unknowingly and unwillingly harm those who approach them. Add this too: fascinators are thought to injure especially by the spirits of the eyes, as though the cause of the evil dwelt chiefly in the imagination or brain, whereas the origin and source of the evil of contagion can lie in any part, and even in the whole body. Moreover, those with contagion do not harm unless putrid breaths are received into the passages of the body; but the former harm whomever they wish, even if they have touched only their clothes. Finally, contagion, when it harms, is itself first harmed, and from a putrid humor exhales a putrid breath; but fascinators need not be badly affected, and therefore they do not have spirits that are putrid and harmful per se. For if they were such, they would be destructive to all without distinction. Yet they harm no one except those whom they desire to harm. Therefore fascinators become pestiferous through the will; they are not such in themselves. Accordingly, fascination and contagion differ very greatly.

FURNIUS. If I have understood you correctly, out of the three ways in which people can be harmed as though by fascination, you think only one should properly be called fascination. The first and most frequent is when someone exhales a foul and putrid exhalation which can contaminate with a similar vice the bodies to which it happens to cling, whether the sick person wants this or not. You called this mode contagion. The second is rarer, when someone is struck with terror by the foul and horrific gaze [p. 100] of a malformed and angry little old woman, or another person, and on that occasion falls into a disease, whatever that disease may be. You left this mode unnamed. The third, which you finally think may be called fascination, is when someone by will and choice strives to harm a certain and designated person by eyes, voice, or touch, with no other thing applied. I see indeed that these modes are plainly different, so that they cannot be comprehended by one definition; and therefore I concede that there is no fascination of the third mode, if it is posited to occur without the intervention of spirits. But if it is held to occur with spirits intervening, as it has seemed to almost everyone, I cannot yet agree with you.

ERASTUS. You rightly say that very many affirm that spirits are the vehicle of fascination. This happened because they did not distinguish between fascination properly so called and contagion, which they have included under fascination. For they understand by spirits either vapors and any effluences whatever, or spirits properly so called, especially animal spirits, since these seem especially to go out from the eyes. If they understand vapors exhaling from putrid and filthy bodies or juices, then it is contagion, not fascination. For they are raised from any place whatever that contains putrefaction within itself, and flow out through all the passages of the body or skin; they do not proceed from the eyes alone. Nor do they obey the power ruling the body, so that they may envy and harm one certain and designated person rather than any person they meet. For if nature could govern them, it would never have allowed them to be corrupted. After they have been corrupted against its will and resistance, they also act according to the quality they have acquired, especially once cast out of the body. For who would rave so much as to suppose that nature, which could not preserve useful and good juices from putrefaction, can now rule them when putrefied, rebellious, hostile, and made deadly, and direct them outside the body wherever it wishes? Indeed, we too often see that nature does not govern them as before when they are not putrefied, but merely rendered more intemperate [p. 101] or otherwise disturbed.

FURNIUS. You speak as though it were necessary that flowing contagious breaths be putrid. Yet this is not true, nor are all putrid things contagious. Therefore one can reply here that fascinating vapors are not yet putrid, but still obey governing nature. Indeed, perhaps the Soul executes its desire through the animal spirits themselves, having the species of fascination within themselves.

ERASTUS. You could scarcely say anything more alien from truth than that spirit, the primary instrument of the soul, is emitted by it outside the body so that there, like a court officer, it may execute its commands. The soul uniquely strives to preserve them within the body, since without them it can neither do anything nor remain in the body. Indeed, I tell you that the spirits were neither made for this purpose, that they should go out, but rather that they should serve the soul informing the body, nor can they go out with an impressed species of the work to be executed. For very many would have to go out together if they must both carry the species and change an alien body according to it. Against this opinion stand all the arguments that philosophers have devised against those who thought that vision occurs by emission of spirit from the eyes; to recount these here would be too long and useless. For who would believe that spirits, tenuous, subtle, mobile, indeed generable and corruptible from moment to moment, go outside the body and are not immediately dissolved? Does not a rather vehement affection of the mind, a sharper grief, or a more copious evacuation often dissipate them, against the soul’s will and resistance, so much that the animal collapses and, while they are being recollected, seems more like a dead person than a living one? And shall we think that those which, even when existing in the body, are so easily scattered and withdrawn from the soul’s command, are carried whole and joined through the air outside the body, and obey the commands of the absent soul?

We must ask, furthermore, whom we should appoint as the guide of their journey. For by their own nature, I think, they will not go without error into a certain and designated lodging, and no other, unless perhaps you make them certain Mopsi or Tageses, as Scaliger wittily says, who divine the place into which they ought to turn aside. [p. 102] Pomponazzi is wonderfully stuck in this place, in chapter 10 of his book On Incantations, and openly confesses that this question is altogether most difficult. After he has anxiously and solicitously tried everything, toward the end of the chapter he attributes to the instrument the power of determining. Whoever wants to see more of that unhappy disputation should read this author himself; we shall briefly and plainly show that they cannot be directed either by the soul of the fascinator, or by the one who was supposed to suffer the fascination, or by themselves.

That the soul of the fascinator cannot accomplish this is evident from the fact that no soul so affects its spirits that it communicates its powers to them in this way, so that they persevere in them fixed and durable. For just as the sun, illuminating the air, leaves no light behind in it when departing, so the soul, being present with and moving the spirits, affects them, but leaves behind in them none of its power when it ceases to move. For if the proper power of the soul could inhere fixedly in another thing, inanimate things could exercise the works of an animate thing, or of the soul. Moreover, I think no one doubts that spirits existing outside the body are inanimate. For every soul is the form of a certain body and is not outside it so long as it informs that body. Therefore it would be far more absurd to say that spirits carried through the air outside the body retain this power of the soul fixed to them than to say that a knife, acting through the assisting power of the craftsman and retaining no art remaining in itself after being moved by the craftsman, had retained the stable art of carving and could exercise it by itself.

Nor are they drawn by the power of the soul of the patient. First, because the soul neither attracts nor moves an alien spirit, but its own. Then, even if it could attract, nevertheless it could not know where and when that spirit was wandering in the air, waiting for attraction by a certain soul. For if it could be attracted by any soul whatever, it would necessarily often err, and would not turn aside into the place where it had been ordered to execute the commands. Finally, if it knew, it would much less attract it, lest it procure destruction and ruin for itself. For the form of each body does this: it preserves its subject and itself in that subject. But if it obeys the attracting soul, the fascination passes out and will cease to do harm; or as soon as possible it will again be driven out like an ungrateful and harmful guest. Now that it cannot by its own powers seek and find a predefined place, and defend itself against the injuries of the air it meets, [p. 103] is both known in itself and clearly and plainly evident from what has just been said. Indeed, if spirits had in themselves the power of bringing or directing themselves to a determinate place and there executing the things commanded, and therefore of moving alien bodies at the pleasure of another soul, who would doubt that they would have to partake of reason? But they cannot be animated outside the body, nor ought they to go out from their own body. Certainly they are never expelled by a Soul rightly governing the body; nor can they preserve themselves once they go out. It remains, therefore, that this mode of fascinating by emitted spirits is impossible.

FURNIUS. Granted that spirits do not go out, is nothing therefore found by which fascination is transported?

ERASTUS. Nothing, because it is impossible for affections and qualities to pass without a body in which they exist. But that by which someone is harmed through fascination is some quality or affection. Therefore it is necessary that it cross over with some body flowing out from the body of the one infecting. Moreover, the effluvia of our body, when it is naturally disposed, are exhalations raised from the dissipated substance of the members and from humors thinned and converted into breath, especially those which, by quantity or quality, cause trouble for nature and cannot be corrected by it. For the heat implanted in each member, while it performs the works of nutrition, turns some parts into breath and drives them out through all [p. 104] the passages of the skin, together with excrements attenuated into vapor. In diseases it sometimes thrusts harmful juices out of the body at once, before they have been so attenuated that they can be digested and excluded by breath or insensible transpiration. When it has cast them out of the body, it does not drive them farther, nor rule them any longer. Beyond these, nothing goes out from our bodies by the will and care of the soul, provided it is not impeded. It does not expel spirits, but zealously preserves them as necessary for all the actions of nature, as much as it can.

FURNIUS. I have already understood this, yet I do not see that it follows that nothing flows out except those putrid vapors of yours, the carriers of contagion.

ERASTUS. I confess that many benign breaths, free from harmful putrefaction, exhale daily from all parts. But the person who assigns this faculty to these breaths errs much more gravely than the one who assigns it to animal spirits. For if fixed imagination joined with a vehement desire to harm fascinates, then the species of the injury must be transmitted by these breaths. Therefore, if those breaths carry it across, it is necessary that they first have it impressed upon themselves by the soul. For they cannot fabricate it for themselves, nor place upon themselves something fabricated by another. But it is more certain than certain that the soul expresses the species of its conceptions and imaginations first in spirit, especially the phantastic spirit, and least of all fashions them in those vapors which flow from dissipated humors or from the dissolved substance of the parts. I shall bring forward two reasons for this at present. The first is that vapors of this sort are excrements, whether they are thought to be raised from the dissipated substance of the parts, or from humors and other excrements thinned out. For when some part has been dissolved into breath, it has become excremental and useless. But the soul strives to evacuate excrements, not to adorn them with the images of its thoughts. The second is that the soul does not form species of this sort in the whole body, but only in a suitable instrument, just as it exercises vision nowhere except in the eyes. But those vapors burst forth from the whole body, while the smallest part proceeds from the eyes. Therefore those who draw fascinating spirits out from the eyes speak more consistently, since they can flow from the brain and the place of imagination. From these things it is clear that vapors emanating from the whole body are by no means transporters of species. It is equally manifest that not even spirits transfer them, since they too cannot migrate. Nor do they fly across by themselves. And even if they especially could leap across, they would still be able to do nothing other than represent. Therefore whatever superstitious people, together with Paracelsus, babble about the fascination of envy, love, hatred, and imagination must necessarily be utterly false.

FURNIUS. I do not mean that affections of the mind are poured from one person into another through fascination; nor did I cite authors affirming such things for that reason. Rather, I brought them forward only so that belief in fascination might more easily be produced, namely that certain little old women and some others are reported chiefly to waste away still tender infants, or to torment them by other diseases sent into them, through the emission of pernicious vapors.

ERASTUS. This opinion is no better than the former one. For if a vapor passing over corrupts the body to which it has adhered, not through an impressed species but through an acquired diseased quality, it was itself first affected by such a quality. For a diseased affection that is in me cannot be communicated to someone else unless some body from me, sharing in that same affection, migrates into the other.

FURNIUS. I deny that this is always the case, that one who infects another by exhalation first suffers from the same disease. For very many who did not suffer from plague have infected others with plague.

ERASTUS. I know that garments and animals sometimes bring plague into a house, although they themselves are not sick. Air too contaminates others, though it does not itself feel disease. But we are not speaking about these things, but about human beings. I say that a human being cannot exhale a poisonous vapor if [p. 106] he has nothing poisonous within himself. If the exhalation has acquired its deadly quality not in the person but outside him, then the person from whom it proceeds was not the effector of contagion. If by his clothing, or an animal by its hairs, received seeds of plague and shook them out in the presence of another, and if that person was harmed by them, it will rightly be said that the former did not suffer from plague; yet the person from whom those seeds proceeded did suffer, and he had clothes upon himself containing the seeds of the evil. But if he had received those same seeds in his skin or body in the way he received them in his clothes, he would have suffered in the same manner, unless a stronger nature had first repelled them from itself.

The truth of this matter appears from the fact that those affected by plague, if the sufferer’s nature has overcome the poison, do not contaminate those living with them and approaching more closely any more than if they were suffering from some other putrid fever. Therefore, if a vapor poisoning others acquired its malignant quality in the body from which it exhaled, it acquired it from a similar quality inhering in some one part or in several parts. If that quality was not equally manifest, grave, and savage in the former person as in the one later affected, this must be attributed to the quality of temperament and to greater powers. For often the same disease does not rage with the same force in different people, but seems milder in some and crueler in others. Moreover, that communication of affections made through an evaporating spirit is called contagion, not fascination, as is clear from the preceding. Besides, it is agreed from the same points that less of such vapors exhales from the eyes than from other parts, unless perhaps the eyes alone, or more than other parts, are diseased, as happens in ophthalmias. It has also been proved that these vapors cannot be directed to a certain place or person, nor be harmful to one and harmless to another, but are equally deadly to all, except insofar as each person’s temperament and nature resist. Therefore this person and not another is affected by them not because the person from whom the vapor flowed wished that person, not this one, to be affected, but because he was more prone to disease. [p. 107] Finally, the person from whom they go out cannot command the corrupted vapors to be carried into this region rather than another, and to harm a certain person while others remain unharmed. But if this were in our power, we would never allow those whom we love to be infected by any contagion; nor during a time of plague would anyone send his children and others away to safer places.

FURNIUS. I wished to ask why, since you called contagious vapors putrid, not all putrid spirits are foul by contagion; but since the answer is clear partly from Aristotle’s seventh Problem, partly from what has been said, I willingly omit it. Meanwhile I confess that, driven by your arguments, I go over to your opinion in mind and feet: namely, that there is no fascination properly so called, but that the things others ascribed to fascination can be reduced to one of two modes.

ERASTUS. That is how the matter stands whenever something of this sort has been done by human beings, or is done. For what is accomplished by another and greater power assisting a human being, even if it is thought to have been perfected by that human being and is called fascination by the ignorant, is nevertheless not fascination, nor does it deserve to be so called, as has been sufficiently declared from its notion. Moses, the Prophets, the Apostles, and very many other holy men have wrongly had an evil reputation under this name, as is proved from the reading of Gentile writers, since they produced miracles and prodigies by another’s power, which foolish Gentility thought were accomplished by magical power. In a similar way those too are deceived who think that the things certain ruined human beings accomplish through demons are performed without crime and sin by I know not what innate properties. Wicked spirits are accustomed, whenever by God’s permission they have kindled a disease through the agitation of spirits and humors, to persuade most unhappy little old women that they themselves were the effectors of such works.

FURNIUS. You do well to warn me of these things. For a little above I wanted to ask you what difference you posit between fascination and other incantations. [p. 108] For you seem to make the former a kind of species of the latter.

ERASTUS. You judge very well. For whoever harms by sight, voice, or touch, or thinks that he harms, with no contagion intervening and no other cause present, harms not by his own power but by diabolical power. We always except divine actions. Therefore he has not harmed by a natural faculty, but by a greater force, which is to enchant. When he uses for this purpose execrations or charms, words, characters, images, or other things, even if these are not harmful in themselves, yet are thought harmful because of a power infused by demons, whoever does such things is said not to fascinate but to enchant. The distinction is almost not in the thing but in the instruments; the craftsman in both cases is one and the same, namely the Devil. But setting these things aside for their proper place, let us dispatch what was proposed.

FURNIUS. This also pleases me. Continue, therefore.

ERASTUS. A few things seem to remain concerning this disputation; before I attach them to the rest, I shall briefly repeat the principal heads of what has been said. We have demonstrated that Imagination, whether it is taken as a faculty of the soul, or is posited as an imagined species, or is used for both, that is, for the very act of Phantasy, can neither move its own body nor another’s, which is far more difficult, and ought not to do so, except insofar as, by representing pleasant or sad things, it moves the appetite toward pursuit or flight. I explained Aristotle’s meaning when he said that Imagination is an alteration, and likewise showed that Pomponazzi erred by the whole sky when he cited that testimony of Aristotle in support of his own Phantasy. I also showed that the experiments adduced both by him and by others are empty and foolish. Finally, I taught most openly that what ancient and recent writers have written about fascination is either false and futile or has other causes. Therefore nothing now seems to remain except that we conclude the present disputation [p. 109] and say truly that all things are equally false and impious which the Platonists, Avicenna, Algazel, Alkindus, Pomponazzi, Paracelsus, and other superstitious men have put forward concerning the powers of imagination, making it the cause of the miracles mentioned above.

And to deal with Paracelsus: how can imagination be called a star forming all things at its own discretion, if its only power is that of representing? In what way will what an animal imagines itself to be exist in reality? If this is true, why are melancholics, who most stubbornly imagine that they are precisely what they imagine themselves to be, not pots, sheep, hens, birds, healthy, dead, kings, and I know not what else? Perhaps Paracelsus too, while promising others a life of six hundred and more years, indeed one that would last until the very end of the world, could not complete his forty-seventh year because he imagined that he would die within that time. Hindered by perpetual drunkenness, I think, he could not by imagining drag Venus and Mercury down from heaven, so that he might be granted, not immortality, with which he writes that many mortals were endowed by them, but at least a longer life.

The things he babbled about the pouring forth of rays are worthy of laughter rather than refutation. For Phantasy is neither a body nor present in a radiant body, as we are speaking here about rays. The animal spirits, whose work it uses, are not emitted by the naturally disposed soul, and they do not go out by themselves without harm to the animal. It is absurd that he raises menstrual blood into heaven, from which some Vulcan there fabricates crosses to be sent down onto clothes. In the book On Tartar, or on invisible diseases, he writes that this happened in these words: “The imagination of a woman raised menstrual blood into the middle heaven, and from that it formed there what it then saw painted. Afterwards those things fell down insensibly upon human beings. Hence crosses were seen on clothing,” etc.

He also deserves the rod because he contends [p. 110] that our thoughts and imaginations become embodied and then fly up to the stars in the heavens, infect them with similar depravity, and from there, after they have been cooked enough and rendered harmful, are hurled down again upon us. It is worthy of the scourge that he asserts that we can compel the heavenly stars by imagination, and that he derives from heaven the power of characters, images, magical words, indeed of all Magic; about these we shall discuss later in their proper place. What? Does it not surpass the belief and thought of all human beings when he writes that a certain man lying sick and all but dead, by imagination drew to himself from a robust youth that young man’s life, powers, senses, and nature; and that some Archasus drew to himself the doctrine and prudence of others by the powers of Phantasy? One may ask whether he thinks life, morals, power of sensing, health, strength, and knowledge of the mind could migrate from their own subject into another. If he denies it, he convicts himself of an impudent lie. If he affirms it, it is necessary that he either think all these things were bodies, or concede that an accident deserted its subject and passed into another. But this conflicts not only with truth and sound philosophy, but also with the judgment of all sane and intelligent people who have ever lived from the foundation of the world. Moreover, if he denies that morals, nature or temperament, powers, health, and knowledge are qualities, and contends that they are bodies, he is unworthy to be named by the learned, much less to have his prodigious lies refuted. That he sometimes thought this is proved even by this: that he asserts any imaginations and affections of the mind whatsoever to degenerate into bodies, and often says that diseases are bodies. Certainly, whoever attacks such portents with a rather long speech does nothing other than offer himself up to be laughed at by those who know. Therefore, omitting other matters, I should like only to know how the man who transferred all these things from another into himself was not twice a man. [p. 111] For whoever has someone’s nature, talent, powers, senses, and life also has his humanity. Therefore he then had a double humanity, unless perhaps you say that by an exchange the other was made in the blink of an eye from a youth into an old man, from robust into weak, from healthy into sick, from lively into dying, and finally from Nireus into Thersites. If you deny this, then he was the same old man and young man, robust and weak, healthy and sick, at the same time in the same part. Can anything more monstrous than these portents be imagined?

But these things could nevertheless be forgiven and laughed at, had he not also taught things wickedly impious. Indeed, it is a crime not expiable by any punishment, however bitter, that with Pomponazzi and other atheists he asserts that prophets are generated by the stars, and that their rising can be foreseen in heaven before they are born; and he holds that almost all the power of miracles proceeds from this, that some people subject the power of the stars to themselves by their imagination. Albertus Magnus also handed down that stones marked with certain figures have the power of divination and of revealing secrets, and in such trifles he is altogether excessive. Pomponazzi advanced to such a point of audacity that he even built up the claim that the resurrection of the dead is procured by the powers of nature, if indeed souls are posited as immortal; and he shamelessly asserted that religions necessarily change according to the revolutions of heaven, so that now this religion, now another, emerges, takes increase, prevails, rules, and reigns.

FURNIUS. We are not concerned with Pomponazzi’s wicked filth. As for the presentiment of future things, since it does not wish to fabricate outside the animal any of the things that are in the mind, but only endeavors to see and know future things before they occur, it is not attacked by your arguments set down earlier. Therefore, if presentiment of future things is, as you contend, a miracle, then at least in this way a sharp-witted human being will perform something miraculous through imagination.

ERASTUS. So it is. [p. 112] For those arguments demonstrate only that these claims are false: that species existing in Phantasy are or become the things themselves, or retain the power of the things of which they are effigies and images; and that imagined things are stupidly thought to be generated outside the animal by imagination and desire. Concerning the office of prophesying, I have disputed briefly, yet solidly and plainly, in the little book published against the madness of astrologers; and perhaps some things will be added when we later discuss Divination. At present I shall merely touch upon those things which more closely concern our proposal. For presentiment of contingent future things is truly miraculous. Therefore, so that you may perceive that even this miracle does not proceed from Imagination, I shall run through this matter in a few words and, as it were, only point it out with the finger.

Prophecy, then, is agreed to be the prediction or foresight of contingent future things. For foreknowledge of necessary things contains nothing especially wondrous. This too is agreed: that our knowledge proceeds from things known insofar as they excite notions of themselves in us; and that nothing is known by us unless we have images, conceptions, or notions of it. Thirdly, it is agreed that no conceptions of our mind are true unless things outside the soul correspond to them. Fourthly, it is agreed that each thing acts according as it exists. This also is agreed: that future things absolutely do not exist. From these points it follows necessarily that future things excite no notions and no images in our soul. But of things of which we do not have notions within us, we have no knowledge at all. Therefore either we do not know contingent future things before they come to be or exist, or some existing thing creates their notions in us. But no natural thing by itself can generate in us a notion other than of itself. For how can what exists fashion in us a species different from itself, and of a thing that does not exist? For nothing acts above [p. 113] its own nature.

FURNIUS. You assume two things for yourself which we shall by no means grant you: namely, that there are no images in imagination which have not been impressed by external things, although anyone can fashion for himself the most astonishing species, to which no external thing corresponds. The other is that one species cannot represent two things, as though it were not agreed that the effigy or notion of a cause at the same time generates the species of its effect. Since both are false, you will labor in vain in what follows.

ERASTUS. I am not unaware that Phantasy can fashion prodigious images. But I firmly deny to you that they are drawn from anywhere other than from things. I freely grant you that Phantasy wrongly composes things which ought not to be joined. Phantasy receives separately both the idea of a man and that of a horse. When it composes these and forms a Hippocentaur, it does not fashion figures not received from the senses, but absurdly and falsely joins things which nature did not will to be joined in this way.

The answer to the second point is equally easy and ready. It can by no power happen that the species of some thing represents anything other than the thing of which it is the species. Yet because some causes actually produce their effect, while others do so only potentially, it happens in the former cases that cause and effect are indeed represented together in imagination, but not by the single species of the cause. Fire, for example, when someone sees it burn the pieces of wood by which it is fed, offers a double species to the mind, namely that of fire and that of the burning of the wood. Yet both are not represented by one species of fire. You will understand this from the fact that an infant who does not know to fear fire fears nothing and touches burning coals, and stretches his hand into flames. But when he has felt himself burned, he does not easily come nearer to it afterwards. It is therefore manifest that the one species of fire represents nothing other than such a substance.

Nor are we speaking here either about causes necessarily generating their own determinate effects, or about those which are now already actually effecting the same things, but about natural contingent things, and therefore about things not yet actually acting. [p. 114] For we are disputing about the presentiment of contingent future things long before they begin to be made and produced. Things that are already coming to be are not absolutely future, but exist in some way. This is the question: whether the species of a thing not yet actually producing a definite effect, but possessing potency alone, which can be impeded in infinite ways, for unless it could be impeded it would not be contingent, can then represent that perhaps hoped-for effect. Who does not see that this is impossible? For what is something potentially is not that very thing truly, so long as it remains that same thing potentially. But what does not exist in reality cannot act. Therefore it will produce a species of itself insofar as it is actually something, but not insofar as it is potentially something. Is there anyone so senseless and stupid who, upon seeing a builder not yet building and hired by no one to build, thinks that at the same time he can see what kind of house, for whom, when, and in what place he is going to build a thousand years hence? Certainly the species of the builder cannot show him these things.

I shall speak summarily. It is altogether necessary that the species of a contingent future thing in the imagination of a seer is either expressed by the future thing itself, or produced by the cause of that same thing not yet acting, or made by a higher cause, or fabricated by the seer himself. The first is impossible. For it would act before it was born and would exist before it came to be. We have shown that the second is equally absurd and impossible. If it has proceeded from a higher cause, there can be none besides God, to whom alone future things are known. But in that case he foresees future things not through the power of imagination, but through divine power. If you think it is fabricated by the seer, there will be no reason why the thing should fall out as he dreamed it would fall out. For if the thing must happen because he imagined it so, he not only predicts future things but also brings them about. What then prevents these imaginers from finally giving us as effects whatever Lucian related in his stories? Nor will you excuse them if you reply that these things are above the powers of nature. [p. 115] For it is almost more possible that a head similar to a human head should be joined with the body of a bull than that future things should be foreseen by the powers of Phantasy, or that species received in it should be changed into bodies, govern heaven and earth, and even compel the stars to its obedience like a beast of burden.

It is sufficiently clear, I think, both from what has just been said and from what was disputed above, by what intolerable and plainly sacrilegious error those men, if indeed they do this unknowingly, are to be pitied; but if they say it knowingly, are to be execrated, when they attribute to the powers of imagination what belongs to God alone. By a similar crime they ascribe to it the power of producing miracles, on which matter perhaps we dealt with too many words earlier. Consider, I ask you, how futile the conjectures Avicenna uses are when he tries to prove that the matter of the sublunary world obeys our Imagination more than it obeys contrary things that transform it. If someone, he says, wishes to walk on a beam placed on the ground, he does so with no danger; but if he wishes to cross over a ditch or water on the same beam placed in a high place, he falls because of the danger produced by imagination. Who ever denied that fear is struck into an animal by imagination representing danger, and that by it the spirits are contracted by a certain impulse, and that the power of the muscles is in some way weakened or diminished? When the beam is stretched out on a level place, the cause of fear is absent. Therefore the muscles support the body in such a way that the animal cannot easily fall. Often we imagine terrifying things, but things beyond the sea, which cannot harm us; by them, as I noted from Aristotle, we are affected no otherwise than if we were looking at a painting. Therefore those things strike our mind which we judge are going to harm us, not those by which we are persuaded that we cannot be harmed.

He also adduces yawning, which nevertheless does nothing other than, as it were, remind nature of its office. Therefore those who see someone else yawning generally yawn, [p. 116] because the matter is almost always prepared; but those who see others urinating do not always urinate, because they have not always collected urine in the bladder. But since enough has been discussed about this whole matter, we shall pass to other things, unless it seems otherwise to you. For the things he put forward in various places, besides what has already been said, to establish this opinion, you remember, I think, have been weighed and refuted by us above.

FURNIUS. That does not displease me. Yet in passing I should like to hear something further from you about Avicenna’s opinion, which you were just now refreshing in my memory. For this seems more probable than the others, because he assigns all that power to an Intelligence, which a human being would win for himself through Imagination and render, as it were, friendly and obedient; so that now not so much Imagination as the Intelligence joined to it ought to be called the maker and cause of those wonders. Marsilio Ficino explains the mode by which souls share in the Ideas of the Intelligences in these words: “Therefore the higher spirits operate upon our spirits, since they are conformed to them, only by the influxes of their images, just as a face acts upon a mirror; and by acting upon them they form them and make them similar, to such an extent that souls often operate almost as wondrously as the celestial spirits are accustomed to do.” And a little later: “Then prodigies, dreams, prophecies, oracles come.”

ERASTUS. This foolish fiction seems unworthy of refutation, and most alien not only from any sense of piety but also from learning. Yet the Arab Avicenna so adored it that he would seem unwilling to admit anyone dissenting from it into the fellowship of philosophers. It rests upon several false hypotheses. First, he posits that certain demons or Intelligences inhabit the stars, differing among themselves in dignity and powers. Then, that these Intelligences can change the matter of the elemental world at their pleasure, though with unequal power, even with no intervening alteration. For if the less noble ones change it with alteration intervening, the nobler ones change it without such alteration. [p. 117] Likewise, that our souls are endowed sometimes by one of these substances, sometimes by other varied and dissimilar ones, with powers and properties by which they differ among themselves. Fourthly, that matter obeys nobler causes more. Fifthly, that those incorporeal substances are nobler than the contraries by which we see matter altered. Thus he thinks it happens that a soul born under the benign star of Jupiter excels others in nobility, and acts not only as a soul but also operates as suffused with the powers of Jupiter, and therefore has all matter here below obedient to it for accomplishing whatever the Intelligence of Jupiter can accomplish. Nevertheless, he says that this soul needs strong and intense imagination, by which it may draw into obedience to itself the place, with the patient disposed, and finally that it may free itself from the passions of the body and govern as if free.

Moreover, he tried to confirm that this mutable matter obeys our soul by several experiments that do not come within many thousands of paces of the proposed matter: walking on a beam, the victorious hen, venereal contagion, the likeness of infants with parents, the imagination and appetition of pregnant women, yawning, and the rest, about which we have already discussed abundantly. This Phantasy has something in common with the Platonists and astrologers, about whom discussion will occur in their proper place. At present I shall dissolve in a few words only those points which pertain more closely to imagination. I do not think it at all necessary to refute specifically Ficino’s opinion, which neither accords with philosophy nor agrees with Sacred Scripture. Indeed, because it directly opposes these, it seems rather to be execrated than refuted. Not only in this passage does he attribute divine power to the soul, but often elsewhere too. He expressly affirms that Avicenna, Algazel, and the Platonists are in the present case. For he says that Plato too thinks that from our Mind, if it uses its whole power for a certain work, [p. 118] just as fire burns what is brought near with all the powers of its nature, wonders will arise more easily than from fire and heaven. What of the fact that he thinks the words of Christ concerning faith moving mountains are confirmed by this philosophy? Paracelsus agrees beautifully with him somewhere in the exposition of these words. Will you think that a priest of God, as Ficino wished to seem, and not rather an approver and high priest of Egyptian rites, was so licentiously mad against piety? It is certain that none under this sun, I speak of philosophers, ever lived who were greater and more dutiful worshippers of demons than the Platonists. And shall we say that the words of truth are confirmed by their execrable lies? Ficino was so addicted to these foul and plainly diabolical fables that he preferred to lick the stinking saliva of the Platonists rather than taste the sweetest honey of truth. Deceived by the impious, he impiously believed that the heavens, or their minds or demons, could produce miracles.

But setting this aside, let us deal with the matter itself generally; it can be shown false in more than one way. First, because an Intelligence cannot be conceived by imagination, since it is a substance devoid of body and does not fall under the senses. But the species of Phantasy, or their beginnings and parts, so to speak, have been derived into it from the senses. Certainly, precisely because incorporeal things are such, we cannot perceive what they are properly like, except insofar as by negation of corporeal qualities and, as it were, by a certain analogy, we gather something about them. It is therefore impossible that we should have the true effigy and true image of any intelligence or celestial mind expressed in Phantasy. Indeed, when we wish to conceive by thought what our souls and the angels, the ministers of God, are like, we fashion certain corporeal things, namely form and figure. And certainly, when they sometimes had to reveal themselves to a human being by God’s command, they assumed such forms. I should also like to know what instruments they use [p. 119] to generate species in Phantasy, since they themselves are not sensible. For every function that proceeds outside the substance of the agent needs an instrument, as Aristotle skillfully warned in the book On the Generation of Animals. It is also known in itself and confessed by all that a created substance devoid of body cannot act upon a corporeal substance without a corporeal instrument. Moreover, none other can be conceived than heaven. But this acts only by motion and light. Yet light, since it can only heat and illuminate, cannot introduce ideas of incorporeal things. And even if it could, it would generate them in all people, or certainly in most. For if not all are suitable, or not all imagine them, at least philosophers often desire to comprehend them by imagination. Add that there would be no need for any objects if phantasms could be produced by those Minds through heaven. The blind and deaf could also have certain knowledge of colors and languages.

Secondly, even if those Minds could especially form, and were accustomed to form, ideas of themselves in Phantasy, nevertheless nothing else would happen to us than that we would discern their proper natures by the mind. For it has been so demonstrated that a spiritual image can do nothing other than represent the thing of which it is the image, that you can no longer doubt it. Thirdly, it is certain that those Intelligences do not operate through the species which they might impress in our Phantasy any more than corporeal things act through the same species. Who, I ask, is so insane as to think that fire heats, burns, melts, liquefies, and performs other such acts through the species which it has stirred up in my Phantasy? All things pour forth infinite species of themselves into all parts of the air. Therefore, since no plausible reason can be given why fire should perform the same things through one species and not equally through all the others, fire would perform all such things infinitely. Yet the aforementioned effects of fire are seen neither in air, nor in water, nor in mirrors, nor in our brain. [p. 120] Therefore it perfects them not through these species, but through its innate and real heat. I pass over now that those species touch very diverse things in a spiritual mode, not all the same thing. From this it is sufficiently clear that, since nowhere do they do anything other than figure or represent, this, and no other, is their force, property, and nature.

[5. On Certain Intelligences, Rotators of the Celestial Orbs]

Fourthly, it is certain, by the consensus of all people who have devised anything about this matter, that those Minds do not act upon these lower things except through the instruments of the orbs which they are said to move. Therefore it would not be enough to have the species of some Intelligence in Phantasy; rather, the power of that whole orb would also have to be contained within the skull. But even this would be fruitless if the species or Idea did not have within the brain the same potency which the Intelligence itself, assisting its own orb, has outside the brain. Indeed, Aristotle nowhere taught, nor do the Platonists prove, although they boldly affirm this as well as other things, that those celestial Minds are the effectors and craftsmen of particular things that arise and perish here below, except insofar as they move their orbs and, according to the diversity of motion, light, and heat, affect these sublunary things differently indeed, but nevertheless generally and equally. Therefore, according to Aristotle’s opinion, no one can attribute more to the Intelligences than what they can effect by the motion, or rather by the light and heat, of heaven. But these can move and change matter in this or that way according as it is apt or unfit; they cannot fashion and transform it otherwise. Nor, for the reason stated, can they effect particular things occurring by natural power; much less can they, through natural instruments, produce things beyond and above the order and powers of nature. If you wish me to embrace everything in one word: by its heat it gives actuality to things, just as a hen sitting on eggs of different kinds warms them, or rather by one and the same heat hatches chicks of different kinds. A sign of this is that the celestial stars were made and distinguished only after [p. 121] plants and animals had been created, as is clear from the book of Genesis.

I do not trouble myself with the dreams of the Platonists, since they contend not with arguments, but with superstitions nourished in their own Phantasies, as men who seem to have been made by the Devil to fabricate fictions and to devise, increase, confirm, and propagate the most ruinous superstitions. Finally, those Intelligences or Minds, movers of the heavens, neither exist nor were ever made by God. The heavens are moved in the order and manner in which they were commanded by their Creator to be moved, and they do not transgress His commands. For the same one who commanded also gave them, at the same time, the power to accomplish without error and weariness exactly what He commanded. Nor do they act upon sublunary things by any nature other than that which is nothing else than the ordinary power of God implanted in all things according to each one’s condition; and they perform their offices as they were commanded. And this command mixes the elements, and not only in earth is it efficacious in things that are putrid, forming from each thing what must be formed, but it is also the author of productions in the seed of plants and animals, and even of human beings. What other power besides the Divine could have fashioned and shaped for our souls, which in agreement with Sacred Scripture we believe to be created by God and infused into bodies already prepared, a suitable body, that is, its own? Accordingly this command of God is that formative power which accomplishes all things rightly and wisely. Finally, it is that power through which natural things do what, when, and how each was commanded to do. He willed that there should be no error in the heavenly things; He willed that error should sometimes occur in these things of ours. The former are moved in such a way that they never depart from their fixed courses unless commanded; the latter, however, always fight among themselves and therefore frequently change their course.

These few things, briefly and as it were in passing, I have wished to discuss for the present about Avicenna’s most tasteless and wicked imagination, so that you might at least begin to perceive with what absurdities it labors, [p. 122] apart from the fact that it expressly opposes the word of God. In passing, you also noticed this: that not only in earlier centuries, but also in our own age, in which God has imparted so great a light to the world, both philosophers and, what is far more disgraceful, theologians have ignorantly referred the productions of very many things to the powers of Intelligences, which it is certain neither exist nor were adorned by Aristotle with those powers. God uses the ministry of good and evil angels according to His good and holy will. But that He set individual angels over individual orbs of the heavens, by whom they are moved, only someone will assert who has either resolved to defend manifest falsehoods or has not read the Sacred Scriptures attentively enough.

Aristotle too saw this same thing when he lifted the eyes of his mind higher from these corruptible things and turned himself to the contemplation of Divinity by another path than that which has its origin from sensibles. For in the book On the World to Alexander he consistently asserts that God moves all the heavens by His power, more quickly or more slowly according to the breadth of the space in which each orb is revolved and according to the proper constitution of each; and he firmly denies that He entrusted this office to others. His words are these: σεμνότερον δὲ καὶ σεπτερώτερον, αὐτὸν μὲν ἐπὶ τῆς ἀνωτάτω χώρας ἰδρύσθαι, τὴν δὲ δύναμιν διὰ τὸ σύμπαν κόσμον διεξιέναι, ἥλιος τε καὶ σελήνη καὶ τὰ ἄλλα φαινόμενα περιάγειν, αἰτίους γίγνεσθαι τῆς ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς σωτηρίας. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῆς κινήσεως αὐτῶν οὐδὲ τῆς ἐνεργείας τῆς παρ’ ἑτέρων, ὥσπερ τοῖς παρ’ ἡμῖν ἀρχοῦσι τῆς πολυχρησίας διὰ τὴν ἀσθένειαν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο ἦν τὸ θειότατον, τὸ μετὰ ῥᾳστώνης καὶ ἀπλῆς κινήσεως πάντα δι’ αὐτῆς ἀποτελεῖν ἰδέας. κατὰ γὰρ τὸ ἄνωθεν ἐνδόξως ὑπὸ τῶν φαινομένων ἀναγόμενον κινήματα τὰ ἄστρα ἀεί καὶ ὁ σύμπας οὐρανός — “It is more august and more venerable that He Himself be established in the highest region, while His power passes through the whole cosmos and causes the sun, the moon, and the other visible bodies to revolve, and becomes the cause of preservation upon the earth. For He has no need, for their motion or operation, of service from others, as rulers among us need many hands because of their weakness; rather, this was the most divine thing: to accomplish all things through His power with ease and simple motion. For according to the motion brought down gloriously from above by the visible things, the stars and the whole heaven are always moved.”

In these and other words of the same sixth chapter, what we have said is most manifestly contained. And indeed they so agree with the most holy Scriptures that nothing else can be criticized except that [p. 123] he seems to place the power of God where God Himself is not, that is, because he would seem so to enclose God in heaven that He is not at the same time everywhere present in first act, or according to substance.

I have still heard no one doubting about this whole matter, and I wonder that the Scholastics passed over this question, unless perhaps they persuaded themselves that Aristotle thought otherwise. You should not wonder that the Scholastics, whose concern was not so much to investigate truth as to make Aristotle a theologian, decreed nothing about the present doubt, especially since they had no less trust in the author of the book On Causes than in Aristotle, and altogether believed that both agreed in doctrine. But if you consider by what arguments Aristotle was induced to attribute individual Minds to individual orbs of the heavens, you will very easily find what you seek.

First he posited that only bodies are properly moved. Then, that no body is moved first by itself, and therefore that even in animals one thing moves and another is moved. Thus he held that some bodies are moved by an external mover, namely those lacking soul, while others are moved by an internal mover, namely animated bodies. And indeed he held that heaven, lest he posit that bodies are infinite, is turned by an internal mover, that is, that it is animated. Moreover, since he saw that animals are moved by themselves, aroused by some object of appetite, he judged that the heavens are revolved in the same way. But he concludes that this appetible and desired thing is immobile, immutable, incorporeal, and intelligible from the fact that he thought the heavens were moved with a uniform, equal, and eternal motion. And although he decreed that the soul is not moved per se, he did not deny that it is moved accidentally when the body is moved. Therefore, since he judged that things moving with eternal and entirely uniform motion must be altogether immobile, that is, moved neither per se nor accidentally, he denied that they are corporeal powers and asserted that they move as something desirable, which the Greeks call ὀρεκτόν — “the object of desire.” But this could not have happened if the heavens lacked a soul. To this belongs that whole disputation by which he proves that every faculty of bodies is finite and cannot move uniformly for infinite time. He was most firmly persuaded that the heavens are eternal and are therefore stirred by eternal motion; accordingly he concluded that they are moved by an infinite and immobile thing in the way stated. From these points he thought he had established that the first mover, whether he thought it was God or another Intelligence is not our concern to investigate here, is an incorporeal power and informs no body, but moves insofar as it is good and desirable. [p. 124]

Because he also believed that there are several spheres, and that each is rotated by its own proper and peculiar motion, he also supposed that each has its own proper desirable thing, which it seeks as the end of its motion. You therefore perceive that Aristotle is so far from thinking that those Intelligences move, form, fashion, and transform these lower things, and exist as proximate causes of the wonders that occur here, that he did not even affirm that heaven is turned by them in any other way than insofar as they are understood as something good and desirable. If he had supposed that they move the heavens by acting in any way other than the way in which an end moves, he would have posited animated heavens in vain. To this can be added that Aristotle held it as most certain that those Minds understand nothing new, and that they by no means know these lower, mutable things. All the ancient Peripatetics too denied that the first Mind understands the second; much less did they concede that it perceives the particular changes of this turbulent world. What madness, then, is it to make those separate Minds, according to Aristotle’s doctrine, the effectors of the miracles that occur here? He who did not even think that God does anything without the heavens and apart from the customary mode of nature: did he think that greater powers exist in other Minds?

The reasoning is similar concerning the souls which they affixed to the orbs. For they can do nothing without their own orb; but just as our souls are efficacious in their own bodies and can do nothing outside them, so too the souls of the heavens would do here only what can be accomplished through the orbs. Since their action is very general, it effects no singular thing before it has been contracted, limited, and defined to a certain effect by an individual cause. But if, according to Aristotle’s opinion, separated Minds do not understand fluid and mutable things, how will they effect those same things? How also will they impress images of themselves upon our souls, like a face producing its likeness in a material mirror? Our intellect, by illuminating species received through the senses, makes them actually intelligible when they were such only potentially, because, of course, they are material; but it cannot introduce an image of itself into the senses. Minds separated from every concretion of matter will be still less able to do this.

But for the present it is enough to have declared that Aristotle’s disciples do not rightly assign the power of creating and of performing miracles to Minds separated from matter. And even if Aristotle had taught this, it ought not to move us greatly, since we know that the heavens were created and are moved by the faculty given to them by the Creator, and by God’s command, not by an assisting Intelligence. [p. 125] He who made them commanded them to be turned by their own motion; and He who commanded also at the same time gave them the ability to do so, so that they by no means need this service of Intelligences. We know, moreover, that the heavens and stars lack a rational soul; and therefore that they are not rotated by will or rational appetite like human beings.

FURNIUS. You have removed every scruple from my mind, and I rejoice greatly that I have been more correctly instructed. For now I also understand more fully those things which I remember you touched upon above sparingly and soberly. Therefore let us descend to other matters, if you please.

ERASTUS. Our purpose had been only to demonstrate that miracles cannot be produced by the force and power of Imagination, something which your Paracelsus dared to assert almost more shamelessly than the rest. But led by a certain sequence of things, we have partly touched upon and partly explained certain other matters that ought to have been expounded in another place. For the things I wished to touch lightly about the presaging of future things should have been referred to their proper place. The things we have said about fascination properly belong to operative Magic. But it is good that you wanted this whole matter to be declared, so that we would not have to repeat it in what follows. It remains, therefore, that we show that no miracles can be effected by the powers of Magic, so that it may become clear that God alone is the effector of miracles, as we rightly contend.

FURNIUS. If I must confess the truth, there is nothing whose explanation I await more eagerly than Magic, because from my earliest age, when I recall even my remotest memory, I noticed that many people attributed much to this art. Although Magi were commonly held infamous, I know for certain that they were nevertheless held in particular honor among the powerful and princes. And so I thought that not so much the art was condemned as its abuse and the insolence of certain practitioners.

ERASTUS. I hope you have already understood, and will understand more plainly hereafter, that the whole art, if indeed it is worthy of that name, is vain, futile, false, and execrable.

FURNIUS. I know that there is a certain infamous Magic, which I too judged should not be approved. But I wish to be understood as speaking not about this diabolical Magic, which evokes devils and openly uses their ministry, but about Natural Magic, which is thought to be, as it were, the summit and a certain perfection of all philosophy.

ERASTUS. I know this excuse. But it is better that we first see what Paracelsus thought and wrote about Magic, and then consider the matter itself. For in this way it will appear whether there is some praiseworthy species of Magic, as very many seem to think. He often makes mention of it in his books, and everywhere commends it, except in one or two places, in which he speaks about insane and condemned Magic. In the book On Occult Philosophy [p. 127] he writes that it is the most hidden art, and the knowledge of supernatural things imperceptible to reason. “For our reason,” he says, “when compared with it, is foolishness. Therefore it was fitting for theologians to learn it, not to censure it, since there are many mysteries in Scripture which reason does not grasp. Which of the theologians ever cast out a demon without Magic, or summoned a Spirit to himself, or drove one away from himself? Who, I ask, ignorant of Magic, ever completely healed a sick person, or accomplished anything similar, much less moved mountains? Faith alone is employed in it, no ceremonies.” Christ speaks of this, he says, when He says, “If you have faith as great as a grain of mustard seed,” etc.

Abuse then created incantations, as was done by witches, who through their false faith send spirits and Ascendants even into those far absent. They fashion an image, and in the name of the person whom they desire to harm, they drive a nail into the tooth, foot, eye, etc., and in this way deprive those whom they wish of the power of eyes, feet, teeth, etc., and even kill them. Elsewhere he says that Magic is true knowledge, by which the power of the celestial things is drawn down here into the middle by the Magus and directed into whatever subject he wishes. He makes words, characters, images, etc., by this method no less efficacious than medical potions. He writes in the book On Long Life that by the benefit of this art Adam preserved his life and health for so many years. I remember too that we said above that he places no distinction between Magi and Saints except that the latter do by divine power what the former accomplish by the work of magical art. In the book cited above he asserts that the foundations of this art are pyromancy, necromancy, geomancy, and many others of this kind; and besides these, certain prayers, imagination, and faith.

If you please, add what Pomponazzi the enchanter says: that his Magic is good in itself, and therefore is rightly called knowledge, because it is a certain perfection of the mind; only such a mode of learning it is prohibited. [p. 128] Indeed, from the fact that Apollonius of Tyana, that Magus, is read to have raised some from the dead, he concludes that both Magic and Necromancy are sciences. I recount these things here so that it may become manifest how beautifully Pomponazzi harmonizes with Paracelsus. It now comes to my mind that I also read in Paracelsus that Necromancy is by no means diabolical, but a plainly natural art born from the stars. He also thinks, in the book On the Causes of Invisible Diseases, that the Egyptian Magi, the adversaries of Moses, produced serpents, frogs, and other things by the power of natural arts, which I forgot to mention above. In On Gout too he asserts that storms are stirred up and thunder created naturally. But in the book On Long Life, if memory does not deceive me, he thinks that the Magi who came into Judea to greet Christ were carried by a force of horses that was not natural. In the book On the Opening of the Skin, he calls Magic the greatest and most excellent art, similar to the Cabala of the Jews. You have heard enough from Paracelsus. Whoever wants more should read him himself. I shall bring nothing from other lovers of this madness, because there is no need, nor does it much pertain to our matter. For everyone knows what Albertus and others thought about superstition, to say nothing of the Platonists and Arabs.

Therefore I come to the explanation of Magic. They say that the name “Magic” was born among the Persians. Thus Apollonius of Tyana says in his letters: μάγος ὀνομάζεται τὸς θεοὺς ὡς ἔφερον — “A Magus is so called as one who concerns himself with the gods.” Others derived it from the Magusaeans, among whom Suidas writes that the study of Magic and Astrology first began. Most judge that among the Persians it signified the same as Philosopher among the Greeks, Chaldean among the Assyrians, priest among the Egyptians, and wise man among the Latins. To say it in one word: if Plato, Cicero, and others are to be believed, a Magus among the Persians was the same as an interpreter and worshipper of divine things. Yet I do not believe that they were occupied only in the interpretation of sacred things, but I think they also performed wonders, as we clearly [p. 129] gather from the Sacred Scriptures. Indeed, Strabo too, in book 16, writes that among the Magi were numbered astrologers, necromancers, νεκρομάντας, ὑδρομάντας, λεκανομάντας, and others of that sort — “necromancers,” “hydromancers,” and “lecanomancers,” that is, diviners by the dead, by water, and by basins. Cicero too asserts that the Magi were accustomed to augur and divine. From these points we clearly perceive that they were not only occupied in interpreting sacred things, but also attempted greater things, unless perhaps someone thinks that the production of wonders was part of Persian theology.

FURNIUS. It is not absurd to judge so. For our theologians too have often been renowned for miracles.

ERASTUS. It is good that you do not say “always.” For from this very point you show that it is not necessarily required for the study and knowledge of Theology that miracles be produced. Among the Persians, wonder-working, θαυματοποιία — “the making of marvels” — was so golden a part of their wisdom that no one was held for a Magus who did not know how to perform tricks. Hence I think those are mistaken who distinguish the Magic of the Persians from infamous Magic and think that it was better. Certainly the first author of Persian Magic, Zoroaster, whom some say was Cham, others the son of Cham and grandson of Noah, and who is reported to have flourished in the times of Ninus and Abraham, was at the same time also a theologian. But what kind of theology he instilled into peoples, let anyone who wishes read in Plutarch’s book On Isis and Osiris, so that he may perceive from where the most impure heresy of the Manichaeans drew its origin. Eusebius too writes about him in book 1 of the Preparation for the Gospel, chapter 7, that he attributed to God the head of a hawk.

But for the present, to omit all other things for the sake of brevity, the Sacred Scriptures alone teach us abundantly that among the Egyptians, Assyrians, and Persians, Magi were held to be those who could produce wonders and things surpassing all powers of nature. Today too they define them in no other way than by the production of wondrous things exceeding the order of nature.

FURNIUS. I am not concerned about what kind Persian Magic was; but I wish to learn something more certain about natural Magic.

ERASTUS. We shall soon come to that. Now certain other things must be added about the invention [p. 130] of Magic. It could have had no other inventors and teachers than malignant spirits. This is first clearly understood from the Sacred Scriptures. For since they condemn Magic and command Magi to be punished by death, it is more certain than certain that it was devised not by God but by the adversary of God. Then the authority of the ancient theologians proves the same. For Saint Peter, in Clement, book 4 of the Recognitions, skillfully, elegantly, truly, and at length declares by whom it was invented and through whom it was propagated. Eusebius Pamphilus, in book 4 of the Preparation for the Gospel, chapter 11, asserts that the maleficent arts were established by demons. “For all evildoers,” he says, “especially venerate these demons and their President.” And in book 5, chapter 7, he demonstrates the same by the testimony of Porphyry. For he writes that they showed by what things they are delighted and by what things they are enticed. In addition, they taught human beings by what things they are compelled, what they wish to be offered to them, in what places they dwell, what days one must avoid, what the figures of images ought to be, and altogether all such things. He also shows, by the words of Proserpina, that characters and figures are loved by them. Augustine too, in book 2 of The City of God, affirms that magical arts took their origin from demons through incantations, in the way they wished to be worshipped. Lactantius Firmianus agrees with these in book 2 On the Origin of Error, chapter 15.

Add that the Magi themselves and students of Magic openly confess that they drew all this knowledge from demons. Porphyry has been mentioned. I would speak in vain about Proclus, Plotinus, Iamblichus, Plato, and all the other Platonists, since this is known to everyone. Apuleius, in the book On the Demon of Socrates, writes that the divinations of augurs, haruspices, seers, dreams, and the miracles of Magi pertain to demons. The Arabs too refer them to these as authors and teachers. Among them Almadal, according to Giovanni Francesco Pico in the book On the Foreknowledge of Things, chapter 2, says that he read in the most ancient books of the barbarians that a certain Magus on some mountain, I know not which, [p. 131] over the space of thirty years noted the characters of all the angels and, by a continuous labor of fifty years, reduced them into a book and order.

And what need is there of words? What Magi do, they do either by the powers of nature or by some greater power. If what they do does not transcend the powers of nature, they will not rightly be called Magi. Nor were such people either reproved and condemned by God or ordered to be punished with death. Therefore they try to perfect their miracles supported by a higher power. But above the faculty of nature there is no other force than that of God and of good and evil angels. Yet it is agreed that Magi do not do what they strive to do by the work of God or of good angels. Therefore they use the power and aid of evil demons. But who, apart from these, would have taught human beings by what signs, voices, figures, ceremonies, and things they wished to be summoned and, as it seems, compelled? Thus you plainly see that no miracles can be produced through Magic, since it wholly rests on the powers of demons, whom we showed above cannot change things otherwise than according to the aptitude which they received from God in their first creation.

[6. Whether There Is Any Natural and Permitted Magic]

FURNIUS. I was not asking about this wicked Magic, as I said before, but about natural Magic, which is written to be nothing other than the highest perfection and, as it were, the supreme consummation of natural philosophy.

ERASTUS. Some make Magic threefold, but most only twofold. The former distinguish the Magic of the Persians from infamous Magic and natural Magic. But it has already been declared that they are in error. For the Persians had no other Magic than that infamous kind by which, with certain sacrifices, they enticed demons, and by their work foretold future things and did certain wondrous things. For Zoroaster was the inventor of Magic and at the same time a teacher of sacred rites, as I showed a little earlier. Proclus, moreover, in the book On Sacrifice and Magic, openly asserts that the Magi, even when they applied agents to patients through natural sympathy, were accustomed to use the invocation of divine powers; [p. 132] indeed, that they used these very things for the evocation of demons.

FURNIUS. How then does Scripture praise the Magi who came from the East and worshipped Christ?

ERASTUS. There is a long disputation here: from where they came and who they were. Since this contributes nothing to our purpose, it will rightly be neglected by us. Nor is it agreed that they were Persians; Justin Martyr affirms in the διάλογος πρὸς Τρύφωνα — Dialogue with Trypho — that they came from Arabia. Nor is it explained what sort of Magic they practiced. But if they were worshippers of infamous Magic, no doubt they cast it aside once they had learned better things. He who revealed Christ to them and gave them the star as guide of the journey, and warned them in a dream about the road they should take, could also have taught them what it was fitting to follow in life. It does not follow that God therefore wished to approve Magic or judge it right because He received Magi. For in this way He would approve the art of prostitution and crimes of every kind. For He received prostitutes and criminals too when they were converted to Him. Certainly among the ancients Augustine and Origen do not hesitate to call them impious; yet they affirm that they afterwards lived piously. Chrysostom thinks that they were later baptized by St. Thomas the Apostle.

FURNIUS. Let us leave this matter and at last deal with Natural Magic.

ERASTUS. You press this natural Magic of yours just as if there had ever been, or still were, some natural art that produces miracles. But I tell you that such a thing as that of which we are speaking has never existed, nor does it exist today.

FURNIUS. Will you then dare to deny what has been received and handed down by so great a consensus of all learned men?

ERASTUS. I am not ignorant that most people affirm that there is a twofold Magic: one infamous and forbidden, using commerce with and the work of evil spirits, which they call γοητεία and ἐπῳδή — “sorcery” and “incantation”; the other honorable and permitted, which, by observing the agreement and disagreement of things, which the Greeks call συμπάθεια and ἀντιπάθεια — “sympathy” and “antipathy,” accomplishes incredible things exceeding the common order of nature by a fitting application of agents and patients. I also know [p. 133] with what praises they adorn this latter kind, calling it the summit, pinnacle, perfection, consummation, and end of natural philosophy. But I should like to be shown what this art is, who devised it, who cultivated it, and what precepts and parts it consists of that do not go beyond the boundaries of nature. Unless you say that this is the art about which Giovanni Battista della Porta of Naples has written many things in recent years, I know for certain that you will show no other under this sun. But the true things in that art, for he mingled many superstitious and false things with true ones, and copied most disgraceful lies from others, are so far from being able to retain the name of Magic that they do not even seem wondrous to skilled farmers and those somewhat more devoted to rural matters. And although at first they may excite some admiration, nevertheless, once the cause has soon been understood, and it is easy to understand, they cease to seem wondrous. But so that the whole matter may be examined more diligently, certain points seem to need examination with greater exactness.

FURNIUS. I very much wish to know the truth in this part, especially since I recall no one ever having affirmed what you affirm. For all whom I have read and heard confess and concede that there is a certain species of Magic that is natural and permitted, and indeed most worthy of the highest commendation of all good men.

ERASTUS. I know that others, and also Giovanni Francesco Pico, think the same as I do. But what others have thought does not greatly concern me whenever they do not produce just causes for their opinion. Ancient Magic, according to the testimony of Pliny and the Platonists, indeed according to the thing itself, was a certain combination of idolatry or false and superstitious religion, astrology, which they call the key of Magic, and medicine. “No one doubts,” says Pliny, “that it was first born from medicine. To flattering and desired promises it added the powers of religion. Finally it mixed in the mathematical arts. And by this triple bond, once the senses of human beings had been possessed, it grew to so great a height that even today it prevails among a great [p. 134] part of the nations.” Do you think this is natural?

FURNIUS. I am not speaking about this kind, which is agreed to be execrable from the fact that the religion of the Gentiles was nothing other than the worship of demons. But a little above I said that we judge those Magi who have some dealings with a demon or impious worship to be wicked and criminal.

ERASTUS. Do you therefore wish to stitch together and forge a permitted Magic from Medicine and Mathematics alone, or to add the ceremonies of true religion, so that it may again cohere by a triple bond? But it can be demonstrated without any trouble that pious ceremonies and sacred words cannot be twisted here without sacrilegious error, so that they may serve the construction of an art that produces wonders. For the power of ceremonies is none other than that of representing. Ceremonies were instituted for the sake of representation, or certainly of order and adornment, so that by falling upon the eyes they might serve both the understanding and the memory of the less skilled. Indeed, people observe with greater attention the things that are said and done, and retain them more faithfully in memory. Therefore they serve only human beings who understand their meaning; they neither change, nor increase, nor diminish the innate powers and faculties of natural things. Moreover, what was instituted by God only for the sake of representing cannot be part of an art through which wonders are produced. For there is a very great difference between signifying something to rational animals and possessing no other power, and increasing or diminishing the innate powers of inanimate things. Therefore those who transfer rites that signify pious and sacred things to the production of miracles, for whose sake they were instituted neither by God nor by human beings, sin very gravely.

The crime of those who drag sacred words here is still more atrocious. For words, insofar as they are words, can do nothing other than signify by convention. And the words of Sacred Scripture declare to us the mind and will of God toward us, and [p. 135] show what He in turn asks from us, and finally teach how we ought to be disposed toward our neighbor. If we transfer them from this use to another, first indeed we shamefully deceive ourselves; then we are unjust toward God and His word, while against His will and command we foully abuse His word. It is not permitted to us to abuse things given by God for salvation for other matters. And lest we should dare it, He forbade it with grave threats and punishments in Exodus 20. Therefore magical θεουργία — “theurgy,” for so some call that part of τῆς μαγικῆς, “the magical art,” which calls upon either good angels or even evil ones for a good end by the power of sacred words and holy ceremonies — is nothing other than an impious and most disgraceful abuse of the divine Word, to be punished in all cases by capital punishment. From these things it is clearly understood that true Religion cannot be a part of that Magic which you say is natural and permitted.

The futility, superstition, and impiety of Astrology we have demonstrated elsewhere. That the powers of Medicine are not so great is both manifest in itself to everyone and very well known to you, unless perhaps Paracelsus has persuaded you with his impious and detestable lies.

FURNIUS. You sing the same old song to me again and again. I have already said too often that I wish to be understood as speaking of natural Magic alone, which is free from all superstition.

ERASTUS. That is why I repeat it so often: because I find no other Magic. If you know another, indicate it to us. You call it a certain perfection of Physics, and nevertheless you think it is an art. How shall we reconcile these things? Physics is a science, is concerned with universals, and has immovable cognition as its end. But your Magic is a certain art occupied with the production of wonders, that is, it treats singular things and has production as its end. For although true arts have some general precepts, they are nevertheless destined and directed toward singular things; and if they cannot be rightly adapted to these, they will not even be able to be called precepts of art. [p. 136] How then will Magic, that is, production or operation, be the perfection and end of the science of Physics? This is just as if you were to establish the smith’s art, the builder’s art, and masonry as the ends and perfections of Geometry, or to think that Medicine is the consummation of Physics. Have you not heard that elegant and knowledgeable physicians take the beginnings of their art for themselves where the physicist ends his speculation? I ask you: what excellent philosopher, rightly versed in the knowledge of Nature, ever lived who wished to be called a Magus? Those who excelled above the rest rejoiced to be praised by this name, that they were and were held to be outstanding Philosophers; but if someone had called them Magi, they would have thought themselves injured. Thus Galen heard the name of excellent physician not unwillingly; but he did not endure hearing the name of seer, diviner, or Magus. In the case of Magi the situation is the opposite. For as many as were praised for Magic in all ages were ignorant of natural philosophy and medicine. Who does not know that your Paracelsus was utterly ignorant of all good arts and nevertheless arrogated to himself outstanding knowledge of Magic? Indeed, he boasts that through Magic he performed wondrous works.

FURNIUS. Were not Albertus Magnus, Roger Bacon, and besides these others, notable philosophers?

ERASTUS. I do not deny that they were not unsuccessfully engaged in philosophy for that age; but I say that they did not need great knowledge of philosophy to learn Magic. What I say is not merely proved, but plainly and most certainly demonstrated, by the fact that very many others, who left the aforesaid men far behind themselves in the works of Magic, were plainly unskilled in all philosophy. Certainly those philosophers copied more about Magic from others than they did themselves; while others, by contrast, did more than they wrote.

[7. On Operative Magic and Its Species]

FURNIUS. Again you slip down into profane Magic, about which I am not dealing with you.

ERASTUS. It is a strange thing: you want me to speak magnificently about something which neither ever existed, nor exists, [p. 137] nor ever will exist. This is what I was saying: if it were the most eminent knowledge of natural philosophy, then each person would know as much of it as he excelled others in this knowledge. But the greatest philosophers were entirely without Magic; and those who joined Magic to their philosophy held no other Magic than that detestable kind whose whole force consists in ceremonies, barbarous words, images, prayers, exorcisms, characters, and other such superstitions. Did those men teach us any other Magic? I do not think so. Therefore it can be taught that they knew no other, although no one denies that they were illustrious philosophers in that age. Name for me, if you can, any one philosopher who left behind anything written about Magic that does not pertain to superstitious and infamous Magic. If neither you nor anyone else can show this, you will labor in vain to persuade us that this natural Magic is an art distinct from natural philosophy. But if you say that it was handed down by philosophers, I shall deny to you that it is Magic. For no part of natural philosophy teaches the production of wondrous works that depart from the customary mode of nature. Certainly natural philosophy considers the affections of natural bodies; it does not touch things that exceed the powers of nature. Nor was Aristotle ever held for a Magus, although he so felicitously and abundantly refined the part of Natural Philosophy that no one has yet been able to equal him, much less surpass him. I pass over now the fact that your Paracelsus writes that Magic treats of nothing except impressions upon the supernatural body, which some call incantations and superstitions. To these may also be added what Pliny stitched together from the opinion of the ancients out of theology, astrology, and medicine, with no mention made of physics.

FURNIUS. When we say that Magic is a natural art which teaches how to do wondrous works, we mean that those works are produced [p. 138] by the power of natural things; and that it is therefore natural, whether the speculation of these things is contended to belong to the physician or to the natural philosopher. We call it natural in the way in which we also affirm that medicine is a natural art.

ERASTUS. It is agreed from what has been recalled that physiology is not a part of Magic. Now it must be stated that not even medicine contributes to the fabrication of wonders. For I do not think a long demonstration is needed here. Indeed, no distinguished and famous physicians, provided they practiced their art by the right Method, were ever held for Magi. Who accused Hippocrates, whom Paracelsus confesses in more than one place to have been an excellent physician, or Galen, of any Magic? Each detested Magic. Concerning Galen, certainly, no one will doubt who reads him attentively in the ninth and tenth books On the Powers of Simple Medicines, in the chapters on jasper, saliva, and wolf dung. In the Preface to the sixth book of the same work he calls magical things μύθους, γραῶν γοητείας, ληρώδεις, μαγγανείας περιέργους ἔξω τῆς ἰατρικῆς τέχνης, καὶ ψευδεῖς — “myths, sorceries of old women, foolish trifles, curious jugglings outside the medical art, and falsehoods,” things unworthy to be touched by students of medicine. He rebukes Xenocrates of Aphrodisias on this account, that he did not shrink from Magic. Hippocrates, however, in the book On the Sacred Disease, says: “Those who first named this disease sacred seem to me to have been men of the same sort as today’s μάγοι τε καὶ καθάρται καὶ ἀγύρται καὶ ἀλαζόνες — ‘Magi, purifiers, charlatans, and impostors,’ who pretend that they are exceedingly pious and know something more.” Therefore, if there is any Magic of which Medicine is some part, those men were utterly ignorant of it. Yet they possessed the medical art in such a way that they shine before all students of this most excellent art like the sun and moon, the brightest lights of heaven.

The matter is perceived more plainly from this: that it is agreed that the physician is the imitator and minister of Nature. For Natures, not physicians, are the curers of diseases, as Hippocrates skillfully wrote. Therefore, if something miraculous occurs in cures, [p. 139] it should not be ascribed to the physician. The sum is this: Medicine does not teach people to perform miracles, but to observe the motions of nature, so that suitable ones may be aided and faulty ones prevented. But whoever thinks that our natures perform miracles of the kind Magic promises is himself a miracle and a monster. Certainly those who surpassed others in our art and acquired a famous name from their success in curing diseases by no means wished to be called Magi, but elegant and learned physicians. Magic promises things that otherwise seem impossible, and indeed in a very brief time. Hence Galen, when he recommends some remedy as one that helps quickly, says that it benefits “like an incantation.” But physicians, however excellent and learned, do not cure more quickly than the natures of sick bodies complete their own motions. It is therefore clear that not even true Medicine, from which Magic is thought to have been born, contributes anything to it.

FURNIUS. I think the authors meant this when they said that Magic arose from Medicine: that physicians, more than others, discovered, explored, and noted the properties, powers, familiarity, and enmity of things. For no others are more occupied with this particular knowledge of all things; and for this reason they provided others with the occasion and material for more diligent inquiry. For they say that the Magus marries heaven to earth, that is, calls down fuller powers from celestial things into inferior things.

ERASTUS. Pliny’s opinion seems to be this: that physicians began to cure diseases with remedies of this sort. “For since some had nothing,” says Hippocrates, “which, when administered, would be useful, they devised such things so that their ignorance would not become manifest, and so that they might seem to know something more.” He says they add all these things for the sake of divinity, so that they might establish for themselves a secure cure; so that, if the sick person emerged healthy, glory and skill would be ascribed to them, but if he died, their excuses would be safely placed. He writes that for this reason they were accustomed to bring forward various pretexts: that foot should not be placed over foot, nor a black cloak worn, nor hand placed over hand, [p. 140] and other things of this kind. By these modes and arts Magic seems first to have been born from Medicine, when ignorant tricksters sought an excuse for their ignorance. Would that similar impediments were not still being brought forward today, both by others and by the disciples of Paracelsus. For this reason they prescribed that herbs be gathered at certain hours, and that some things be prepared in one way and others in another, so that if the cure did not succeed, a way of escape would lie open. In this way, I say, Pliny, Hippocrates, Galen, and others understood Magic to have been born from Medicine; and we too clearly understand it.

Others, for the same reason, so that the matter might seem more probable and certain, pretended that remedies receive from the stars wondrous powers, far nobler and more excellent than their natural and innate ones. And lest the fraud be detected, they asserted that they must be prepared only at certain hours and, as it were, points of time. By this reasoning, once the fiction had pleased people, it happened that Astrology always held the first place in this Magic: not insofar as it prophesies, but insofar as they thought that the stars bestowed divine powers upon things subject to change. Nor was it difficult to persuade people of this, since they believed the stars to be the causes of all future things, and very many supposed them to be gods. And it is agreed, apart from this, that Astrology was the foundation and, as it were, a most abundant fountain of all superstitious and impious arts.

But as far as the present undertaking is concerned, it is true that physicians examine the powers of natural things more diligently than many others. Yet that they marry them to heaven so that they may be endowed by it with new and greater powers than they have from their own nature is utterly false. You recently heard how much Hippocrates valued these trifles, and what Galen thought about those who taught that herbs should be gathered under a certain position of heaven or with the murmuring of certain names. So that you may see this vanity more clearly, answer me when asked. Imagine that someone, [p. 141] under a certain position of the stars, melts, fashions, and adorns some metal, and engraves a certain image upon it, and think that it thereby acquires the power of helping epileptics, for example. I therefore ask you: do you think that this figure of heaven sends its powers perpendicularly into this metal alone, which the Magus is now handling, or do you suppose that it diffuses them through the whole hemisphere?

FURNIUS. I believe it is spread far and wide and touches many things like the light of the sun. For since those powers emanate like rays from the whole bodies of the stars, and since all the stars that are seen are larger than the earth, we cannot think otherwise. Add that the craftsman could never be certain whether heaven had missed and fallen rather upon another body, if those celestial powers flowed down like threads. Yet I think these images must be made when the configuration stands above the earth.

ERASTUS. About this elsewhere. I ask secondly whether you think that the same power falling down from heaven infuses its powers into all things that it touches, or only into the metal which the Magus handles.

FURNIUS. If you look at the very force descending from heaven, it is the same for all things. But not all things are equally fit to receive it. The same sun acts upon mud and wax, although by one and the same power of the sun the former is hardened and the latter softened.

ERASTUS. I ask thirdly whether you suppose that celestial influxes affect sublunary things differently because of their different natures, or because of something else.

FURNIUS. I judge that things are changed and affected in their own particular way because of each one’s own nature. For each thing receives the action of an agent in the way it is fit to receive it. For one agent could not produce different things at the same time if the patients were changed according to the nature of the agent. Yet I add that this is aided by art and, as it were, disposed for easier reception.

ERASTUS. Do you therefore think that the nature of the metal which the Magus melts and forms is changed by melting and formation?

FURNIUS. Not at all.

ERASTUS. Therefore, according to its nature, [p. 142] it both previously receives celestial influxes and will also receive them afterwards.

FURNIUS. Entirely.

ERASTUS. I should also like to know whether configurations effective for carving such a figure appear rather often in heaven.

FURNIUS. If they appeared only once, no experience of this matter could be had; and we would be taught in vain to fabricate such things if the opportunity were never given. Therefore such configurations return, some more frequently, others more rarely.

ERASTUS. Therefore the artificial preparation is empty and rotten, since the matter has already received the same faculty before, and will receive it again hereafter.

FURNIUS. You are mistaken by the whole sky. For it could not receive the power coming from the stars before it was prepared in this way.

ERASTUS. But you were saying that it receives because of its own nature, and that this nature is neither given nor taken away by preparation.

FURNIUS. But I added that there is need, in addition, of that figuring by art.

ERASTUS. We shall deal with this matter more fully a little later. Now I want you to posit that, because of artistic adornment, the stars can give neither more nor less to these things.

FURNIUS. If I grant this, you will indeed have won. But the whole case turns upon this hinge. Therefore you will not obtain this from me before you have shown it to be true.

ERASTUS. Therefore, setting this aside for its own place, I shall say only this. If each thing receives powers from heaven according to its nature, and preparation neither gave nor removed that nature, then it is necessary, if it now receives otherwise than before, that art has removed some impediment. But it removed nothing except perhaps some filth; and whoever thinks that the hidden powers of heaven are impeded by such filth is ignorant of all Astrology. For they say that nothing stands in the way of these faculties, but they pass through all rocks and, in the depth of the earth, create, form, and endow with powers. The artisan changed the figure, and perhaps rendered the matter softer. But these and similar things neither advance nor retard the actions of heaven. Nor does celestial force enter infused matter more easily than matter that is compact and [p. 143] hard, as is clear from what has been said. Therefore that preparation is empty and is applied in vain. For I do not think you make heaven an animal which is accustomed to be moved and persuaded, as if by prayers, by the beauty of a figure or by a character loved by it. But I ask further: can the stars, after the image has been impressed, still communicate their powers to the matter?

FURNIUS. Nothing prevents it.

ERASTUS. The doctrine of the astrologers holds that every minute configurations ascend that are very different in power, so that infants born at almost the same time, yet not at the same point, must have the figure of their birth very different in power, and very often plainly contrary. But if this is true, the person who has prepared and fashioned the metal can never be certain whether, a little afterwards, the ascending figure of heaven might remove all the efficacy of the former one. But if the doctrine of the astrologers is false, of which I am as certain as I know certainly that I am a human being, then it is also necessary that the opinion of the Magi is false. Therefore whatever they built upon this foundation will necessarily collapse. But they built all their teachings upon it. Therefore Magic is nothing other than mere and impious vanity.

FURNIUS. What if someone says that artificial configuration granted this: that the matter thereafter preserves for all time the power which it drew from heaven during its preparation, so that it cannot be overthrown and erased by what follows? I remember that Paracelsus hands down something similar about a certain knotweed. “It no longer has commerce with the stars,” he says, “when it has been plucked; but while it lives adhering to the earth, it draws its power from heaven.”

ERASTUS. A splendid excuse, of course. You confess that the nature was not changed because of the work of art, and that heaven affects sublunary things according to the nature of each. Therefore you must also confess this: that the action of heaven is not impeded by art. What intelligent person, I ask you, apart from impious Magi and superstitious astrologers, thinks that an artisan impedes and prevents the operation of heaven, so that it does not act upon sublunary things [p. 144] as God willed and commanded it to act? Whoever changes natures does not circumscribe and limit the action of heaven; but because all things suffer differently according to the diversity of their natures, he makes them suffer now otherwise than before. Here we posit that nothing natural has been changed. But what if I prove that those powers which you falsely imagine to be implanted in the stars scarcely last a moment?

FURNIUS. I wish to hear.

ERASTUS. You will readily grant me, I hope, that those hidden powers are not elemental qualities, but plainly concealed, insensible, and spiritual.

FURNIUS. So it is.

ERASTUS. You will also confess that they are proper to certain stars. For if they were common to all, it would be foolish to think that more is conferred by a certain position of certain stars than by any others concurring in whatever way.

FURNIUS. I confess it.

ERASTUS. Therefore you will concede that they are essential, not accidental, since the stars are not altered by accidents in the same way as these fluid and almost momentarily changeable things.

FURNIUS. I concede that the particular powers of individual stars proceed from their essences; and since the essence of all is not the same, their properties are not the same in all. Yet I constantly deny that nothing is to be attributed here to accidents. For the star of Mars, for example, although it has a different potency from Mercury, nevertheless is increased, strengthened, diminished, impeded, and dulled according as it mixes its rays in this or that way with the rays of the others.

ERASTUS. Skilled astronomers think that the rays are mixed not in heaven, but here on earth, where they coincide as if at a point. But it is enough for us that these effects arise from the properties of the stars and from the mixtures of rays because of their mutual aspect, as you call it. Thus I argue: hidden, insensible, and spiritual powers of things, arising from their essence, cannot be separated from the essence of those same things. For if they are thought to inhere in another thing, they will no longer be essential and proper. For just as the essence of one thing cannot [p. 145] be the essence of another, so the proper power and faculty of an essence cannot be imagined outside the essence whose property it is. Hence the faculty of laughing, speaking, and counting cannot be imagined in any body other than one endowed with a rational soul. Nor can the light of the sun be found without the sun; rather, it is necessary that it depart and come with it. But the celestial faculties with which we are dealing here are not elemental or sensible, but hidden, proper, specific or individual, insensible, and altogether spiritual. Therefore they depart and return with their stars, and remain impressed and fixed in another thing no more than the light of the sun remains in the air when the sun withdraws. Therefore these powers are much less stable than the light of the sun. For the latter illuminates the air similarly for the time during which the sun is above the earth, regardless of the aspect by which the other stars look upon the sun, provided no clouds or other bodies are interposed. The remaining planets are more impeded and are moved by a more varied motion. But when these have been changed, it is impossible for the former powers to stand, provided the positions of the astrologers are true, as we now posit. And so an image fabricated under a certain constellation will retain the faculty of that constellation no more than a hammer or knife retains the art of the craftsman after he has set it down. The reed pen with which someone writes has no more of the art of painting as soon as it has fallen from the writer’s hand. Moreover, those images are less apt to receive celestial powers of that sort than a reed pen is to retain the art of writing. For the hand is present more often in the work than the configurations of heaven, which both occur rarely and hardly last a moment. You see, then, how unhappily you marry your Images. The dowry you expect soon perishes and is far too slippery. Magi must seek another, more constant bridegroom, who promises a firmer and more certain dowry and does not so easily dissolve the marriage.

FURNIUS. It is not altogether true [p. 146] that celestial powers do not remain stable. Does not the sun leave heat behind itself in air and earth?

ERASTUS. We are not dealing here with sensible qualities of the elements, but with insensible powers, more spiritual than light itself. God willed the sun to generate by its light heat suited to the elements. Therefore it generates this not in a moment, but in time. But you are speaking of powers infused in a moment and without motion, resistance, and alteration of the patient. Therefore there is more difference here than between light and darkness.

But I think it is better to confirm this argument, which is otherwise clear enough in itself, also by the testimony of Sacred Scripture, so that every exit may be closed to all. For God prohibits, and indeed forbids under the gravest penalty, making an election of hours and days. But whoever does such things under certain constellations of heaven, and believes that at other times and hours there is no place for them, truly and properly elects hours and days. Therefore whoever attempts such things not only is frustrated in his hope, but, what is much graver, incurs the penalty imposed by God Himself upon such people.

FURNIUS. If those who choose a certain time sin against God’s law, then all physicians err who teach that some herbs should be gathered in spring, others in summer, others in autumn. Hippocrates sinned most gravely, since he forbids administering medicines when certain stars rise and set. All human beings err who begin and complete different businesses at different times.

ERASTUS. When God prohibited the election of days and hours, He did not command that we should not observe the sensible qualities of the air. For He did not will that we should commit seeds to the earth in winter, or reap at an unsuitable time; but He commanded this: that because of the various motions and positions of the stars, which they call constellations, we should not think one hour more fortunate than another. Therefore physicians do not err who gather some herbs at one time when they are dry, at another when they are moist, at another when they are hot, [p. 147] at another when they are cold. Nor do those err who gather some in flower, others after the seed has arisen, others before they have grown. Much less can Hippocrates be accused, since he prohibited evacuation under the dog-star and before the dog-star. For he did not wish us to inspect the position of these stars in heaven, but ordered us to observe the changes of the air which usually occur at those times. The reasoning is similar in other cases.

The sum is this: God does not disapprove, indeed He praises and commands, noting the sensible changes of the air; and for this reason He painted heaven in such varied fashion that, by the different rising and setting of certain stars, human beings might distinguish the seasons of the year. For you at least know that before the times of Julius Caesar, almost all peoples of the inhabited world were accustomed to define the seasons of the year by the rising and setting of the brighter and better-known stars. If you did not know this from elsewhere, you could have learned it from Galen’s Commentaries on the books of Hippocrates’ Epidemics. Those who cut wood at certain times, when they want it to be durable, also act prudently, insofar as they have discovered that at one time it abounds more in moisture than at another. All these people observe sensible changes; they do not judge only certain days or hours to be suitable because, of course, there is some particular position of stars in heaven, but because they see and sense that a certain affection is present in the air and other things. The farmer does not sin against divine law when he reaps fruits after maturity perceived by sense. Nor does the vintner violate God’s law when he gathers grapes at a certain time, when he finds them ripe by taste, sight, and touch. The reasoning for other things is the same.

This is manifest from the fact that farmers do not preserve some point of time or certain hour in which the planets look upon one another mutually in this or that way, but judge that whole time suitable which has a temperature fitting for carrying out those things. Therefore when God forbade observing days and hours, He did not prohibit choosing a sensible and convenient temperature of the air [p. 148] suitable for the things to be done; rather, He decreed that we should not seek a fortunate or unfortunate cause in time itself because of the aspects of heaven and the stars, or other causes of this kind. Therefore those truly transgress this law of God who dare to assert that at a certain hour, because of a certain schematism of the stars, some things are begun fortunately which either before or after would not have been similarly favorable because unfavorable stars then reigned.

FURNIUS. If you can, I ask you to demonstrate by other, stronger arguments that heaven does not confer wondrous powers upon things. For I cannot yet rest content with those that have been brought forward.

ERASTUS. Although I had decided to dispute this matter below, where Divination will be treated, nevertheless I do not mind now bringing forward the points that serve this undertaking. Receive them thus. Heaven does not have in itself those powers about which the present contest is being waged. Therefore it cannot give them to these earthly things. That it lacks these faculties is sufficiently perceived from the fact that it is a corporeal, universal, and common cause. It is the same for all things, and it bestows upon all things the same thing which it contributes to any one thing. Moreover, what the nature of a common cause is, I declared above by the example of a hen sitting on different eggs. I shall now repeat this briefly, since whoever understands this matter properly very easily extricates himself from all the labyrinths of the astrological Magi.

Suppose, then, that a hen is sitting on various eggs, fertile and infertile. Let the fertile ones be of different kinds: of hens, geese, ducks, pheasants, other birds, silkworms, serpents. Suppose, if you please, that little stones and seeds of herbs and whatever else you wish have also been placed beneath her at the same time. If, I say, the hen sits upon all these things, she will warm them precisely with one and the same heat, not with one heat for one and another for another. Therefore this one and the same heat, existing as one, produces very different effects by one single action, namely heating. For it makes the infertile eggs rot, [p. 149] but animates the fertile ones; and from them it hatches chickens, goslings, ducklings, other little birds, silkworms, and serpents, animals most diverse in nature, powers, habits, and form. But it leaves little stones and other things that are not apt to be essentially changed by this heat unchanged, although it has heated them in the same way as the eggs. For this reason it is common and is said to be a common cause, because it bestows upon one only as much as upon the others, that is, because by one faculty or action it affects all equally. Thus the sun, by one and the same heat, at one time of course, by heating the earth and the roots and seeds existing in it, produces things differing in whole genera.

From these points we see most clearly what the properties of a common cause are. The first is that, by that one faculty of its own on account of which it is called common, it acts in the same way and with the same power, that is, it impresses one and the same effect upon all things. For if it bestows one thing upon one and another upon others, it will no longer be common to all. Thus in all things placed beneath it the heat of the hen generates a common and one heat. I call it one insofar as it proceeds from one cause; but not one insofar as it is divided in different subjects. The second is that the things of which it is said to be the cause are apt to receive that common effect. For agent and patient are relative, and something cannot be called an agent if no patient is present. The third is that a common agent generates none of the particular effects by itself without the conjunction of particular agents. Thus the heat of a hen will never generate a goose or a chicken without suitable eggs. Thus the sun will never generate a horse or a human being without a horse or a human being. For the common cause is only an assisting cause, and without it particular agents cannot produce their effects. For it excites, strengthens, and confirms the faculty implanted in each thing.

If you transfer these points to heaven, which no one doubts to be the most general and most common [p. 150] cause of lower things, you will perceive the truth very easily. First, it is certain that heaven at any one time sends down to all things one and the same common faculty, not bestowing one upon one thing and another upon others. For although things are affected by it more or less according to their different position, nevertheless all receive one single power.

FURNIUS. And what else did Paracelsus say in the book On Great Philosophy when he affirmed that the influence of heaven is like a heaped-up fire made from every kind of wood, cooking each thing according to its own disposition? In the same place he asserts that the sun has one single property, just as fire has the faculty of heating.

ERASTUS. I am not moved by the words of this man, since what he sometimes says correctly he never preserves, but after casting such things aside, he substitutes false and absurd things, and generally increases falsehoods by falsehoods. The nature of all things compels us to think as we have said. Secondly, it is certain that all these sublunary things receive the celestial force. Thirdly, it is agreed that heaven creates no particular effects here without particular causes, but only communicates its own common powers equally to all.

FURNIUS. As though we did not see daily that the heavens generate both animals and plants from putrid matter.

ERASTUS. When mice, frogs, worms, and herbs are generated by heaven from putrid earth, this is not the work of heaven alone, but of the property of the matter together with heaven, and of the heat implanted in it having such a power. For just as the heat implanted in eggs, if it is not fostered and increased by suitable external warmth, cannot produce an animal from the matter subject to it, even if that matter is suitable for the generation of an animal, so too the heat present in putrid things needs the help and aid of celestial heat. But it is not the heat of heaven that forms the animal, but the heat implanted in the matter, increased and strengthened by that celestial heat. Hence it is that heaven cannot generate anything whatever from any putrid matter whatever, just as the heat of a hen cannot hatch any chick whatever from any egg whatever. [p. 151] But if either the hen’s heat could generate without the heat innate in the eggs, or the celestial heat could generate without the inborn and internal spirit of each thing, then the hen would generate any bird from any egg, and heaven would draw forth anything from anything. Therefore the general and common power of the heavens grants to things particularly only as much as individual things previously had, when by strengthening their heat it causes them to act according to the powers implanted by the Creator.

FURNIUS. What, then, will you finally conclude?

ERASTUS. I wish to show this: that heaven, because it is a general and common cause, at any given time sends one single effect into all things, by which each is impelled or aided to do what it can do according to its own nature. This common power is called heat by the Peripatetics, which is imparted in varying ways to sublunary things through the varied motion of the heavens. From this arise the varieties of the seasons and the dissimilarities of things. The Platonists invented those particular powers; they attributed individual demons to individual stars and made them the craftsmen of such things. Paracelsus follows their opinion, naming them spirits, Ascendants, Craftsmen, and I know not by what other names. No learned person has dared to ascribe such powers to the bodies of heaven and the stars. The Sacred Scriptures agree most beautifully with the doctrine of the Peripatetics, attributing no other faculty to the stars than that of illuminating, distinguishing day and night, and varying and signifying the seasons of the year. Not even asinine people, provided that even a tiny bit of reason remains to them, doubt that these things are accomplished by the light and heat of heaven.

FURNIUS. The Sacred Scriptures do not deny that there are other, more contracted powers in heaven.

ERASTUS. They assign none to the heavens which cannot and should not be referred to light and heat. If you contend that others are present, I shall ask whether they are common or particular and proper. If you say they are common, the earlier question returns. For in these sublunary things they will produce [p. 152] a common effect; they will effect nothing particular. But things do not differ by what they have in common, but by what is proper to each. Therefore they will introduce no particular powers. If you affirm that they are proper, the most absurd and most false consequences will follow. For, to keep the example given above of the leaden plate fabricated for curing epileptics, I ask you whether the power of the configuration under which the plate is prepared also touches other things, or descends upon the plate alone. This cannot be said, as is clear from what was said above. Therefore, since it touches all other things, but can give its power to no others, it will be idle for the greatest part, that is, it will be present to other things in vain. That configuration too will be wholly in vain whenever perhaps no Magus is thinking of preparing a plate at that moment. Moreover, elemental things will not be changed, each according to its own nature, by the powers of the heavens, since the greatest part of things will suffer absolutely nothing from such hidden powers. For if you assert that they do suffer, you make the power common.

FURNIUS. Granted, they do not move by this faculty; nevertheless they move by others. For they do not have only one power of moving. Therefore they cannot be thought to have been created in vain and to be idle.

ERASTUS. This faculty, certainly, will then act in vain, whatever we think about the others. Next I ask you: who told human beings that these particular powers are present in the stars? For we perceive the general powers by the senses and understand them by the mind.

FURNIUS. Experience has taught it, just as it has taught most other things. I think you have not yet forgotten that nobleman who recently died, who seemed to have helped many with a leaden character suspended from the neck. Yet I confess that these were not fabricated under a certain position of the stars, but were hung on a certain day with some murmuring and with the imposition of fasts and prayers.

ERASTUS. Perhaps Menecrates the physician, of whom mention is made in Athenaeus, had fashioned a plate of this kind, for which he wished, because of the cure of this [p. 153] disease, to be saluted and regarded as a god. I say to you freely that the things astrologers babble about the experience of such matters are the most rotten lies. It has already been shown abundantly that the heavens have no such powers. Nor does the plate obtain this salutary power from itself. Still less could it have received it from art, as will soon be understood. Therefore, if anything of this kind occurred, it proceeded from another power, namely from an evil demon. But because I do not think that demons can remove true epilepsy, the demon cured those whom it had afflicted, as if they were suffering from epilepsy. These, I say, it ceased to afflict when such a plate was hung upon them. An evident sign is that it did no good at all for infinitely many. Therefore either someone recovered by chance, or he seemed better for the reason I have just stated. Indeed, that nobleman cured few, and perhaps no adults, but almost only children; and children are often seized by this disease and are also freed from it without any remedy being applied. No one is ignorant that these are generally cured easily by remedies. Therefore the plate was bound on by chance when they began to recover either of their own accord or by the powers of medicines.

For such a plate was either the cause of health, or a sign, or an accident. It could not be the cause. For lead is not endowed with this power. Nor did it receive it from art, as is known in itself. Nor could it be given by heaven, as has been demonstrated. Therefore, since it could not be endowed with this faculty from elsewhere, it was not even a cause. But if it was a sign, it was not natural, as is evident; nor was it instituted by God, who condemns such things. It was therefore a sign to the demon, by which it was invited to perform the cure through an occult pact. If you deny that it was a sign, nothing remains except that it was an accident, just as if someone were freed from a fever after thunder sounded, when nature overcomes the disease and attempts to expel harmful things.

Therefore it has now been most firmly proved, partly by arguments of reason and partly by the testimonies of the holy word of God, that heaven does not have those hidden powers which the astrologer-Magi say are infused by it [p. 154] into their images. But once this marriage has been dissolved, or this means of endowment removed, that natural Magic has been removed from the midst, which was thought to be a certain art, distinct from Medicine and Natural Philosophy, working wonders, but born from a kind of marriage and union of these with heaven. The fact that the matter is no different from what we have said could also have taught us this: that whatever writings exist about Magic as a separate art belong to wicked and criminal Magic. I always except those true and certain things which that Neapolitan collected about the formation of fruits, preservation, methods of seasoning, varied grafting, and similar things. He mixed with these many things just as true as it is true that dried and dead pennyroyal, suspended from a beam, grows green again and flowers around the winter solstice. I mention this so that no one may think that I approve everything simply. Moreover, these things should not be called by the name of Magic. First, because they are done more rightly by skilled and ingenious farmers than by the most learned and altogether consummate philosopher. Secondly, because they are not done above and beyond the order of nature. Nor do they contain that admiration which magical things have, or which at least everyone thinks they have. Finally, because most of them are not done more quickly than the order of nature allows. But all people think that things perfected by the power of incantations are perfected quickly. Hence I noted above that Galen too compared the efficiency of remedies that act effectively and quickly to the powers of incantations.

FURNIUS. Indeed you have made me begin to doubt strongly whether there is any natural Magic by which wonders are produced. If it is established that artificial preparation contributes nothing to the nobler and more divine reception of celestial powers, I greatly fear that the magical marriage is truly magical, that is, vain and deceptive, and that the bride remains without a dowry.

ERASTUS. I have openly shown that no Magic is found to produce miracles except prohibited [p. 155] and infamous Magic. Now the order of our undertaking requires that we say something about its species. Therefore the principal parts of Magic are two: one working wonders, and one divinatory. We shall deal with divinatory Magic later; now we must discuss operative Magic, which we said is called γοητεία and ἐπῳδή — “sorcery” and “incantation,” because it uses charms and exorcisms. As many species of this can be posited as there are instruments which Magi are accustomed to use. They use barbarous names, prayers, exorcisms, even sacred words, various ceremonies, characters, images, and figures. We shall chiefly debate those species which pertain more closely to the medical art. First we shall consider what images, figures, and characters accomplish. In passing, we shall also offer some remarks about other περίαπτα — “amulets” — and things called ligatures. After this we shall discuss words, both sacred and barbarous. Finally, we shall add something about philtres, which are referred to φαρμακεία — “the use of drugs, potions, or poisonings” — and about the powers of witches in curing and harming.

FURNIUS. This pleases me in every way, especially since I desire to hear how much art can lend to Nature in this matter.

ERASTUS. I must show that images made by art receive no more from heaven than the matter from which they are made can receive. Although among fair judges of things there is no need for many arguments, nevertheless we shall confirm the proposition by some arguments drawn partly from the nature of heaven, partly from the aptitude of the patients, and partly from the powers of the arts. Therefore, we showed above that heaven is a general and common cause, and accordingly produces one effect common to all things. From this it necessarily follows that particular powers, by which things differ among themselves, are not introduced into things by heaven, but were already present in all things according to each one’s nature. For since it impresses one and the same quality upon all, and by this confirms individual things and, as it were, rouses them from sleep so that each may act according to the powers of its nature, it is necessary that each first have its own [p. 156] nature, just as it is necessary for eggs from which a hen must hatch a chick by her warming to be endowed with their own fertile heat and spirit. Since heaven did not give these individual natures, but only dispenses and governs them by its general faculty, everyone sees that heaven gives nothing proper and particular to Images, but impresses only this upon the matter which it impresses at any time upon all other things. Those who think otherwise presuppose that heaven gives things their forms and powers, which has been declared false and impossible by the earlier arguments. Certainly heaven gives to these things neither matter nor form without the aid of a proximate and true cause. Therefore it does not bestow properties either, all of which belong either to matter, form, or the composite. And what need is there here of more words? Sacred Scripture, which cannot deceive, teaches that to each thing its own nature, powers, and properties were implanted by God in creation, and that the power was also contributed of preserving itself and propagating itself with those same powers. From the same Scriptures it is plainly evident that all metals and plants existing within the earth and born from the earth were endowed by the Creator with their own nature, powers, and properties before He had created the stars. And after He created them, He did not command them to instill new powers into things, but to govern, by their light and heat, the most general and common powers, the generation of things, to divide day and night, to distinguish the seasons of the year, and thus to temper the rising and setting of things by a succession altogether admirable and indeed miraculous. The opinion of Aristotle, the prince of the Peripatetics, agrees with this definition of the Sacred Scriptures, from which no creature may depart. His disciples followed him, all who were not driven mad by Platonic phantasms or stupefied by the madness of astrologers or Magi.

Next, all who are not utterly unlearned understand that action and passion are found only in those things which are of the same genus. But that natural and artificial things differ not only in their proximate genera, but in their whole genera, is far better known than that it should be called into doubt. [p. 157] For natural things have in themselves the principle of their motion and rest, by which they are moved and rest per se. Artificial things, however, have this principle outside themselves. Therefore natural bodies cannot act upon artificial bodies insofar as they are such; but if they act upon them, they act upon them insofar as they have natural matter. But the bodies of heaven and of the stars are natural and act by natural powers. Therefore they do not change artificial things except insofar as these are in natural matter. Who is so ignorant and foolish as to think that heaven acts upon a garment insofar as it has received this or that form from a craftsman? Heaven indeed changes garments insofar as they are made from wool, linen, or skins; but insofar as they consist of a certain figure, they suffer nothing from it. Idiots know this: they understand that moths are born in skins and that other garments are torn, gnawed, lacerated, and putrefied, not because of form, but because of matter. Hence they preserve linen garments in one way, woolen in another, and garments made from skins again in another, although one and the same artificial form is present in all. Therefore, since it is clear that heaven and other natural causes change the same things neither more nor less because of the form effected in any matter than if they had either no form or any other form at all, this too is manifest: that Images receive no more powers from heaven than if their matter had never been formed in that way.

As for those things which they say are marked with such powers by heaven, the difficulty is equal. For nothing can be more certain than that all things suffer nothing from heaven unless they have potency and aptitude for suffering from natural causes. But it is agreed that artificial things, insofar as they are such, [p. 158] lack this principle. For just as natural things can be moved per se only by natural things, so artificial things can be moved only by artificial things. Thus the craftsman can change a square form into a round or quadrangular one without changing the underlying matter, just as a natural cause can alter matter in various ways without the artificial figure suffering. Although one is frequently changed in the changing of the other, it is nevertheless certain that this happens accidentally. Moreover, it is certain that heaven has no faculty other than a natural one. Therefore it cannot move earthly things except by natural powers. Nor can these things suffer from heaven unless insofar as they are subject to the motions of nature. But they are not subject to these motions insofar as they are marked by artificial forms, but insofar as they are endowed with nature. Therefore they cannot suffer anything from heaven because of the form impressed by the craftsman.

To this is added that things formed differently by craftsmen do not change their nature. For if, for example, you engrave into a magnet the image of a lion, a bull, a fly, or any other animal, it will be neither more nor less a magnet now than it was before. The proof is that because of the sculpture it will neither attract iron more easily nor with more difficulty than before, if it has suffered no other change. But things which now have the same nature they had before are moved by heaven in the same way, as far as these hidden and spiritual qualities or powers are concerned. This argument, too, should not be scorned: order, figure, and composition are not efficient principles. But it is certain that art gives nothing to matter in the formation of Images except order, figure, and a certain composition. Therefore from this reasoning too it is clear that matter is figured in vain. Galen writes about jasper that he had found by experience that its power was equally efficacious without the engraving of King Nechepsos as with it. [p. 159]

If we consider the powers of art, the Magi will find just as much support. For if art aids the action of the heavens, it aids in this respect: that it removes impediments. For it does not change nature in the formation of Images. Therefore we must see what those impediments are which impede heaven. But heaven is a natural cause and made by God for this purpose: to rule and govern by its power the whole machine of this sublunary world, as was said a little earlier. Therefore no natural quality resists the action of heaven in such a way that it does not act upon individual things as it ought to act. I am not ignorant of what must be thought about elemental qualities. But because our present discussion is not about these, I intentionally omit this explanation. We are speaking about spiritual and insensible powers, to which hard things do not offer resistance, and soft things do not yield too much; powers which, they say, pass through even to the depth of the earth, through the hardest rocks and however dense and compact the earths may be. Add that in these fabrications neither hardness nor the other proper qualities of metals are removed. And even if this were useful in stones and metals, nevertheless it would be done in vain in wax and other soft matter.

The sum is this: the hidden actions of heaven can neither be delayed nor advanced by those qualities of matter which art is accustomed to change. The Magi themselves too ascribe the reason for the reception of celestial powers not so much to other qualities as to figure, inscribed characters, and similar things. They very rarely or never mention heat or cold, while they perpetually press, repeat, and inculcate the former things. But tell me, I ask you, how do you think the heavens are aided by art? Celestial powers, since they are certain natural qualities, do not inhere in the surface alone, but also occupy the deep parts. Hence, even if one especially thinks that artificial figure is useful, it contributes only so far as the celestial power is received in the surface alone and by no means penetrates into the depth. For art shapes only the surface; it does not touch the parts situated [p. 160] in the depth. If it could pass through the interior of matter in the manner of nature, it should no longer be called an imitator and a kind of ape of nature, but rather nature. But it is an imitator and ape of nature because it makes things like nature in the external parts, but does not touch the interior.

FURNIUS. I do not hesitate at all to affirm that you falsely assert that art adorns and renders only the surface fit for the reception of celestial powers. For it very often changes the interior too, namely whenever it uses fire for melting metals, for liquefying solid juices, for cooking liquids, or for performing similar things.

ERASTUS. No one doubts that art, using natural qualities as instruments, sometimes changes the interior of matter according to the nature and powers of those qualities. But this alteration is natural, not artificial, and is accidental to art. For art does not alter the whole thing in order to shape the deep parts too and introduce a certain species into them, but so that it may be able more fitly to form the external parts. At present we are speaking about Images, figures, and characters which are inscribed or impressed in another similar way. Although the reasoning is not very dissimilar for those which are cast or otherwise shaped. In order that the craftsman may more easily introduce species or forms into matter, he melts it, liquefies it, softens it, purges it, mixes it, or otherwise disposes it; not in order that he may form the parts situated in the depth in the same manner as the external ones. But heaven does not need these alterations for the impression of the powers with which we are dealing. Therefore it communicates its faculties to sublunary things neither more easily nor with more difficulty because of them. Indeed, if softness, melting, purification, and qualities of this kind prepared something for the reception of a certain power from heaven, characters and figures would be engraved in vain; yet without these all think the images ineffective. Nor, even by the judgment of the ancients, is there any other distinction between astronomical and [p. 161] magical images than that in the latter demons are openly invoked, while in the former they are tacitly and secretly invited and admonished by characters as signs of a pact. Therefore it is clear that those materials are melted, liquefied, or otherwise changed for no other reason than that they may be more easily figured.

And it is certain that these natural qualities do not cling to the surface alone, but also occupy the underlying parts. For heat, cold, color, taste, odor, and τὰ ἄλλα — “the other” natural things — are present not only in the surface, but in the underlying body. This is so proper to them that whatever adheres only to the surface neither should nor can be held for a natural affection. Therefore, if you insist altogether that some things receive those admirable celestial powers by reason of artificial figure, not only will what I said follow, namely that such powers are sprinkled upon the surface alone, but this too will be established: that powers of this kind are not natural. Accordingly they will be something mathematical or something artificial. Both are impossible. For it is not imaginable how a natural cause by a natural action should produce an artificial effect. Moreover, by what machine will a mathematical figure be drawn down from heaven to earth? Or of what action will it be the cause, if it is granted to be drawn down? Certainly no learned philosopher ever conceded that quantities are principles of acting. If nevertheless you contend that it is present, you will confess that it is a diabolical power, since it is not natural. Those who rashly believe the astrologer-Magi entangle themselves in so many difficulties.

How firm, certain, solid, and true the arguments I have brought forward are is clearly perceived from the fact that the sharpest astrologers and Magi were never able to find a constant mode by which they might enrich their Images with such great faculties. The Conciliator, when he asks whence they receive efficacy, recounts five opinions; among them is that of the theologians, who judge that such things are done by demons. He himself approves this opinion, which alone is true, least of all. [p. 162] For he prefers the madness of Avicenna, who attributes it to the powers of the soul, to the true opinion of the theologians, yet that does not satisfy him. The third opinion is that the celestial Intelligences sprinkle powers through light, as through an instrument, into suitable matter disposed fittingly at the proper time. The impious and profane Pomponazzi defends this same opinion against Thomas Aquinas in chapter 12 of his sacrilegious book On Incantations. And it has been refuted by us in such a way that it is not necessary to add more. The fourth and fifth opinions, the latter of which he prefers to the others, are purely and simply astrological. In the former he holds that Images obtain efficacy from the nativity of the maker; in the latter, because heaven moves someone to the fabrication of a certain image at a certain time, by which evil or good is brought about, which, because of the quality of his nativity, ought to happen to the person for whom it is prepared. And by this reasoning he tries to evade the argument which proves that natural things do not act upon artificial things. “For art,” he says, “is in this way reduced to nature as to a universal principle.” Who does not see that all these things are foolish, stupid, and false? From what was said above it is clear that heaven bestows upon no thing any particular nature and quality, but contributes something common to all. Moreover, he refuted the impious doctrine of the astrologers in his defense of Savonarola against Stathmion, and indeed with arguments which no intelligent person will attempt to refute.

FURNIUS. I should gladly like to hear, first, what you will answer to Albertus, who affirms almost the same thing as the Conciliator, and then what you will answer to Pomponazzi’s arguments in defending himself against Thomas. Certainly Albertus seems to defend his opinion quite plausibly in the book On Minerals, where he says that this is the principle of Magic: namely, that whatever is done either by art or by Nature is moved by celestial things. The matter is agreed concerning nature. Since doubt could arise about art, he proves it roughly as follows. There must be something that has aroused a human being to do something now, not earlier or later. But nothing except heaven can be adduced, as the wise affirm; and rightly so. For there is a twofold principle of acting in a human being: Nature and will. Moreover, it is agreed that the will is drawn by nature, unless it resists. Hence, when nature is moved by the stars, it draws the will along with itself, and thus the will, enticed by nature, begins to will to fabricate images. Thus in children we see the powers of heaven before they use reason, since we discern them to be more fit and inclined toward one art than toward any other things. It is moreover certain that what exists as the cause of a certain effect is sometimes rightly called the cause of a second effect. From this it follows that, while the stars are a certain cause moving art, they also infuse something of their powers into the things effected by art. Once these things have been posited, he argues for the proposition as follows: what is the principle in the order of generating things infuses its power into what follows. The figures of heaven are the first of figures and are therefore the principles of the others. For this reason these lower figures receive something of power from those. “I speak,” he says, “about figures not mathematical, but natural and implanted in matter.” I do not know by what arguments Pomponazzi defends himself against Thomas, yet I desire to hear.

ERASTUS. You have understood Albert’s meaning rightly. I dispute against this man unwillingly, and I do not like to cite him. He is openly and undisguisedly a Magus, or at least he confesses that he copies from infamous Magi the things he smeared onto his books; he does this openly in this very passage which you have produced. But I must humor you, since we have so resolved. He posits a principle of Magic that is not only disputed, but altogether false. But principles must be so true that what is concluded from them receives all its credibility from them. Therefore what must be thought about all of Magic can be perceived from this one point alone. Indeed, it has been shown more than sufficiently that heaven, which is a natural cause, acts naturally and upon natural things. For agent and patient must be contained [p. 164] in one genus. The patient too does not suffer from a natural cause unless it is naturally fit for suffering. But art gives nature to no things, nor does it make them fit so that they can suffer naturally. And to be silent now about other matters, who is so mad as to think that some thing acquires through an artificial figure a natural potency to receive something from a natural cause? If figure could provide this, it could give nature. Indeed, matter cannot even receive figure from art unless it has first been made fit by its own nature. It was said above that artificial figures exist only on the surface, are something mathematical, and neither give anything to nor take away or subtract from the aptitudes of nature.

Next, it was shown that heaven and the stars are not causes of individual actions and do not impart anything particular to any things, but bestow upon all and each one and the same power, by which individual things are confirmed and aided to perform what they were made by their own nature to do. Therefore it is madness to think that the stars infuse I know not what particular powers into one thing rather than others, since at any given time they contribute one and the same thing to the universe. Celestial power is to natural things what the vital power proceeding from the heart is to the members of our body. Is someone so deranged as to think that the eyes receive from the heart a different faculty from that which the ears and all the other parts receive from the same heart? Whoever thinks so is not merely delirious, but utterly deprived of reason. The heart contributes precisely the same thing to all parts at once, namely vital heat, by which individual parts, aided, do what God commanded them to do. Since this heat is one at any given time, it can do only one thing everywhere, namely heat, however much the different parts, strengthened by it, produce very different actions. The eye sees, the ear hears, the stomach digests, the foot serves walking, and finally each part privately does what it ought to do. Thus, I say, heaven affects sublunary things [p. 165] at any given time, so that it communicates one common faculty to all and gives a particular one to none, although each thing, after receiving it, acts according to the powers and property of its own nature. For what is equally related to many things moves or effects nothing particular unless it is contracted by something and determined to one certain thing. If it is variously defined and limited by all at once, it acts variously at once; but left to itself, it can act only one thing. Since, therefore, heaven cannot adorn natural things fit to be moved by it with new powers, but can only arouse those powers which were previously present in each thing, how, I ask, will it instill those admirable faculties into an artificial figure, which lacks every potency of acting? Anyone who sees these things and does not see the error of the Magi is more ignorant and stupid than an ass.

I therefore deny that art or artificial things, insofar as they are such, are moved by heaven. I deny that heaven impels or provokes or invites a human being to do this or that thing rather than any other thing which he is fit to do. That I rightly deny this, even the blind see. “But there is something,” he says, “that excites now and not before.” What then? Does heaven alone make it that we do something now which we were not doing before? Therefore we will not be able even to pass urine, nor eat, drink, sleep, nor go anywhere, indeed neither look at nor hear anything, unless a particular position of the stars impels us to this? This madness exceeds all belief, when they seek in heaven the causes of our actions and thoughts, which here below are infinite. Away with those beasts! “But the wise,” you say, “Ptolemy and others like him, said so.” I would be surprised if you had named others. I have long known that astrologers and Magi are joined to one another in the closest kinship. It is certain that the will is often drawn by nature; but to think that nature is bent by heaven toward particular things is not only false but also impious. Nor do children have their inclinations from the impulses of heaven; rather, each inclines toward one thing more than another because of the property of his own nature, to say nothing here of divine Providence.

It is already clear that the stars do not move either art or the artisan insofar as he is skilled in art, but insofar as he is a human being, and that by a general and common reason. Yet although, once the foundations have been undermined and torn out, the building cannot but be ruinous and collapse of its own accord, nevertheless we shall examine the walls too, after the foundation has been shaken. “What is the principle in some genus,” he says, “infuses its power into the rest.” This is true if it is truly an efficient principle or has the character of a true genus. But perhaps some philosopher will concede that the celestial figures are first among figures in time and magnitude; I do not concede it simply. For the stars were completed and created after the planets, as Scripture teaches. The magnitude of the figure makes no difference to the matter. Next, figure is not a principle of acting, and therefore gives no powers to others. Thirdly, it cannot be shown what figure is contained in heaven except the spherical one. Finally, since he himself says that he is speaking about natural figure, what does this have to do with artificial figures, about which the disputation was undertaken? The magical and astrological arts do not use figures generated by heaven, but figures shaped by a craftsman. I ask you, when you consider these things, do you not pity yourself?

FURNIUS. Yet it is agreed that even demons observe the waxing and waning of the Moon in certain operations of theirs; from this one may infer that what astrologers and Magi prescribe about heaven is not altogether nothing.

ERASTUS. I know that in the Gospel someone possessed by a demon is called a lunatic. But both Jerome and Chrysostom will answer you that they observe such things in order to bring God’s creatures into disrepute; next, to persuade us that there are powers of this kind in the stars, such as Magi have devised for themselves by the work of demons, and thus more easily call us away from God and His right worship. Finally, because they cannot [p. 167] change matter otherwise than as it is fit to be moved, it can happen that they set up their plans according to the motions of the Moon and the Sun, for from these stars the principal power flows. For just as the Sun varies the seasons of the year, so the Moon in a certain way varies the month.

FURNIUS. I desire nothing further here; I desire to hear something more about Pomponazzi’s defense.

ERASTUS. Thomas’ argument was the one I set down above: that figure is order and composition, and neither takes anything from the powers of matter nor adds anything to them. Although this argument of Thomas is firm and true, it is nevertheless not truer or firmer than the others which we have brought forward besides. And since they cannot free themselves from this argument, they betray the falsehood of their case plainly enough. First, he says, it contradicts common custom. For Ptolemy and the astrologers who either preceded or followed him, he himself calls them Wise Men, would not have said this unless they had found it true. And it is agreed that it matters greatly under what position of heaven wood is cut, seeds are committed to the earth, grain is threshed, and many other things of this kind are performed. After this he confirms it by reason in this way: some metals are like Saturn, others like Jupiter. But things that are alike agree in properties. Moreover, things that agree in figure and quality are more alike than those that agree in only one. Therefore, if figure is not present by nature, it must be added by art, since art assists deficient nature. Thus bird-catchers deceive birds when they fashion birds most similar to true birds in qualities, figure, and size. These are the splendid arguments of an atheist. What he says about custom is false, if he is speaking of the right custom of pious and intelligent people. If he says that there are more Magi, astrologers, and superstitious people than pious and good people, I shall not deny it; but I shall deny that this custom ought to prejudice truth. Therefore the fact that he cites Ptolemy and other astrologers does not concern us.

What he reports about [p. 168] other matters does not support his case, as was shown above. For woods rot more easily or with more difficulty not because of the cutting, but because of the moisture which they contain within themselves more abundantly at one time than another. But if the comparison were to have force, the woods would have to contract such a quality because of the figure of the cutting, just as they assert that metals or other things receive the powers of heaven because of figure. But this is so false that nothing could be more false. Then it was said above that country people observe not the position of heaven, which they do not know, but the quality of the air, which they note partly by sense, partly by the changes of the Moon. Hence it happens that they generally cut wood for building before the spring equinox, while it is dry and therefore can putrefy less easily, at the time of the waning Moon. They do not, as I said, observe the minutes of hours and peculiar conjunctions of the stars, but they have found by experience that almost the same time is suitable for this matter every year, whatever aspect the lesser stars have among themselves, whether they agree or fight.

Then the assumption he makes for himself, that certain metals are similar in qualities, such as color, to certain planets, is so rotten that I think no one fails to see it. For if it were permitted for us to reason in this way, brass would have powers most similar to gold. But why do I speak of brass? How many things are similar in color to gold and to the light of the sun, in which nevertheless nothing else is found common and similar to gold and the Sun? Someone must be very mad and senseless to allow himself to be deceived by such hypotheses. What shall we say about figure? The shamelessness and audacity of these tricksters is astonishing. Certainly they are no better, those who, knowingly and deliberately, babble such things; and we are compelled to judge this of Pomponazzi, who was not ignorant of Peripatetic philosophy. Who told them that the star of Saturn has the figure of a whole cross, a half-cross, or of any other thing? Indeed, it is intolerable insolence petulantly to affirm that this [p. 169] certain figure is more proper and native to this star than to that one. Physicians, farmers, and others of this kind would have spoken more rightly about how nature is aided by art than criminal Magi or superstitious astrologers. And what then? Is it not most worthy of laughter that he thinks the Intelligences invented in heaven are almost enticed and deceived by such Images in the way that foolish little birds are deceived by painted birds? Since the adversaries give themselves away so shamefully in dissolving one argument, what do you think will happen if they are compelled to answer our other arguments solidly?

FURNIUS. In this part I am entirely satisfied; and therefore I shall henceforth judge useless the book which our Theophrastus wrote on characters.

ERASTUS. In the book On Occult Philosophy he says that one should not trust all characters, but only those in which truth is present. Of these he posits two, drawn from the names Adonai and the Tetragrammaton; he contends that they have power against all things, and asserts that they contain in themselves the virtue of all the others, if they are written on a cake and given in food. He affirms that Israelites and Necromancers performed wonders with these two characters.

FURNIUS. I have abundantly understood how much I ought to attribute to characters. Therefore you may continue and bring forward what you think about the powers of words. I think, however, that you will never deny that by far the greatest power has always been believed to reside in words, although I do not think they should always be used with Theophrastus. For in the book already cited he says: “Conjurations can do something by themselves; yet the wise man should not use them, since they fight against God and His word, and even against the light of Nature. Evil spirits can be pressed by them, but not crushed.”

ERASTUS. Paracelsus says many things everywhere, but proves nothing. Therefore, leaving trifles aside, we shall treat the matter itself. Words are partly natural, partly artificial, just like Images. Indeed, the matter of words, as of images, is natural, namely the voice; and the matter of voice is sound. But the form is [p. 170] a certain articulation, which is impressed by the innate instruments of the animal upon the breath rising from the chest and lungs, just as some image conceived in the mind is engraved upon external matter by external organs. And just as an Image represents some thing, so too words, provided they are not barbarous and unknown, signify the mind’s thoughts. They signify, however, not by nature but by the agreement and convention of human beings. For if by their own nature they signified something definite, then, just as the nature of all people is one and common, so too the signification would be one and common. We eat, drink, hunger, sleep, and perform all other natural actions, and we have no need of a teacher for this, wherever we were born and brought up, because these things are innate in us by nature. In this matter there is no distinction between a Greek, a Latin, a Persian, a Scythian, and an Indian, although they may have been born under very different stars. But we do not all have and understand the same words; rather, there is an almost infinite variety. Hence it happens not only that different peoples use different nouns and words, but also that the same words among different peoples signify very different things. Many similar words are found in differing languages, which nevertheless do not designate the same thing in each of them. Add that deaf people would know how to speak, even if they had heard no one speaking, if speech and its signification were born with us and natural. From these points we see most plainly that words do not signify by heaven or Nature, but are artificial, and have been made marks and signs of our thoughts solely by the constitution and consensus of certain human beings. Thoughts, because they are in us by nature, are the same among all. But the marks of these have as many and as great differences as there are differences of languages.

Two things necessarily follow from what has been recalled. One is that heaven and the stars, even if they especially had in themselves the powers [p. 171] about which we are disputing and could communicate them to other things, nevertheless could impart no more to one word than to all the others. For insofar as words are articulated, they are not natural but artificial. But artificial things, insofar as they are of this kind, suffer no change per se from Nature and natural things. The other is that words, insofar as they are voices or articulated sounds, can have no powers except the one which their first imposers and others agreeing with them wish them to have. But they wished them only to be marks and significations of things, so that people might declare to one another what they were thinking in their mind. Therefore they can accomplish nothing beyond this very thing. I am speaking, however, of words that are known and signify. For the barbarous and Egyptian words which the Magi also used in antiquity, and which neither the Greeks nor the Egyptians even then understood, are not marks for us, but for demons, as Iamblichus asserted in responding to Porphyry.

Therefore whoever seeks in the words themselves a force and power effecting wonders plays an empty game. It was also said above that quantities are not principles of acting. But speech is a certain numbered quantity. Therefore by itself it does nothing other than signify. It was no less truly said that natural action cannot exist between those things which do not have common matter. Thus the heat that is in fire is not contrary to the cold that is in the mind, nor does the latter suffer from the former as the cold present in water suffers. But it is agreed that words and the wonders which Magi and other superstitious people think are effected by the power of charms have no common matter because of which the former could act and the latter suffer. Besides, in what way do words touch the things which they effect? Certainly no natural action occurs unless the agent touches the patient, either by its own body, or by its power, or by some quality. Thus we say that heaven touches these things of ours by its light, which has the efficacy of generating heat. But that words [p. 172] can in no way touch things, especially absent things, is better known than that anyone could doubt it or that I should need to prove it with many words. They are not shot out toward things far away in the way an arrow is shot from a bow or string.

Certainly in words there is nothing natural except the matter. For the form, as has been demonstrated, is artificial and has no force and power other than that of signifying and expressing concepts of the mind. And because words signify by a certain agreement and consensus of human beings, not absolutely, they are evident and certain signs only to those who understand them. To those ignorant of the language they are no more signs than the songs of birds or other unknown sounds. Therefore, if powers arose from form, they would have effect only among those who understand. But all Magi quite often use barbarous words which neither they themselves nor any other mortals understand. It follows, therefore, that they are spoken because of demons. If we think that not even demons understand them, then they do not act because of signification and form. Moreover, the matter, which is breath shaped in the larynx from the chest through the windpipe, has no power except such as the other vapors of our body possess, nor can it touch anything outside the human being. For as soon as it is outside the mouth, it is dispersed into the air. Indeed, if that matter of expiration possessed some particular virtue, it would act equally under any artificial form whatever. Therefore it would not matter what words were used; indeed, no words at all would be needed. For expiration or blowing alone would suffice, and this would have greater powers by as much as they go out in greater quantity in this way than in the formation and pronunciation of words. But all Magi contend that powers of this sort are present only in certain conceived words, not in any others. Therefore it is again evident that words effect no such thing. Even if we granted that words by their own power touch certain remote things, nevertheless we would understand that they lack the power of performing those wonders. [p. 173]

For this power would be present in them either insofar as they are words or insofar as they are present in a certain matter, as has been said. But neither is granted. For if they were efficacious insofar as they are words, all words would be able to do the same thing. But not all can; indeed the same words are not efficacious always or in all cases. As for matter: because it is different almost every moment, and according to the quality of the blood elaborated in the heart and the various and dissimilar affections of the heart, it must vary almost infinitely. Therefore we shall again stick in the mud, since we will never be able to be certain when those dispositions have naturally been so affected. Add this too: although all Magi contend that those powers lie hidden only in certain words, nevertheless they do not all use the same words for curing the same disease or for effecting the same thing, but some use some, others others, and very often ridiculous words, and ones foolish beyond human belief, as you yourself know.

You see how wisely and truly it was said by Aristotle and other philosophers that things are not true or false because of our affirmation or negation. Our speech is true when it agrees with things. Whoever wishes to use true speech must fit it to things, not conform things to speech. This is so because words have no power of effecting, as has already been said so often, but only of representing and signifying. I conclude, therefore, that words can in no way be judged the authors and causes of wondrous works. But if they are not causes, and nevertheless the desired effect sometimes follows, it is necessary that they were either certain signs of that effect, or an accident, as if thunder occurs while I am walking. They cannot be natural signs. For whatever is a natural sign of some thing is either its cause or its effect, or is effected by the same cause by which the thing it signifies is effected. Moreover, it has been shown that they are neither first, nor secondary, nor instrumental causes of wonders. That they are not effects is [p. 174] known in itself. For according to the hypothesis of the Magi, words precede things in time; they posit them as causes. That both are not made by one cause, namely the human being, is altogether evident. For the human being could then make miracles together with words, while the words contributed nothing to the effecting of these. For the rainbow, for example, is sometimes a sign of clear weather, because it is produced by the same cause by which clear weather is introduced, but it contributes nothing to clear weather. Thus smoke too is sometimes stirred up by the same cause, namely fire, because of matter, from which heat proceeds, although it does not aid the power of fire to heat, but rather impedes it.

Therefore, if words are signs, they are artificial signs, instituted between the parties by some mutual agreement. Thus the sound of a trumpet signifies something definite to those hearing and understanding it. These signs are therefore instituted between parties so that one or both may remind the other of some certain thing or duty. In the present case, they must be signs of a definite promise, by which the one to whom they are presented is reminded that he must do what the signs demand. For in vain is a sign of a wondrous future thing presented where there is no effector. But not even the most wicked Magus will dare to deny that God has nowhere promised that, upon the pronunciation of certain conceived words, or upon the presentation of certain signs and characters, He wishes to do this or that because of the pronounced words or presented characters. And that no such pact has been sanctioned among human beings is evident from very many points. First, because often no one understands them. Next, because they would be put in vain before human beings who cannot effect the signified thing. Thirdly, because they are generally pronounced to inanimate things. Fourthly, because often the human beings upon whom the Magus strives to create evil do not know the words have been pronounced, and therefore cannot be admonished by them. And if they knew, they would not execute but would altogether attempt to impede the Magus’ plan. What remains, then, except that they are signs by which [p. 175] the evil demon is invited to accomplish what he has contracted with some Magus to do? For it was shown above from Porphyry that demons indicated by which signs, words, things, Images, etc., they were pleased, by which rites they wished to be summoned, and, finally, how they could be compelled. This too was said: that Iamblichus, when asked by Porphyry about barbarous and unknown names, responded that their significations are known to devils. It was briefly recalled what the Arab Almadal left written about these things. But if they are signs to demons, it is not permitted for us to use them. And nevertheless it is necessary that they are often empty, since it has been demonstrated that demons lack the power of producing miracles. But if you do not wish them to be proposed as signs even to demons, it is necessary that you confess them to be accidents and concede that they lack every power effecting wonders; and this was what I undertook to show.

FURNIUS. It has been shown clearly and firmly enough that things of this sort were introduced by the vain credulity of human beings, with the cooperation of the demon; things which sensible men long ago laughed at, even among the Gentiles. Yet because some objections seem possible, I should like an answer to them.

ERASTUS. I shall answer according to my strength; only bring them forward freely.

FURNIUS. If there is no power of enchanting in words, how are wild beasts delayed and captured by them, how are household mice, which we call rats, and finally serpents compelled by them? Secondly, it can be asked whether, just as once the Magi, as we read in Plutarch, Symposiacs 7, question 5, ordered those occupied by evil Genii to read with them the Ephesian names, it is now lawful to heal the same people with sacred names. Indeed, what we read in Numbers 5 concerning the waters of jealousy is thought by some to pertain here.

ERASTUS. Those points need no answer other than what has already been said. It has been evidently proved that this force is not in words, since they can do nothing other than interpret the mind’s thoughts. And what they can do in this way, they can do among those [p. 176] who understand. Thus orators, speaking ornamentally and artfully, persuade human beings of many things. But serpents and brute beasts are not persuaded and compelled by words in this way, since they do not understand them. Therefore a greater force does such things; this is clear even from the fact that words are not efficacious when pronounced by just anyone, nor always. But if that force were present in words, it would always be present in them. The sum is this: demons, as has been said, thus mock mortals and persuade them that words accomplish what they themselves do, having been summoned by those words as by a sign of a pact. Nor is it strange that even today he gladly exercises his fraudulent arts in serpents, since he showed at once from the founding of the world that he has power and reigns in them. Magi cast out demons with Ephesian names in the same way, when the demons pretended that they were being driven out and confirmed by this means an impious opinion in human beings. It is not permitted for us to abuse the word of God in so foul a way. It was not given to us from heaven for this purpose, that by its pronunciation, suspension, or writing we should put demons to flight, but so that from its reading, hearing, and meditation we may learn what the will of God toward us is and what He in turn asks from us, as the Apostle testifies in 2 Timothy 3, and Scripture asserts in many other places. Whoever applies the word of God to uses besides these acts impiously and criminally and will not escape divine punishment, Exodus 20.

The things we read in Moses about the scraping off of words in the description of the waters of jealousy had the manifest promise of God; it pleased Him by such a miracle to frighten women away from adultery. If the same ceremonies had been used in another place, they nevertheless would not have had the same powers. Certainly Scripture so clearly attributes the whole action to God that anyone doubting whether that power belonged to the words, insofar as they were words, must necessarily be foolish.

FURNIUS. If the matter stands in that way, as indeed I am now compelled to believe, having been persuaded, by what occasion do you think otherwise learned human beings drew those admirable powers [p. 177] into words? They seem to have been moved by some plausible reason, which I would gladly hear.

ERASTUS. I shall speak briefly, although it has already been said before in the disputation on Images. The Platonists, as they were the most superstitious of all learned men and the most dutiful worshippers of demons, openly ascribe all such things to demons. They posit certain orders among them and think that some command and others obey. Thus words have power insofar as one of the commanders, entreated by them, either of his own accord from a pact does what the Magus desires, or orders another to execute the commands. Hence it is that such words are either unknown and known only to demons, or they contain supplications, invocations, prayers, commands, adjurations, and are altogether directed to intelligent substances.

Plotinus varies, while he refers the matter now to the friendship and discord of things, now to the unity and connection of the universe, now to the one thing governing all, which they call the soul of the world, now to the power of the soul, and finally to the sounds and figures of words. Ficino, drunk with his madness, believed that words acquire powers from conjunction, just as material things acquire them from mixture. And because he easily saw that this is refuted at every moment, he adds that it comes either from the present position of the stars, or from the human being’s nativity, or from the singular power of the soul. Finally he adds: “But I suspect whether perhaps cunning demons pretend to be either enticed or expelled by certain magical devices.” I would refute these things, if he had not both slightly betrayed his own doubt and hesitation and if they had not already been solidly dissolved before.

Therefore I add only this here. All philosophers agree on this: that heaven can do nothing in the Intellect. Once this is posited, it is clear that heaven can give no human being the ability that representations of our thoughts made through words can effect anything other than the purpose for which the Intellect formed them, namely that they are representations of the things which it retains conceived within itself. [p. 178] Therefore the things that astrologer-Magi and Magus-astrologers fabulate about the position of the stars and nativity are rotten and even impious trifles.

That profane Pomponazzi was not content, together with the rest, to assign this to the stars and the movers of the heavens, but also wished to add an atrocious blasphemy. For he says that words and prayers receive powers from the fact that celestial things favor one Religion more than others, at different times, of course. For he says that every Religion is born from the vicissitude of the motions of heaven, takes increase, dies, like other things subject to generation and corruption. And that each has a certain period in which it is strong and good, and has the heavens propitious and favorable. From these, at the rising of a new Religion, excellent men in virtue, or mortal gods, are stirred up and produced, whom they endow with the power of miracles, since they understand that so great a change cannot be made without prodigies. He asserts that these new gods, or sons of God, in the new succession of Religion or Law, as he calls it, must be corrupted in the way we see menstrual blood perish in the generation of a human being. Nor, he says, were fewer miracles committed in the rise of the Turkish madness or of any other impiety than were produced at the beginning of the Christian Religion. Hence certain words and signs once endowed with wondrous power now grow cheap; and those which were then sluggish are now adorned with plainly divine powers. Thus neither Images nor words have power everywhere and always, because heaven now favors the author and founder of this Religion, not of another, and accordingly does not always infuse the same powers into the same words or characters or figures. What, I ask, could be said by a human being that is more horrible? Can anyone who loves piety read these things without shuddering? I do not think so. He competes with Paracelsus in impiety, so that it is not easy to say which is more wicked. Such diabolical Phantasms should not be refuted with arguments but cursed with dreadful execrations, [p. 179] together with their authors. Almost this one thing can be approved in that book: that he affirms no one cures with words and characters without superstition. Although this is true, it is not true for the reason he himself produced.

Finally, Augerius Ferrerius indeed takes power away from words and characters, but only in the case of the learned and those who have understanding. He thinks, most foolishly, that there is such great force in the minds of these that what they have firmly persuaded themselves of, they powerfully accomplish, provided the mind of the patient does not resist. He says that among the unlearned, a firm persuasion is acquired through the opinion which they have conceived about sacred words and characters, and that they can be applied in cures for their sake, so that the distrust of their minds may be overcome. This man could have been tolerated if, with Hippocrates, he had said only that the confidence of the sick person contributes to the expulsion of disease. But when he thinks that the physician’s constant and firm persuasion is efficacious in another’s body, he strays far. For we showed above that it is impossible that a human action remaining in the agent, which they aptly called immanent in the Schools, insofar as it remains in him and does not pass from him into the patient, should operate anything outside the agent. Now whoever does not see that conceptions and persuasions are not transitive or outgoing actions is deprived alike of the eyes of mind and body. What does it benefit the sick person, then, that I myself desire something in my own mind?

FURNIUS. Certainly I approved this man’s judgment, and I think even now that a vehement and constant will of the mind is useful insofar as he applies remedies according to it.

ERASTUS. The ardent desire of the physician causes him to inspect and do all things more diligently and more accurately; and no one doubts that in this respect it benefits the sick person. The remedies which touch the sick person act upon him strongly or weakly according to their own nature; they neither acquire nor produce anything from the desire of our mind. As for the affections of the sick person, it certainly matters very much whether he trusts or despairs. [p. 180] For no one doubts that affections of the mind alter one’s own body; about this matter enough was disputed above. But the person trusts more than others who is persuaded that he is being cured by someone who has both recognized the disease and properly learned the art of curing. Yet to wish to introduce this confidence by characters, magical murmuring, sacred words, is not only foolish but also superstitious and impious. Certainly it is an intolerable abuse of the most holy word of God, as I recall I warned above too.

I think you perceive clearly enough from what has been disputed, both from our arguments, which no one has ever been able to shake or will be able to shake hereafter, and from the incredible variety of modes by which astrologers, Magi, and other superstitious people say that both figures and words acquire new and unusual powers, that all such things are vain, false, impious, and magical, and therefore not to be approved, but to be avoided and detested by us.

FURNIUS. Now at last I see that no faith is to be put in Images, figures, characters, signs, or in words, charms, adjurations or exorcisms, or in ligatures, or in περίαπτα — “amulets” — or suspended words, whether sacred, profane, or barbarous and unknown, and figures; but that all these things should be judged impious, vain, superstitious, and execrable.

ERASTUS. This was what we had proposed to show: that no one can perform miracles by the powers of Magic. This, I think, has been sufficiently proved. Because of the consequence, we then also showed this: that it is not permitted for a Christian and a student of piety to use such things; indeed, that no one can use them without manifest impiety, even if he does not know whence they have those powers. For it has been declared that they proceed from the demon. For although those who do such things often do not know that they have commerce with the demon, nevertheless by the use of these things they do nothing other than tacitly remind him of the pact entered into. Therefore this differs from other malefactors and Magi [p. 181] in that they do not, like those others, openly seek help from the Devil. Nor does it matter whether they use sacred or profane words, things, and signs. Indeed, it is a more atrocious crime to abuse sacred things in this way than profane things. For, to omit what has been said above, it is much graver to make Sacraments of the Devil out of sacred things or words given to us by God for this purpose, that they serve our salvation and lead us to true acknowledgment of Him, than to transfer profane things to impious uses.

Indeed, that thousand-fold artificer, that old deceiver, strives in all things to imitate the institutions of God, partly so that he may afflict the Creator with insult, partly so that he may more easily deceive us. Therefore, just as God, by covenant and gratuitous mercy on account of His only-begotten Son, not by the force of the Sacraments, forgives sins to believers; so too the evil demon wishes to seem to present himself to his own and to give what they seek, not because of the dignity of the things offered, but because of a promise or a covenant entered into with them and because of the impious credulity of the superstitious. Nor does he bring about the things for whose sake such things are done, whenever God permits, for any other reason more than so that he may declare that he wishes to keep faith. Therefore, since those who use such things, although they often do so imprudently, bind themselves to devils as if by certain Sacraments, all things of this kind must be avoided by us Christians with great zeal.

FURNIUS. It is astonishing that God permits wicked spirits to perform such things, since in this way an occasion for error seems to be given to us.

ERASTUS. It is not always lawful for us to inquire into God’s counsels; rather, we must often rest content with this: that there is no injustice with God, and therefore He acts justly in whatever He does, even if we cannot see it. So far as we are able to know, He sometimes permits demons to do such things on account of the agent, sometimes on account of the patient, and very often on account of both. Thus the effect sometimes follows because of the unbelief of one or of both. Very often it follows because of a pact entered into, whether expressly [p. 182] or tacitly, against God’s open command. Sometimes God punishes unbelief, so that those who believe a lie may be more deeply entangled, receiving the reward of their perfidy and negligence, Romans 1. Most often He allows such things to happen in order to test our faith and patience, as Moses elegantly explained in Deuteronomy 13, and as the history of the holy man Job demonstrated. Satan himself, as I said, does everything in order to deceive the untrained, to ensnare the superstitious, and to draw all others away from true confidence in God and from His right worship.

FURNIUS. I agree with you more readily because I have formerly heard and read that all these things are condemned by theologians. Yet I did not believe them, because they did not seem to prove their opinion sufficiently, nor did they themselves shrink from all such things. Nevertheless I should still like to hear from you whether it is not permitted for a pious man to use such things for the liberation of others or of himself when he is ill, for example, whenever he has neither made nor thought of making a pact with a demon. For to many it seems that a man does not sin so gravely if he always uses such remedies for a good purpose and never for an evil one.

ERASTUS. I understand what you mean. Paracelsus thought that we could, without harming piety, seek help even from demons. So you are asking whether he judged rightly in this matter.

FURNIUS. That is so. For in the book On Occult Philosophy he writes that the man who uses such things for the benefit, not the destruction, of human beings by no means abuses the name of God, whatever the Sophists may cry out. Indeed, he devotes the whole fifth book On the Causes of Invisible Diseases to this disputation, in order to show that such helps, remedies, and cures proceed from God, even those which are carried out through evil demons. He proves this from the fact that Scripture promises us prosperous and happy things even from our enemies. “He who is drawn out of a pit by a robber,” he says, “and he who is drawn out by the Devil himself, is helped by God in the same way.” Likewise: “Nor should the lover of God think otherwise than that, if the Devil offers him silver or gold, [p. 183] if he shows him a remedy, if he leads him out of prison, it is done by God’s command; although he also assists the wicked, so that Scripture may be fulfilled when it bids us expect salvation and peace from our enemies.” Likewise: “Who will rebuke me if I command a Devil who is present to pull a horse out of a pit, and he obeys me? Who would not rather think that I have power over unclean spirits?” In sum, he does nothing else in that whole book than try to show that it makes no difference from where and by what means you try to obtain help, provided you do not seek to harm. For demons too, obeying the divine command, heal the sick. I would bring forward more, if what I want were not sufficiently clear from these passages.

ERASTUS. Not even these passages were needed, since his impiety is conspicuous from what has been adduced above. Anyone who wished to transcribe everything would be forced to carry over entire books. But that no one can use these things without offense to God and a most serious wound to his own conscience is very easy to understand from Sacred Scripture. I do not now wish to deal with those who openly consult demons, whether in their own or another’s name, and seek something from them. For this crime is so foul and monstrous that no one can have any doubt about it. Nor do I deal even with those who knowingly and deliberately use illicit things and collect and prepare remedies by magical superstition. I say that all those sin gravely who use things to which God has not given a power of this kind; that is, those who wish to heal or be healed outside and beyond the order instituted by God: by words, characters, medicines gathered or prepared under a certain aspect of the stars, suspensions of ineffectual things, and other things of this kind.

It is agreed that God created medicines of every kind from the earth and made the physician, so that by them he may drive diseases from the bodies of the sick, though not without invocation of the Divine Name. A man who desires to be freed from diseases sins no more than a hungry man offends God when, with thanksgiving, he eats bread to restrain hunger and preserve life. [p. 184] Neither violates the divine ordinance; each only does what God has granted and ordained. But if a sick man trusts too much in the physician and remedies, and does not at the same time, indeed first, implore divine aid, he sins deeply against God. “My son,” says Ecclesiasticus, “do not neglect to invoke God in your illness, and He will heal you. Depart from sin, cleanse your heart from every sin, and then give place to the physician.” The physician no less errs if he attributes more than is fitting to his art. For he too is bound to expect and seek a prosperous outcome from God. The same Jesus son of Sirach clearly teaches this in chapter 38: “God Himself heals through these things and removes pain from a human being. The apothecary tempers his mixtures with these, and his works have no end; but prosperity comes down from Him,” that is, from God, “over the whole earth. He too prays to the Lord that He may prosper his cure.” And God is offended if He is not invoked first, as the history of King Asa shows, 2 Chronicles 16. For it is written that Asa, although otherwise pious, in his illness, which from the history we infer was long-lasting, did not seek the Lord, but the physicians.

FURNIUS. I have heard that Scripture is speaking there of inquiry, because they were accustomed in all matters to consult God through the prophets or priests, as we see done in 1 Kings 14, 2 Kings 1, and 2 Kings 20.

ERASTUS. It makes no difference to our argument what you think in this part, although Scripture seems to speak more about cure than about the outcome of the illness. This is enough: that God is offended if we do not in every necessity turn to Him before all things. For He Himself is the true author of health, and uses the physician and remedies as instruments. Glory is therefore owed to Him, not to the instruments, just as we are accustomed to praise the craftsman, not the hammer, even if the work could not have been made by him without it. Less praise is due to the physician and medicines for healing, since God [p. 185] could have healed without them, had He wished; whereas the craftsman can make nothing without his instruments.

Therefore, if God is offended when we trust too much in remedies created by Him, how will He not be most gravely angry with us if we strive to obtain health by things devised by an evil demon? It is a serious crime to defame God’s creatures; and this is what anyone does who prefers diabolical fictions to the means ordained by God, fictions which have no efficacy, or have efficacy through the demon’s work when God permits it by His just judgment. It is much graver if, by abusing Sacred Scripture, the instrument of our piety and salvation, we make it into certain sacraments or instruments of Satan, to the destruction of the one who uses them.

FURNIUS. What if the person to whom they are applied does not know that they are superstitious and not natural?

ERASTUS. I believe he sins less; nevertheless greater and more certain hope is given to the Devil of gaining power over the human being. For even if the disease has been driven off by the powers of nature, he will then persuade the person, when their character becomes known, that it was done by the power of these things. Nazianzen aptly says: “You have no need of περιάμματων καὶ ἐπωσμάτων,” that is, “amulets and incantations,” “by which the evil one slips in.” Certainly through things of this kind he creeps in, and comes into a kind of right of possession, or at least rejoices that an occasion of greater hope is given to him. Therefore one who uses such things sins in many ways. First, because he as it were defames and neglects God’s creatures. Secondly, because he seeks help beyond the divine order. Thirdly, because he has the persuasion that the Devil possesses powers of helping. Fourthly, because he has at least tacit commerce with him and as it were opens the doors to him for greater attempts. Finally, because he trusts him more than God.

FURNIUS. What if he has tried other remedies in vain?

ERASTUS. The rule remains unmoved: evils must not be done so that good things may result. Besides, what is more unworthy of a Christian person than to seek help against the will of Christ, his Creator and Savior, from Christ’s enemy? Is this not a kind of defection? [p. 186] Could Christ not have brought help? Certainly He could. Therefore the fact that He did not is an argument to us that, with Him, it was not expedient. For His piety, clemency, kindness, mercy, and love toward us are so great that He wills nothing to happen to us which cannot truly promote our salvation. If, therefore, when asked through those means which He has handed down and commended to us, He does not act, because He understands that it is better so, shall we dare to wish to obtain something through forbidden means? It is not strange if He is angry with those who dare such things and permits them to be harassed somewhat by the Devil. All orthodox ancient writers prove our opinion: Clement, Justin, Origen, Eusebius, Chrysostom, Jerome, Augustine in many passages, and certain councils, as the Decretals also testify, in which this whole case is discussed from the ancients, Decretals 2, cause 26. The more skilled and better Scholastics all held the same opinion; a few more superstitious and magical men taught otherwise. Let whoever wishes to see more seek it in the authors just named.

I shall adduce one passage from Tatian the Assyrian, because it declares the matter beautifully. “No affection,” he says, “is removed through the hidden discord of another thing; nor is the sick man cured by amulets, such as little skins hung upon him. These are assaults of demons. And the man who is sick, or loves, or hates, or desires revenge, summons these as helpers to himself. Demons use this method of craft: just as the forms of letters and the verses written from them cannot indicate by themselves what is written, but human beings have established these as signs of their thoughts, understanding the matter from their definite conjunction, according as the order of the letters is determined; so too various roots and the use of sinews and bones do not effect anything by their own nature, but are, as it were, an elementary institution of the wickedness of demons, who have prescribed what each thing ought to be able to do. But when they see their service or [p. 187] cure being used by human beings, they come upon them and reduce them to servitude.”

I have chosen to insert this illustrious passage here from the most excellent and learned book of Dr. Johann Weyer On the Deceptions of Demons, because it includes not only what we have disputed on this matter, but also what Augustine and others rightly wrote. “No natural affection,” he says, “is removed through the hidden discord of another thing.” Understood rightly, this is altogether true. For natural πάθη, that is, “affections” or “conditions,” are removed and introduced by alteration and change, not through hidden sympathy and antipathy without mutual action and passion of sensible qualities.

FURNIUS. Yet almost everyone writes most confidently that a magnet does not attract iron in the presence of a diamond; likewise after being smeared with the oil or juice of onions. They say the same happens in very many other cases.

ERASTUS. These examples would not conflict with ours even if they were especially true.

FURNIUS. So do you doubt whether they are true?

ERASTUS. Very much. And about the diamond I know from certain experience that it is false. That same Conciliator, the astrological Magus, saw it many years ago, so that you may doubt less. Recently Dr. Garcia da Orta, physician of the Viceroy of India, affirmed this in his history of aromatics and some simples growing among the Indians. “I wished to test it rather often,” he says, “but found it to be a fiction, just as that story is which they tell about a diamond placed beneath the head of a woman after an incision has been made. It is also fabulous that they think its edge is blunted by lead because of the mixture of mercury with lead. So far is it from being true that it resists the blow of a hammer, that it is reduced to powder by the hammer and very easily worn away by an iron pestle.” I recall these things now so that you may remember that the greatest part of what we find written about this hidden antipathy and sympathy of things is vain and false. Indeed, of the many things which I was able to test, I found none to be true except those [p. 188] which have a reason known even to unskilled farmers. But even if a diamond impeded the action of a magnet, it would not on that account remove its affection and property; for once the diamond had been removed, the magnet would attract as before. I have nothing certain and established about onion juice and oil; but given the opportunity of a good magnet, I shall test it. Yet I do not doubt that, if there is any truth in this part, it depends on a manifest cause; I suspect I have also read this in Cardano. But to the matter.

Nor is a disease cured by amulets, such as little skins hung upon the body. I know that nothing truer can be said. Our arguments explained thus far also teach this excellently.

FURNIUS. Will you also deny that substances hung upon the body are efficacious without superstition?

ERASTUS. If the substances suspended are opposed by a manifest quality to the cause of some disease, by which they can remove and disperse it, I do not object at all. But if you think this happens by hidden power and because of antipathy, I have already said what I think. Galen, laughing at a man who had asserted that asthmatics are freed by drinking stork dung, said: “If he ordered this drug to be drunk rather often, he would be saying something plausible.” For asthma would not be wholly cured by one lowering even if a spatula could be lowered into the chest and the humor drawn out by it. I too say something similar: if the cause of a disease, such as epilepsy or fever, can be dispersed by a suspended or bound-on substance, I shall gladly believe it. But such things must be great and flowing if they are to accomplish this, when the matter is plentiful, thick, and stubborn. Perhaps such things have sometimes brought some help in the decline of a disease, or seemed to bring help while Nature was expelling the remnants. As for gems, I know most certainly that what I have learned about their hidden powers, as regards medical use and healing, is mere trifles; the case is different for manifest powers.

FURNIUS. I have always thought that certain remedies bound around the neck or other parts repel diseases by a hidden power, by reason of the whole substance, just as the magnet draws iron to itself.

ERASTUS. If the example of the magnet did not exist, [p. 189] those who refer to such faculties all things whose causes they do not understand would have no refuge. But from one miracle of Nature, so to speak, more of the same kind should not be introduced. For because the torpedo brings numbness to those who touch it, it is not therefore necessary that there also be herbs or stones which, when touched, operate similarly. The magnet sensibly draws iron; remedies do not do likewise. That stone draws what can be drawn, namely substance; but magical or suspended remedies are said to draw or repel diseases, that is, qualities which cannot be moved. If they sensibly emptied out the cause of the disease, I would gladly give credence. But I return to Tatian explaining how demons are enticed by herbs, words, papers, sinews, bones, hairs, characters, and so forth: namely, just as letters signify for us, that is, by convention. Thus, he says, they are enticed by these things, not because they are helped by such things in acting, but because they have made signs for themselves, just as human beings made words. All these things have been proved by us before and can be known in themselves. For they are not causes, as even the most unlearned understand. For there is no idiot who does not think that the things which promise such effects need a higher and greater power. Therefore they must be signs. But they were not instituted by God, since He has forbidden such things. Nor were they instituted by human beings; I think no one has ever doubted this. It follows, then, that they are signs of those things which demons promised and which they prescribed for themselves.

FURNIUS. I have fallen from a great hope, for I see that in words, signs, characters, Images, figures, ligatures, amulets, which physicians call περιάμματα, περίαπτα, and φυσικά, that is, “things tied around,” “things hung around,” and “natural charms,” and in collections of herbs, there is nothing true, but that all such things are observed superstitiously. And concerning these I am entirely satisfied, especially since I know that excellent physicians and philosophers despised such things. For Theophrastus, in book 9 of the History of Plants, judges them absurd and invented by men who wished to commend their arts. The same author, in Plutarch’s Life of Pericles, thought that Pericles was in the worst possible state because he had admitted this foolishness even in himself, allowing an amulet to be tied on. And they say that the emperor Caracalla also gravely condemned [p. 190] amulets against fevers. I recall that we spoke above especially about the physicians Hippocrates and Galen. The remaining Greeks were more inclined to these superstitions; among them Aetius and Trallianus slipped rather far.

There remains for me still one small scruple about the gathering of herbs, a matter about which something was proposed above. For physicians think it matters very much when herbs are gathered or remedies are offered to the sick.

ERASTUS. In gathering herbs, physicians prescribe that one must consider at what time of year each is most powerful for accomplishing that for which it is used. Thus they command that some be gathered when the sky is clear and dry or rainy, others when it is hot or cold, some in spring, others in summer, others at another time, because each is usually in its vigor at a certain time. Likewise, in administering drugs, they inspect the times of diseases together with the quality of the air and place in which the sick lie. No sane person has ever disputed against these things; and in my judgment it needs no proof that Paracelsus was insane. Who would deny that the air has one power before sunrise or at sunrise itself, and another at midday? Even brute animals perceive the difference between night and day. Therefore physicians observe the sensible qualities of the air, not the momentary mutual motions of the stars in their astrologically inspected positions. Sacred Scripture forbids only these latter to be observed, and Medicine denies that they should be noted.

It is also plain that charms are recited in vain or impiously while herbs are being gathered. For if they are directed to the herbs, the labor is vain, since the herbs do not hear or understand. If they are spoken to an intelligent mind, it will either be God or another. If God, there is need neither of conceived words nor of a certain hour. For God looks not to words and syllables, but to the mind of the petitioner. He cares not with what words we ask something from Him, but with what affection and what trust, since He searches hearts and is not forced to be content with signs. He hears no less those who groan and ask by thought alone than those who pour forth prayers by voice. And since He alone knows what, when, to whom, how much, and in what way He ought to give, He gives each person as much as He understands to be expedient. For this reason He willed that we should ask earthly things from Him conditionally. For many things which we have judged would be useful to us would be harmful if they happened. The sum is this: those who seek something from God have no need of certain words or of the observation of a certain time. Add that we should not, as has already been said, ask God to produce miracles through us or to infuse natural things with greater powers than it pleased Him to give them at the beginning. If you call upon good angels, they will not hear you when you ask from them what ought to be asked from God alone. For He alone can give powers greater than natural ones. If you ask from demons, the petition is illicit and impious.

Therefore I have now reached this conclusion: Magic, insofar as it uses sacred, profane, or barbarous words, prayers, commands, adjurations, exorcisms, praises, vows, characters, figures, images, observations of certain stars and hours, ligatures, suspensions, and so forth, is vain, futile, impious, and to be restrained by the severest penalties. Indeed, this too has been declared: that it is manifest superstition when powers are ascribed to things which they cannot have by their own nature; for example, when to coral, St. John’s wort, or other things is attributed the faculty of driving away demons and specters, of raising or warding off thunder, lightning, and storms, of driving away fear and sadness, of averting adverse evils, of inducing hatred, of conciliating the grace and favor of princes and others, and very many things of this flour. Certainly those who think that such things are naturally present in natural things must be more ignorant than asses. [p. 192] I am speaking of intelligent people, and of those who have thought seriously about this matter. Who would think that corporeal things have command over and power to act upon incorporeal substances? God alone rules, restrains, and compels demons. Present everywhere to us by His power, and through the ministry of His angels, He protects us from their violence; He does not defend us by the powers of herbs and gems, which act according to their natures only upon things of their own genus, with which they share matter. It was also said that corporeal things can do nothing upon minds, and therefore can effect none of the things which proceed from the mind. Accordingly all things of that sort are false and superstitious.

FURNIUS. Yet some Magi also use natural things; hence they have called some part φαρμακεία, that is, “the use of drugs, potions, or poisonings.”

ERASTUS. That is so. To this part belong φίλτρα, “love-potions” or “philtres”; likewise poisonings, about which we are not speaking at present.

FURNIUS. Poisonings properly so called do not belong to the present undertaking, I admit; but consideration of philtres does not seem at all foreign to it.

ERASTUS. We shall be able to get through this briefly, provided we recall what has been said above. The things I myself have read about philtres are either poisons that induce madness and death rather than love, or they are vain and superstitious. You will find some of the former kind among the ancients; nor is there any need to recall things which it would be better had never come to light. This is certain: drugs do not change minds unless they first change the temperament of the body. But to change this to such an extent that affections and morals must necessarily be changed, and that suddenly, is altogether dangerous. I pass over the fact that it is utterly impossible to change the nature or temperament of anyone in such a way that love rather than some other passion follows.

Of the other kind are certain ridiculous things: scrapings of feet, filth from the ears, saliva, and other excrements of the body, which, when certain ceremonies are applied, [p. 193] have been believed to excite love, with the credulity of human beings confirmed by the evil demon. It is most certain that neither these nor those things can by themselves arouse love or hatred; you could have perceived this from the disputation on fascination and the other matters. If they have seemed to effect anything, the demon effects it and persuades people that it was accomplished by the power of such things. More have always been driven to madness and diseases than compelled to love. Cardano recounts certain things from Agrippa, which it is not necessary for us to repeat. If you desire to see more, you can learn from the life of Hilarion written by Jerome what Satan can do in this matter when the Lord permits it.

The sum is this: some things administered for the sake of arousing love possess something poisonous and bring not love but insanity and death. Others are indeed less harmful, but empty and superstitious, since they have no power from themselves, though through the cooperation of the demon they sometimes seem to obtain an effect. Both kinds, therefore, are used impiously. What has been said about love should be thought to have been said equally about hatred and the other affections of the mind. These are induced not by the powers of drugs, but by those offices either performed or denied which have chief force in this world. But since enough has been said about operative Magic, let us now briefly examine divinatory Magic.

[8 On Lamiae or Striges: a Matter Not Useless to Know]

FURNIUS. We have not yet dealt with lamiae, whom the Greeks also call empusae and μορμολυκείας (“bogeys,” “frightful specters”), and whom the Latins call sagae, poisoners or witches, and striges.

ERASTUS. I think they should be counted among the Magi, since they openly enter into a covenant with the demon.

FURNIUS. Yet there is a difference between them. For Magi use an art which they say they have learned from books, whereas sagae seem to perform wonders without art and without books. Moreover, Magi do not always know that by their art they sin so gravely, since they suppose that by the power of sacred words, and thus by the power of God, they compel Satan; whereas sagae hand themselves over absolutely and submit themselves to his will under certain [p. 194] conditions. Add that Magi do nothing without certain conceived words and exorcisms, while striges use no such things, or at least not always the same things, as Magi do. I should therefore like to understand more closely whether they can do anything, and how much they can do.

ERASTUS. The answer is easy: they can do none of the things they arrogate to themselves. For whatever they can do and do perform is done by the Devil to whom they have handed themselves over, whenever God permits him to do it. It has been sufficiently shown above that the powers of evil demons are limited. The Devil orders them to employ certain things which lack the powers he has persuaded them he has infused into them, not because he needs these things, but so that he may more easily mock them, and, if he cannot bring about the effect, may have a readier excuse. Thus I answer: striges are in no way able to perform the wondrous works which they are commonly believed to perform. For they cannot do them from the proper powers of nature, as is agreed. Nor can they receive such power from a corporeal thing, since corporeal things cannot change human minds and remove powers above those implanted by nature. Therefore they cannot harm by touch, breath, voice, murmuring, words, nod, desire of the mind, or any other instruments of the body that lack harmful power, if you judge their natural powers. For the instrument has no more force and art for acting than is imparted to it by the craftsman. Therefore words, for example, have no greater power than the mind from which they proceed can impart. It remains, then, that they are endowed with such powers from elsewhere. But God and the good angels do not endow them, because they have deserted from God to the Devil and profess themselves enemies of God, of piety, and of all God’s friends. Add that they ask nothing from God and His holy angels. Therefore it follows that they act by the power of Satan, whatever they do. But it has also been shown above that he can do nothing above the powers of nature. Thus the stories told about their powers are for the most part fables, and superstitious ones: that they are carried through the air by the force of some ointment while sitting on sticks; [p. 195] that they enter through closed doors; that they are transformed into beasts; that they raise storms; that they send diseases upon whomever they wish; that by nod, words, voice, or by offering things by no means pernicious, they kill.

FURNIUS. You are telling astonishing things; and not everything you have recounted is credible. We do not deny that the Devil has limited powers. But when you despoil and impoverish him to such a point that he cannot even stir up storms of the air or do other such things, you depart too far from the truth. The history of Job proves one thing; Paul teaches another in Ephesians 6; Revelation indicates another; finally, experience declares another. I have often heard from theologians that Satan’s power is so great that, unless he were restrained by God, he could almost overturn the world.

ERASTUS. Scripture speaks variously of the power and powerlessness of spirits, and we speak with it. Therefore those who do not wish to go astray must distinguish prudently. If we consider their nature and estimate with what great powers they were endowed and adorned by the Creator, they are greater than we can easily believe. Moreover, it is the constant opinion of all theologians that demons retained their nature in the fall and lost only the light of grace and of divine favor; and therefore they remained furnished with very great powers. That they do not use them at their own pleasure for our destruction and ruin is due to divine power and goodness, which does not allow them to accomplish what they can and desire. But God permits it when He has determined to use them as ministers for His own glory and the salvation of His own. Thus when Satan was to vex Job, he could disturb the air; at other times he could not. The whole of Scripture teaches this, since Scripture everywhere makes God alone the author of rain, dew, drought, and fair weather, and commands us to ask from Him alone a suitable tempering of the air. And what can be said more clearly in this matter and cause than what we read in Jeremiah 14? “Are there any among the vanities of the Gentiles who make rain? And do the heavens give showers? Are You not Jehovah, our God? Therefore we wait for You. For You have made all these things.” Accordingly, we say that Satan can do many things when we estimate the nobility, excellence, and power of the nature he received. But we deny this when we consider his power as bounded and restrained.

FURNIUS. Yet the difficulty is not solved in this way. For we too can do nothing without divine permission, and nevertheless we do many things beyond and against the will of God.

ERASTUS. There is a twofold restraint: general and particular. As for general restraint, a human being can do more than demons in these external matters that pertain to the use of outward life. For a human being can steal coins from any place, provided he is not prevented by any bodily barrier. Demons not only cannot take them away, but cannot even accept them from those offering them. In this matter especially the highest wisdom of God shines forth. For if they could take away the treasures of kings, since they can move away all bars, open what is closed, move heavy things, and transfer things that can be moved from place to place, they would corrupt almost the whole world by the distribution of wealth. But this has not been granted to them, although it has generally been granted to man. Yet man is impeded by other things: fortifications, walls, locks; when these are shut, he can do nothing. But things offered he can always accept, and from all people, unless he is particularly forbidden by God. And just as a thief, by general permission, lies in wait for the goods of others, so the demon in almost the same way gapes after our salvation. But as the former is kept off by corporeal things, so the latter is frightened away by divine power and the ministry of the good angels.

Therefore God permits each of them some things in general and some things in particular. Whoever distinguishes these properly will easily extricate himself from the present question. For in some matters man has greater power in general; in others Satan has greater power. For Satan can secretly insinuate himself into the imagination, unless he is prevented by God’s special power, but he cannot take away gold and silver. Man, by contrast, cannot thrust himself into another person’s imagination, but he can seize gold and silver by deceit, artifice, theft, or force. Yet both are so restrained by God, not only generally but also specially, that neither can overstep the limits prescribed to him in both ways. The ancient theologians rightly judged that demons, by the powers implanted in their substance, can, if God permits them, accomplish those things which can be accomplished by local motion and by the suitable conjunction and arrangement of agents and patients; but that they can in no way change the natures of things contrary to the disposition implanted in matter by the Creator. What human beings can accomplish when left to themselves, I think, no one is ignorant.

FURNIUS. I understand this matter sufficiently, and indeed much more correctly than before. But another point remains, of greater importance, as I think. You say that sagae can effect nothing either by themselves, or harm by the instruments which they are accustomed to use, or even injure by the Devil’s work. If the matter stands thus, which I cannot now deny, we must admit that those act most unjustly who order those miserable women to be restrained as most harmful plagues, since they are innocent of the crimes of which they themselves not rarely confess they are guilty.

ERASTUS. Of which crimes do you say they are innocent?

FURNIUS. Of homicide, devastation of crops, fascinations, malefices, entrance through closed doors, sending of diseases, and other such things, which you said could not be done either by them or by demons without God’s particular permission.

ERASTUS. You do not conclude rightly. For it does not follow that, if they cannot actually effect any of these things, they must therefore be acquitted. There are, in addition, other causes for which they seem to deserve punishment.

FURNIUS. What are those?

ERASTUS. This disputation does not belong to the present undertaking, in which we are investigating only whether these remedies have any efficacy and whether we can use them with piety and conscience intact.

FURNIUS. I know; but because this too is being asked today, and because you assert that they are innocent in this respect, I should like to know why they are not unjustly punished by death.

ERASTUS. The chief reason is the command of God, who orders female malefactors to be killed, Exodus 22.

FURNIUS. Rightly. Yet striges are not included in the class of poisoners or sorceresses, as is clear from what has already been disputed. For the law of God must be understood not of melancholic women who say that they possess knowledge of the maleficent art, when in fact they lack it, but of true Magi and poisoners. But the lamiae of our age are plainly delirious old women; they have learned no art, possess no books, cannot read, and are, in short, foolish. It is no less clear that they observe no formulas of conjurations and exorcisms, nor recite any, but injure by imagination, although in actual fact they cannot injure. They have a corrupted imagination painted with various images, by which, like the delirious, they deceive both themselves and others. A very certain proof is that there is no mention of these women in Sacred Scripture, and that Christ and the Apostles are not written to have healed anyone who had been bewitched and injured by such lamiae. By these and similar arguments I am led to think that the greatest injustice is done to these unhappy women.

ERASTUS. I, however, think those reasons of yours far too weak to move anyone. What we said, that they perform no miracles, is true. That you think they should therefore be dismissed is an error. For God’s command orders soothsayers, diviners, illusionists, and Magi of every kind and condition to be punished, not only because they have injured someone or caused damage, but because they have learned and practiced an impious art contrary to God’s command. Who is so ignorant of all things that he does not know that many astrologers, augurs, diviners are condemned by God to capital punishment for this very reason, that they have handled these [p. 199] arts, even if in fact they have never injured anyone? Certainly all those who simply profess divinatory arts, such as augurs, haruspices, astrologers, and other foretellers, procure evil for no one; they only announce in advance what birds, entrails, heavens, and fates have determined. Yet God asserts that not only those who profess such things but also those who consult them are to be punished and execrated, even if they have never openly entered into a pact with demons and have not even thought of defecting from truth and piety. Therefore I am not now affirming anything contrary to what has been disputed, but things altogether consistent with it.

But I shall deal with you more closely. Do you not think that God appointed the penalty of death for all those whom Moses in the present sentence calls malefactors?

FURNIUS. Certainly.

ERASTUS. Do you concede that necromancers, sciomancers, and illusionists are included there? If you admit it, well and good; if you deny it, I shall easily refute the opinion from the words of Scripture repeated in Exodus 7 and elsewhere.

FURNIUS. I concede it.

ERASTUS. But God ordered these people to be punished not because they had caused damage or accomplished what they desired, but because they had learned wicked arts and contracted fellowship with demons. Indeed, led more by a kind of curiosity than by anything else, they summon shades in order to learn hidden and future things from them, or to exhibit some spectacle to those present, and they use them for ludicrous and wondrous things; rarely have they approached for the purpose of doing harm. There are many reasons for this; among them is also the fact that they know it is easier to obtain from demons the things we have mentioned than that they should inflict damage upon whomever and whenever they wish. For God denied them the latter, but granted the former more freely. Hence it is that such people are commonly thought less execrable, since they either never harm or very rarely harm; indeed, they seem to be able to help by indicating hidden things, by foretelling future things, and by other such means. Today such illusionists think, and formerly they also thought, as [p. 200] we gather partly from Josephus and partly from Acts 19, that they are better than most others on this account: that by the benefit of their art, that is, by the power and efficacy of divine words and other things, they can compel demons against their will. Add the invincible argument that God threatens destruction to the one who consults soothsayers, Magi, and other diviners in a doubtful matter, Leviticus 19 and 20, Deuteronomy 18. Now he who asks another about the outcome, as if a sick man asks about the outcome of the disease, causes no damage to his neighbor. Nevertheless God commands such people to be punished, and if they are not punished by the magistrate, He Himself wishes to exterminate and cut them off, as we read in the passages cited and as we have very striking examples in the kings Saul, 1 Samuel 28, and Ahaziah, 2 Kings 1. You now see it clearly and firmly proved that I am not fighting against what was said before, and that sagae are not therefore not to be punished because they cannot do the things which, persuaded by the demon, they think they can do.

FURNIUS. But Moses seems to be speaking of true poisoners, or of those who administer true and natural poisons.

ERASTUS. Moses is not dealing with such people here, as can be established for us from many points. Indeed, such people are included under the laws of retaliation and homicide. For a homicide is not only one who has killed someone with a stone, club, fist, sword, or axe, but also one who has suffocated someone with his hands, a noose, a pillow, or some other thing, or has thrown him down from a height, or killed him by hunger, or forced him to lay hands upon himself, or destroyed him by any other means. No one doubts that anyone is a homicide who knowingly and deliberately kills a human being, whether he kills him by offering poison which he knows to be poison, or removes him from the world by some other instrument. Therefore it was no more necessary to make a special law about true poisoners than it was necessary to establish proper penalties for the other species of homicide which I have listed.

The case is very different for those who try to kill someone by dreadful charms, invocations of demons, exorcisms, sending of unclean [p. 201] spirits, or the offering of enchanted things. Since this manner of killing did not seem to be included under the law concerning homicides, it was deservedly prohibited by a special command. Therefore Moses does not here prescribe concerning those who offer known poisons for the purpose of killing, but deals with others. And he cannot be dealing with any others than those who, by wicked charms, dreadful imprecations, superstitious figures, barbarous names, monstrous characters, impious ceremonies, drugs medicated by the Devil or prepared by illicit arts, attempt to do certain wondrous things or to harm. The word which the Holy Spirit used in the present passage proves this. The same word is also found repeated elsewhere, as in Exodus 7, Daniel 2, Deuteronomy 18, Micah 5, and other places; in all of these it is used for enchanters who, by words, signs, images, characters, and things prepared through the work of demons, wish and strive to do wondrous things or to harm crops, beasts, and human beings. Everywhere it signifies those who have commerce with impure and condemned spirits, by whose aid and assistance they think they can perform miracles or cause damage. Certainly the most skilled interpreters of the sacred language all agree in this matter, although some think it includes more, others fewer.

FURNIUS. Even if it be granted to you that Moses understands malefactresses, not those who are accustomed to kill or harm someone with poison or some other effective thing, still it does not follow that he is speaking of all who, by any utterly inept ways whatever, and by plainly delirious methods, seem to do something by which they testify in one way or another to the maleficium conceived in the mind.

ERASTUS. Nor do I think that he is speaking of all who desire to harm in just any way; but I deny that striges can be excepted. For from what has just been said, it is evident that malefactors are those who, by the work and aid of demons, with a pact intervening, use certain things to accomplish such things as those things cannot effect by their own nature. But striges rely on the aid of the Devil, with an express pact intervening, in carrying out their affairs; [p. 202] and to accomplish these things they use instruments which they know have not obtained such powers from their own nature. They openly confess that they are of this opinion: that those instruments are imbued with new powers by Satan. Therefore they plainly seem to be counted among the malefactors of whom Moses speaks here.

But tell us, I beg you, whom do you think he is speaking of? I, certainly, place it beyond doubt that God here generally included all those whom He specifically enumerated in Deuteronomy 18.

FURNIUS. Necromancers, sciomancers, illusionists, infamous Magi, exorcists.

ERASTUS. Correct. But why does God threaten such people with capital punishment?

FURNIUS. Because they practice arts that are false, illicit, and harmful.

ERASTUS. God did not command anyone to be treated so severely because of falsity alone. Imagine, for this is the case, that there are some who profess the art of preparing a drug which alone is an immediate remedy for all diseases and preserves the body almost immortal. Would you judge this man to be killed because he professes a false art? Let another promise the art of transforming lead, tin, copper, and add wood too, if you like, into true and genuine gold surpassing natural gold in goodness. Would you by your vote put this man to death because he meditates and practices a false art? I do not think so. But because you doubt whether those arts are false, suppose there is someone who promises a natural art of making ships by which we may be carried through the air just as we sail on waters; for I have received report that this has already been attempted by someone. Would you think he has deserved death because he attempted false and impossible things? Rather you would admire the attempt and the ingenuity, if he discussed his invention plausibly.

FURNIUS. I concede that the ultimate punishment is not owed to falsity alone, but if the arts are at the same time forbidden and harmful.

ERASTUS. Now that God did not appoint capital punishment for all because of the damage that some of these practitioners cause is proved with the greatest certainty from this: soothsayers, augurs, haruspices, and other diviners injure no one per se, but only announce beforehand what seems to be portended and foretold by birds, entrails, and other things. Since God wills that these be killed, we are sufficiently taught that such arts are capital for another reason. Add that He threatens destruction even to those who consult them, even if they have never thought of inflicting damage. Why, then, did He wish them to be capital? Because they are illicit, you will say. Correct. But not every illicit work is capital. Some action is illicit because of the kind of work, such as adultery or homicide. Some is illicit because of the end, as when an action good in itself is done for an evil reason. Some is illicit because of an unsuitable manner of acting. Here all three concur. For it is damnable both to learn and to practice these arts. The end too is evil, whether they are undertaken for harming or for foretelling. The manner of learning and practicing is also depraved, since they are practiced and learned through an intervening pact with demons, either hidden or open. This moved Pomponazzi so that, although he judged Magic and Necromancy to be good arts, and impiously thought that our mind is perfected by them, he nevertheless condemned the manner of learning them. Therefore God wished these arts to be capital because they are neither learned nor practiced without a capital pact: that is, because both those learning and those practicing contract fellowship with demons, either openly or tacitly. For when they use instruments which by their own nature do not have the powers they desire, and accordingly expect the effect from demons, they are rightly believed also to make a pact with them, although this often does not come into their mind. You now clearly see why maleficent arts are capital even when they are practiced without damage to one’s neighbor: namely, because of the pact, hidden or express, entered into with the demon. But if they are harmful besides, they are much more capital. It is agreed that no arts are more damaging than those of the sagae.

FURNIUS. How do you now call them damaging, when you asserted above that they are empty?

ERASTUS. I call them damaging not because the arts themselves are efficacious in themselves, but because through their occasion evil demons are continually incited, impelled, and inflamed to do harm. Although they themselves of their own accord are vigilant for this, namely to harm, it is nevertheless probable that often they would not have thought of the things which, once incited by sagae, they then attempt and accomplish, if God permits. The same maleficia are actually done by demons secretly; yet those who incited them, and who even think that they themselves have accomplished them by Satan’s work, are rightly called malefactors.

FURNIUS. Then they are instruments of demons. Therefore it seems that one should act less severely with them.

ERASTUS. They are instruments, but instruments using reason. A person who kills a human being at another’s command is not innocent. Moreover, they are not only instruments but authors and instigators.

FURNIUS. Yet I still do not see that they do more harm to others.

ERASTUS. First, it is agreed that words, exorcisms, charms, and figures can do nothing. Therefore if some effect has sometimes followed, it was the work of the demon, as we have most firmly shown. Do you think Satan does more harm when invited by some charm containing a tacit pact than when entreated by open fellowship and suppliant words? Necromancers and others of that sort form a fellowship obscurely, and they are persuaded that they are good and pious, and that by the hidden power of sacred words they compel demons to do what they have commanded. If they sometimes sacrifice to them, they think that demons are not so much appeased and entreated by such sacrifices as compelled. Finally, as I said, they misuse their aid for things that are almost ludicrous. But lamiae strike sacrilegious and open covenants with Satan, swear fidelity to him, hand themselves over wholly, feast with him, lead dances together, [p. 205] and even mingle their bodies with him, horrible to say. They promise that they will be enemies of God and of all piety, receive his mark, and do all these things in order to be taught by him to harm crops, animals, and human beings. Almost all their plans are directed to this end. They do not summon demons as unwilling servants, as the former do, but receive them as willing beings and as friends. They do not call them forth by charms, but entice them by foul lust, denial of God, and surrender of themselves. They do not extort answers from unwilling spirits, as they pretend, but in familiar conversation, amid foul embraces, ask whatever seems good to them. They do not summon them to raise illusions and shadows, but continually drive them by the spurs of their pacts to inflict destruction. How, then, is he not mad who thinks the arts of these women less harmful than those of the others?

FURNIUS. But they possess no art, nor have they ever left home in order to learn it. They lack books too, and for the most part they cannot read. Nor do they conduct their affairs by a fixed formula of conjuration and set words in the manner of maleficent Magi.

ERASTUS. As though the law of God commands only those to be punished who have learned a long art with much labor and, for that reason, after undertaking a long journey. Do you not remember that punishment is imposed by God on those who consult soothsayers? Did they too have to learn a long art of questioning from books before they deserved punishment? Indeed, they are more execrable even in this respect: what others learn from books, they receive from the very mouth of Satan himself. Moreover, they always have their teacher present and are instructed by him every day. Add that they omit none of the things which other enchanters do in order to obtain their arts, but in addition commit horrible crimes which others scarcely dare even to think. The divine law does not condemn only those who use set words and formulas, but punishes malefactors in general. And malefactors, as we have shown most clearly, are all those who seek to effect things surpassing the powers of nature by the aid and work [p. 206] of the Devil, with a pact intervening, whether hidden or tacit, whether they follow a fixed or an unfixed formula and method of acting. But no one denies that striges attempt things greater than can be effected by the powers of nature from the things they employ. It is equally certain that they falsely suppose that harmless things are imbued with new power by blasphemous or inept murmuring, or by invocation of demons. They make pacts openly, and indeed far more wickedly than all others; they themselves do not deny it. How, then, are they not truly to be counted among malefactors, although they did not draw their art from written precepts?

FURNIUS. But we see Magi effect certain things which striges do not effect. For in Exodus 7 they made serpents, frogs, and blood; the Pythoness summoned Samuel, 1 Samuel 28; others enchanted serpents, Psalm 58. I omit now the things seen in our own times.

ERASTUS. You prove nothing by these things. For it is both self-evident and has already been proved that Magi effect none of these things by the powers of their art, but that all such things are tricks of the demon, who mocks by illusions. Therefore, since in both cases Satan effects what is either truly or seemingly effected, the reasoning in both cases must be the same. Indeed, he is so much the more effective in the case of the sagae, the more obedient he has them. And who is so bold as to think that fewer or lesser things are effected by sagae than by other Magi? If we are to believe the histories, these latter are far surpassed by those women.

FURNIUS. They present harmless things, and therefore do not harm.

ERASTUS. I deny that it follows. For what then? Can words do more than things? I do not think so. For words are only signs and certain likenesses of our thoughts; in themselves they have no other force than that they signify by the agreement and institution of human beings. Yet by certain words not understood, and therefore barbarous, some summon shades, set before the eyes utterly astonishing illusions, stupefy serpents, hold back animals, summon mice, and do other such things. Why, then, could [p. 207] striges not effect the same by presenting certain things?

FURNIUS. Such things are not truly done, but are tricks of Satan.

ERASTUS. I admit it; but the illusions of lamiae are tricks too. The former use words, characters, figures, and so on; the latter use both these and other things that by their own nature are not evil. Both wrongly believe that powers are present in those instruments which are not present. Both effect only what Satan effects by divine permission. Both use certain things or words which Satan has ordered to be used, so that by them he may be reminded, as by signs, of the covenant and pact entered into. In both cases Satan truly works the maleficium when God permits, but secretly persuades his servants that they themselves have been the agents. Thus it happens that the former think they compel demons, while the latter, with equal error, think they entreat them. Meanwhile this always remains true: striges do more harm than other enchanters, if one looks at their purpose and will. For they do and think of nothing but doing harm; Magi for the most part seek only reputation, authority, and praise from their art.

FURNIUS. Magi seem at least in this respect more harmful than striges, that by their miracles they easily lead anyone away from true piety, whereas lamiae are not known to attempt anything of this kind.

ERASTUS. This too is no less false. For I have already said that both do whatever they do by the powers of Satan, indeed that Satan himself does it. How, then, will you prove that he does greater things for the sake of a Magus than of a lamia, whom he almost always attends, with whom he converses, by whom he is stirred by goads, and whom he strives by every means to keep in his service? Would that these women did not cause both more people and more gravely to sin, and to withdraw farther from God, than other enchanters do.

FURNIUS. If lamiae acted knowingly and deliberately in what they do, what you say would not be nothing. But they have a corrupted imagination and are almost entirely mad. Hence they seem no more deserving of punishment than demoniacs, melancholics, [p. 208] or those otherwise insane. For they are possessed by the demon, and therefore they act under compulsion and without knowledge, whatever they do. Moreover, I am persuaded that this kind of person was unknown in the time of Moses. Indeed, it does not even seem to have been known in the age of Christ. For we read that many possessed persons were freed by Christ and the Apostles, but we find no one affected by maleficium healed by them.

ERASTUS. As for what you adduce about a corrupted imagination, I readily admit it. For how would they defect from God to the Devil if they did not have a depraved imagination? Indeed, no one is evil knowingly and prudently; rather, all who perpetrate atrocious crimes err in reasoning. But that they are so injured in mind and judgment that they should be immune from punishment like demoniacs, those delirious from melancholy, or those otherwise raving, I deny to you. For they do all other things sanely, and in this matter too they know what they are doing: namely, that they are acting impiously, before they act, while acting, and after they have acted. They know that they ought not desert God. They know that it is the Devil to whom they defect. They know that they must pay the penalty if people discover what they do. They know that they ought to attempt nothing to the detriment of their neighbor, nor incite the Devil for that purpose. They know it will be a capital matter for them if they are detected. For this reason they cover up their crimes with the greatest zeal, and deny their deeds with such constancy that, even when subjected to interrogation, they do not confess as long as they can bear the torments. Add to this that they do not strive to injure just anyone they meet, but only those from whom they think they have suffered injury, or those whom they remember having denied them something. They are therefore no less sane than other enchanters and criminals who allow themselves to be induced and persuaded by the Devil to do what God has forbidden. For all of them have an imagination so far corrupted that they do not obey the judgment of the mind. Will you therefore think them excusable? I hardly think so. Therefore you will not excuse lamiae either for this reason. If they acted like the mad and delirious, they would not conceal their deeds, but when asked would recite them boastfully. And so they are mad chiefly in this one thing, in which all Magi are deranged: that they think they do the things which Satan, entreated by them, has secretly done.

FURNIUS. Among demoniacs there are some who know everything and have very clear intervals. But who would think that these should be punished with death when they blaspheme God? For they are so blinded that they are utterly unaware of what they do.

ERASTUS. I deny to you that lamiae are always possessed by the Devil in this way. Indeed, this has rarely happened. And it seems to be prevented by the most just judgment of God, lest Satan should occupy them in such a way that they escape the punishment imposed by God. The possessed are not always evil, and when they are restored to themselves during intervals, they grieve from the heart and constantly affirm that they never consented in mind, but that the Devil used their tongue against their will. The case with striges is far otherwise.

FURNIUS. But they are possessed by him and so deranged that they can neither lament their misery, nor grieve over their sins, nor desire salvation.

ERASTUS. I should like you to prove what you say, since I believe no one without arguments. If they were sometimes agitated by the demon like demoniacs, there would be some suspicion. But since they always behave in the same way, they cannot be said to be possessed. What argument could you seek that is firmer and truer than this: we see the truly possessed, during intervals, cruelly torn and miserably afflicted; they arrogate to themselves no knowledge of wonders and attempt no such things. By contrast, sagae boast about the greatest matters, attempt many things, and meanwhile enjoy sound and intact health. Certainly after the pact they are as healthy as they were before. As for your suspicion that they were unknown in the age of Moses, let your suspicion remain yours. It does not follow that they did not exist because Scripture did not expressly name them. It is enough that they are included in the catalogue of malefactors which is found in Deuteronomy 18. [p. 210] How many other crimes are not specifically stated in Scripture, which all nevertheless concede to be prohibited? Christ and the Apostles healed no one under this name, because these women cannot do the things they attribute to themselves and foolishly believe they do. But that such old women existed at that time is most clearly evident from all the poets, historians, and the laws of the Twelve Tables. I think we have shown sufficiently that striges must be punished not so much for the works they do, which for the most part they attempt in vain and never accomplish, as for defection and apostasy, or the covenant made with the Devil.

FURNIUS. But this is not criminal in the civil forum. For who among us does not often defect from God?

ERASTUS. Whoever sins against the law of God turns away from God; but very different is the aversion of those who slip through imprudence, or even act wickedly by willing choice, and of those who freely, from no fear of any danger, with no error or disease, cast off and trample upon God together with piety; that is, who from mere wantonness are apostates, and in addition declare war on God and religion. Peter sinned most gravely, but he fell from weakness. David sinned gravely, and not in one way only, and remained entangled in his crimes for many months; yet he did not for that reason repudiate the worship of God and piety. But if by “civil forum” you mean the Mosaic forum, I deny to you that this is not criminal. If you mean the courts in which a thousand sophisms daily resound, by which people strive to overcome one another, whether by right or by wrong, that does not pertain to us, since we are not disputing what human beings do, but what the will of the Lord is.

FURNIUS. Are you then going to bring back for us the Mosaic commonwealth?

ERASTUS. By no means. For it has many things which are least suited to these times and places. Meanwhile I assert without hesitation that crimes pertaining to morals, whatever Moses made capital, can still today be punished by the magistrate with the ultimate penalty. Moreover, even now magistrates ought to restrain the crimes which God has commanded to be restrained, Matthew 15. I do not deny meanwhile that punishments can be tempered, provided some milder punishment can suppress a crime.

FURNIUS. The pact is empty and null. For the whole transaction is imaginary and completed only in the spirit, and therefore its truth cannot be established through witnesses. Moreover, those between whom there is no communion cannot contract. Likewise, those who think one thing and in another way do not contract. Finally, where deceit, force, fear, error, or ignorance intervene, there is no consent.

ERASTUS. There is no need here for many words. For human fictions do not prevail when the sense of God is under discussion; rather, Scripture must be adduced. For God judges according to His word, not according to human opinions and specious little reasonings. I deny that the pact is imaginary. It is impossible for a human being using unimpeded senses to believe imagined things to be true if the senses do not agree. Imagine someone giving you a thousand gold pieces. You will never believe it, so long as you neither see them with your eyes nor touch them with your hands, and so long as the other senses report that it is false. Therefore we believe imagined things while sleeping, when the senses are bound; or while awake, whenever they are impeded by disease. Sagae make agreements while awake, seeing and hearing the demon. Therefore the work is not merely imaginary, as when sleeping people seem to attend banquets and dances, to afflict some by maleficium, to see those whom they do not see. These, I say, are imaginary; not those things which they do while awake and sane. For sometimes they meet by day and with their friends dance, play, and eat, but the foods which they themselves have brought with them. And it is agreed that these things were sometimes truly done in this way, with their senses intact and their eyes seeing shadows that falsely assumed a definite appearance. [p. 212] Witnesses of the truth can therefore often be had. But what need is there of witnesses when the accused confesses the crime, which she has proved true by many previous deeds?

On the disparity and communion of natures I would speak in vain. No one is ignorant that a pact between God and human beings is valid, although there is no communion between them of the kind that jurists require. In pacts, too, those contracting do not always think the same thing. For they make an agreement in these words: “If you do this, I shall perform that.” This happens here too: “If you abjure God, I shall give a huge quantity of gold, I shall teach wonders,” and so on.

FURNIUS. But the Devil deceives and lies.

ERASTUS. For this reason the Apostle commands us to put on spiritual arms, so that we may resist his power and deceits. For the same reason the Lord commanded all of us to pray, not only at every hour but also at every moment, that He not allow us to be led into temptation. Therefore the excuse of deceit is not valid. Indeed, even if someone should attempt to lead us away from the truth by miracles, we ought not put faith in him, Deuteronomy 13. I ask you: would you excuse your wife or daughters, otherwise chaste and honorable, if someone by deceit, fraud, and artifice moved them to consent to and commit adultery and unchastity? I scarcely believe you would be so kind and merciful. Why, then, do you want the magistrate to spare those whom the Devil has seduced, especially since they are not unaware that they ought to expect nothing good and sound from him? I shall say more: God did not spare even the Gentiles, so as not to exterminate them on account of crimes of this sort, although they did not understand that they sinned in the way striges today understand that they sin. Do you therefore think that He wishes these women to be treated more mildly than those? “It is impious,” says King Athalaric the Goth, “to be lenient toward those whom heavenly piety does not allow to go unpunished.” Do you think God was ignorant of the Devil’s frauds and attempts? If He knew them and nevertheless ordered transgressors to be punished, we excuse deceit in vain. Force, fear, [p. 213] error are not greater here than in the case of all criminals, whom no wise person would on that account wish to go unpunished. Is someone seduced by a false prophet, even one producing a miracle, excused by God? Deuteronomy 13. Why then do you try to excuse them by the authority of jurists? Ignorance cannot be alleged, since they act knowingly. God even wills that the beast with which a human being has had intercourse be killed: how, then, will you think of excusing ignorance here from punishment?

FURNIUS. Yet it seems that the sex should be spared.

ERASTUS. God did not command even this. Indeed, in Exodus 22 He named women especially, so that He might indicate to us that He does not wish even sex to be taken into account in this matter. And although I do not deny that women were named in the law rather than men because they err more often in this respect than men do, still the other point too is true. From the same point another matter is also confirmed, which we explained above: that Moses does not call only those malefactors who have learned the art with much labor and long travel. For when he names women especially, he at the same time shows that he is speaking of others too.

Besides this, another argument also shows that the crime of the sagae is capital: they are idolaters, and indeed the worst kind. For they offer worship not only to idols and images, but to the demons themselves, the worship that they demand, and they do the other things we mentioned above. The idolatrous Jews whom God commands to be killed in Exodus 22, Deuteronomy 13 and 17, and whom we read were killed in 3 Maccabees, last chapter, did not worship idols in such a way that they meanwhile denied that they received any good from the true God; rather, they thought they were helped by both. But sagae stipulate that they will be enemies of God. God commands that no one spare parents, wives, or children in this matter. Therefore He will not wish the magistrate to spare striges.

FURNIUS. What idolater ever knowingly, recognizing the true God, wanted to flee from the true to the untrue, from the good to the pernicious, from the benevolent [p. 214] to the savage?

ERASTUS. No one who loves his salvation. But Scripture testifies that many Jews did this. And even if none had done it, striges would nevertheless be judged so much the more wicked for daring so monstrous a crime. They could also be killed as homicides. For even if they offer harmless things, they nevertheless offer them in order not to be detected and convicted of the crime. Meanwhile they are persuaded that those things have been medicated by Satan and have acquired powers by which they have been made effective for accomplishing the purpose for which they are offered. Moreover, they often strive to lead others too into error, and frequently betroth and hand over their young daughters to the Devil. God commands that such people be slaughtered by a special command. In addition, by exercising filthy lust with the most impure spirits, they deserve capital punishment. For the divine law commands that one who mingles himself with a brute beast be burned together with the beast. Should women who lie with Satan not rather be burned? I pass over the fact that he is often said to enter them in the appearance of a dog or goat, whether he has merely assumed the appearance of these animals, or has invaded and possessed those beasts. Therefore, since they do not sin while seized by delirium, nor by disease of a harmed imagination, nor by insanity, nor while possessed by demons, but knowingly and willingly deny and abjure the worship and faith of God, and give themselves to the Devil, the enemy of the human race, and bind themselves to causing harm to human beings and to foul services, those who tolerate them seem to me to tolerate monsters and enemies of God and nature alike.

FURNIUS. But not all admit all these crimes. Many are also led on by the deception of others; very many are falsely accused by others; and the demon does these things in order to establish a slaughterhouse, in which he greatly rejoices.

ERASTUS. I do not doubt that very many suffer injustice; therefore one must proceed with the greatest prudence. Accusers must not be believed, since most have seen in sleep things which they narrate as true. Nor must it be believed in any way that they have accomplished [p. 215] the things which they boast they were able to do; nor should they be punished chiefly on that account. One must see how, having been persuaded, they came to this point, how long they persisted in that state of mind, and what they did. Those who have perpetrated nothing very foul and who offer excellent hope of repentance should be treated more prudently and mildly. In short, what must be done is that the kingdom of Satan be destroyed and the will of God be accomplished.

FURNIUS. If magistrates used this moderation, there would have been less dispute about this matter, and I would not have troubled you in this regard.

ERASTUS. I have said more freely and copiously what I thought, so that I might at the same time indicate and prove that Paracelsus, and likewise all his disciples, as many as approve and imitate his magical doctrines, and other Magi, are worthy of being recalled and deterred from that impiety, even by the penalty of death.

[9 On divinatory magic and its kinds; and also not a little on divination]

FURNIUS. We have discussed operative magic quite sufficiently; now it is time to add something about divinatory magic. We shall be able to dispatch this briefly, because I have noticed that the foundations of the coming discussion have already been laid earlier.

ERASTUS. That is so. I too had decided from the beginning to touch on this part of magic very briefly, since it has not much to do with medicine. Necromancy, sciomancy, augury, auspicy, and other similar insanities are today approved by no sane person who has even a moderate grounding in piety. For everyone sees that they are so forbidden in Holy Scripture that every opportunity for denial is cut off from all. Paracelsus alone, along with some of his disciples, dares to praise them, thereby openly showing that he yields to no one in wickedness and impiety, but surpasses all.

There are as many kinds of impious divinations as there are things which Satan has chosen to adapt to this purpose. Some have prophesied from water, others from fire, others from other elements. Some have divined from mirrors, sieves, fingernails, basins, crystals. Others have wanted to soothsay from ashes, nuts, beans, and infinitely many other such things. Others have taken omens from the flight of birds, their chatter and movement; from inspection of entrails; from names, sneezes, [p. 216] and all other things. Others have tried to foresee the future from the stars. And who could enumerate all the kinds of this vanity? For there is scarcely any thing which Satan has not diverted from its natural and legitimate use to this impiety, to which he knew human beings were especially prone. For he remembers very well that he inflicted this wound on our first parents: that they wished to be gods. Hence it is that our minds are still inflamed with a great desire to know future things, which that most wicked old deceiver understands very well to be especially proper to divinity.

FURNIUS. Can those kinds not be reduced to definite genera?

ERASTUS. I did this in imitation of Thomas Aquinas in the defense of Savonarola; and I shall repeat it shortly, after I have first explained what divination is and with what things it is concerned. All Latin writers derive divinatio from divinum, because all have always thought that divination contains something divine. Hence the Greeks, according to Plato, called it manikē, as though mantikē with the letter t inserted, so that by this name they might indicate that divination proceeds from divine frenzy. Certainly all nations have believed with great agreement that divination has something of wonder and divinity.

And although the Latin writers who granted that divination exists defined it in various ways, all nevertheless meant the same thing: namely, that it is foreknowledge of chance events. Chrysippus meant nothing else when, in Cicero, he says that it is a power that knows, sees, and explains the signs by which things are portended to human beings by the gods. Nor did the author of the Definitions attributed to Plato, whether that was Plato or someone else, teach anything else when he defined it as “a science that reveals action beforehand to human beings.” For what else is it to know things without reason than to know things which cannot be known by reason? But only chance events cannot be comprehended by reason and precepts. This is clear from the preceding words: those who understand the true and certain cause of a future event do not divine, but those who are ignorant of it do. Thus this remains conceded by all: divination is the prediction of chance events.

Indeed, all things either happen necessarily or contingently. In the former there is no place for divination. For who would think there is something wonderful in a prediction by which it is affirmed that winter will return after summer? Divination, therefore, is concerned with contingent things. In these, furthermore, there are two very different things: common nature and individual properties. Divination is not concerned with both. For what divine element has a prediction by which someone foretells that hares will give birth to little hares, not horses or sheep? Or who will think a prophet worthy of admiration who warns beforehand that horses, not hares or sheep, will be born from horses? The same reasoning applies to all other things. For the common nature, such as humanity, is not properly generated; rather, it is propagated and preserved through the generation of individuals. Therefore what is future is not what is common, but what is particular. Add that no one consults a seer about whether a woman in labor will give birth to a human being; rather, people usually ask whether she will produce a male or a female, a robust and healthy child, or a weak and sickly one, and so on. Therefore we must admit that divination is concerned with the foreseeing of contingent things, not insofar as they share in a common nature or species, but insofar as they are furnished with their own individual qualities, by which they are distinguished from all other things of the same species.

The foreknowledge of these things is again twofold. For either they have already begun to exist and have already begun to be produced by their true and proximate causes; or they will occur a long time later, and as yet nothing is known with certainty about their proximate cause. Whoever says that things which already exist, and have in some way begun to exist, will occur, does not properly divine, nor does he foretell something future; rather, he indicates that things which already exist, though because of their smallness they are not yet visible and therefore still hidden from the unskilled and inexperienced, have already begun. Thus physicians, sailors, farmers, experienced and practiced men in the commonwealth, and others like them make predictions. But if you read that such people were accustomed to divine, or hear them called diviners, understand that they are so called improperly. For it is clear that this prudence, industry, and diligence in human beings is not condemned by God, whereas Scripture condemns diviners and divination properly so called entirely and absolutely.

You now see most clearly that divination is the foreknowledge and prediction of particular contingent things, without knowledge of their proximate causes, before they have begun to come into being and to exist. It was therefore rightly, concisely, and briefly, yet clearly and distinctly, defined as the foretelling of chance events. For that a horse is born from a horse, a hare from a hare, is not fortuitous. But that such a horse is generated, namely noble-bred, sluggish, large, small, brave, timid, robust, weak, and so on, is fortuitous. For it could have been generated otherwise. The same reasoning applies to all other things. In the defense of Savonarola I demonstrated in such a way that all future particulars, insofar as they are particular and future, are fortuitous and fall out by chance, if they are referred to our knowledge, that I rightly trust no sane and intelligent astrologer will try to overturn it.

What divination is, and with what it is concerned, has been said. Now let us inquire whence it comes. I say, then, briefly, that future things, concerning which there is divination and about which we are discussing, cannot be foreknown naturally and by a power innate in us. I demonstrated this in the book just cited so solidly, so clearly, and so fully that a reader eager for truth can desire scarcely anything more. At present I shall touch on a few points in very few words. Future contingent things, about which our discussion has been undertaken, cannot be foreseen by us either by sense, [p. 219] or by imagination, or by intellect. Therefore they cannot be foreseen in any way. For we have these three instruments of knowing.

Now that we do not perceive them by sense is known. For external sense perceives only present things. But future things do not yet exist, and therefore cannot move the senses. For each thing acts in the manner in which it exists. That we do not perceive them by imagination is equally known. For we taught above that nothing is received in imagination which was not previously in sense. But future things could not have fallen under the senses. If you think that the power of imagining can variously combine species received from the senses, I shall not deny it; but I shall deny that this composition could be stirred up by a future thing which does not yet exist. Moreover, that imagined species are not causes so that things outside us become such as they are, was demonstrated before, and is self-evident. For in that case things would come into being which God and nature have never made: a goat-stag, a chimera, castles built in the air, the tales of Lucian, and so forth. For we sometimes imagine such things for ourselves.

Therefore, if we foresee future things, we understand them beforehand by mind and reasoning. But our mind sees nothing future whose cause it does not have present, and indeed in such a way that it knows it to be the cause of that future effect. For I can see fire present and yet be ignorant whether it is going to heat some definite thing, before I know that it is going to be applied to it. For it is fortuitous that at this time and place it will melt lead, before it has been applied to it. But we have posited that the causes of future effects are not known by diviners as the causes of a determinate effect. Nor is this difficult to show. For the cause of a future and fortuitous effect must be fortuitous, that is, it must be indeterminate or indefinite, so that it can act and not act, or at least not act in this way. As soon as it is limited to acting in one way rather than another, it actually does that toward which it has been defined and destined to act; and when it acts in a definite way, it is also disposed in that way. But when it is so affected, it no longer acts fortuitously in what it does, but cannot act otherwise so long as it does not acquire a new disposition. Add that, according to the disposition it has, it will immediately act necessarily, and will not be able to postpone its action to another time, especially if it is a natural cause and acts naturally.

Once this is granted, it necessarily follows that nothing future can be foreseen except what has already begun to be and to come into being. But the prediction of such things is not divination, as I have explained. It is therefore clear from what has been said that future things which are predicted long before they occur are not naturally foreknown. Therefore their knowledge must come from elsewhere, or from outside. But it can come only from God or from good or evil angels. If it proceeds from God or from angels as ministers of God, for even they too are ignorant of future things unless they are revealed by God, it is called prophecy among Christians. Among the heathen this was called divination, because they thought demons were gods. We must avoid ambiguity, and speak rather with Scripture, which for the most part calls it prophecy. This is always and alone true, because God alone knows future things. If it arises from evil angels, it is properly called divination, and it is always false and lying. For if something sometimes comes to pass, either it was not truly future, but had already begun; or they themselves had decided to do it; or they knew it because God revealed it, Deuteronomy 13; or it happened by chance. Hence it is that the name of diviner or divination throughout Holy Scripture, unless you wish to except Isaiah 3, is taken in a bad sense, as Jerome observed. For in Scripture, to divine is to try to foretell future things from things not destined for this by God, or in an improper way. But things predicted by divine inspiration are not foreknown by any art, but are inspired by God. Therefore prophecy is not divided into artificial and artless, as divination is. For Satan wished to imitate God, and therefore by his own inspiration suggested false or ambiguous answers to some.

FURNIUS. Why did he introduce divinatory arts, if he knew that God had forbidden them?

ERASTUS. He certainly had many reasons for his plan; among them this one too: he saw that he would more easily retain the divine name in this way, which he sought by every means. For since he was conscious of his own ignorance, and understood that he would not be worshiped as God if he were found ignorant of future things, he devised so many and such varied arts that, if he failed in foretelling, he would have a plausible excuse ready: that the practitioner or interpreter of the proposed signs had erred. For that most sagacious spirit saw very clearly that this opinion about God is so implanted in mortal minds, namely that future things are known to God, that he would seem to try in vain to remove it from the minds of all. Nevertheless he tore it from the minds of many, when he persuaded Epicureans and other atheists either that there are no gods, or that they do not govern our affairs, or that they do not understand them. Those upon whom he could not impress this, he maddened by the opposite method: he exalted himself as God and offered almost innumerable modes of divining.

Therefore all divination properly so called is the work of the Devil, either suggesting answers by manifest inspiration and without art, or using some art. Cyprian expressed this elegantly and briefly in On the Vanity of Idols, where, after disputing much about auguries and haruspices, he adds the following: “These malignant spirits inspire the breasts of seers with their breath, animate the fibers of entrails, govern the flights of birds, direct lots, produce oracles, always entangle false things with true. For they are both deceived and deceive; they disturb life, trouble sleep, also creep into bodies and terrify the hidden places of the mind, distort limbs, break health, provoke diseases, in order to compel people to their worship.” And shortly after: “This is the remedy from them, when their own injury ceases. Nor do they have any other aim than to call human beings away from God and turn them, from understanding true religion, to superstition about themselves; and since they themselves are destined for punishment, they seek companions for themselves in punishment, whom they have made sharers in their crime by error.” Thus Cyprian.

But there is a twofold character of divinatory arts. Some contain an express pact with demons, and their invocation, adjuration, and as it were compulsion, such as necromancy, sciomancy, and all the others which summon a demon into waters, mirrors, crystals, rings, and other things, or interrogate one already present. Others contain a more obscure pact, of which there are two classes. In one we include arts that consider the motions and dispositions of natural things in order to conjecture future things from them. In this order are astrology, augury, auspicy, haruspicy, chiromancy, and many others. In the other we place those arts which fabricate for themselves the signs from which they soothsay, and do not receive them from nature. Of this flour are geomancy, which takes omens from points, drawings of figures in ashes and other places, the making of little wheels, the casting of molten lead into cold water, and very many others. You will also find some that partake of both kinds, since they partly prepare signs for themselves, partly receive them from the things themselves, as indicators of the future. Every mode of divining can be reduced to these five genera. And since all rest upon either an open or a tacit pact, there is no need for me to refute them one by one, since God commanded all to be execrable and capital.

FURNIUS. What if someone denies that all rest on an impious pact?

ERASTUS. You will find this excellently demonstrated in our defense against Stathmion; it is not useful to transfer those things here. And so I shall dispatch the matter here in a few words. Divination among all peoples has always been considered a magnificent, divine, and wondrous thing. Indeed all learned philosophers, whoever granted divination, attributed it to their gods. This is clear from Plato and all the Platonists. Plato certainly openly taught that all divination is carried down to us from God through demons as intermediaries. The Platonists, although with their master they did not deny the arts of divining, nevertheless assigned no other function to these arts than that they said their precepts concerned the proper and skillful interpretation of future signs presented by God. Therefore they thought future things could not be foreseen unless the gods had shown them beforehand to prophets by certain signs. For they believed birds to be, as it were, messengers and interpreters of the gods, driven here and there by them; by divine command they hid themselves on this or that side; they sang on the right or left; chicks shut in a cage rushed upon the morsel or, having come out, did not touch it, announcing the so-called tripudium solistimum by striking the ground. What I say of these by way of example must be understood of all the others.

Since these things are very well known in Plato and his followers, I shall conclude with one testimony from many, taken from Iamblichus’ book On the Mysteries of the Egyptians: “Prophecy,” he says, “is effected neither by art, nor by nature, nor by natural or animal reasons or motions; nor does it come about in any such way. Rather, each is eternal, sent down to us divinely; and the whole prophetic power is referred to the gods; all its authority consists in them and is handed down from there, and is accomplished by divine works and signs.” Likewise: “Prophecies must be derived from the gods, who contain in themselves the limits of all knowledge of things, not from things which have no foreknowledge in themselves.” Of the Peripatetics it would be vain to say anything, since it is agreed that they entered upon another path of philosophizing.

The sum is this: there has been no people so savage and barbarous, nor again so civilized and cultivated, provided it had some judgment and retained some sense of God, that did not believe that the foretelling of future things proceeds from the gods. All, I say, thought that these things were divinely signified beforehand to prophets, and that they had something greater than other mortals. This agrees with Holy Scripture, which constantly attributes the faculty of knowing future things [p. 224] to God alone. Indeed, through Isaiah, from chapter 41 to 49, among other arguments by which He proves that He alone is God, God most seriously and forcefully presses this point: that He alone has foreknowledge of future things and alone can foretell them. Since I explained this copiously from Holy Scripture in our defense, I willingly omit it here. In this place it is enough to have indicated that no one, however learned or unlearned, thought divination was not of a power greater than the human mind. All granted that the mind is fit to foresee by divine inspiration, by the impulse of intelligences, or by the breath of demons; but no one who was not mad ever believed that it could do this merely from its own nature. Therefore they did not think that those were divining who predicted things that would happen necessarily, provided they knew them to be such. For who marvels at someone foretelling that after winter summer will come again? No ignorant person consults an augur about this. He will ask whether the coming summer will be more fertile than usual, barren, hotter, colder, healthier, more disease-ridden, and so forth.

FURNIUS. Paracelsus thought no differently in the book On Lunatics. “No mortal,” he says, “can know perfectly, or only with difficulty, the properties of the stars. We know indeed that summer will follow winter, but we do not know what kind it will be.”

ERASTUS. This is rightly said; but he added an inept and impious cause, namely that an old woman can within one hour make sterile what was fertile. Moreover, who would think that the person has something divine who predicts that this year dogs will generate puppies, not cats or hares; likewise that pear trees will produce pears, not grapes; vines, conversely, grapes, not apples?

FURNIUS. I remember that someone, in a published prognostic, mocked the yearly prophecies of astrologers in this way.

ERASTUS. Moreover, not even that declaration has any special wondrousness by which things whose actual beginning has been born and which are already known to exist are indicated as future to the unskilled. Iamblichus too affirms this at the end of the book already mentioned. “If there is in us,” he says, “some natural foreknowledge, as in certain animals there is foreknowledge of earthquakes, storms, and cold, this foreknowledge has nothing wondrous about it. For it happens because of the sharpness of the senses, or because they suffer something from it.” Nor does that foreknowledge seem especially worthy of honor by which someone, through reasoning from observation of signs that precede definite effects, warns that a fever will follow from contraction of the pulse and chill. Divine prophecy alone makes us wondrous and divine.

FURNIUS. Were not physicians who foreknew keenly considered wondrous? Galen certainly affirms several times that because of his medical predictions he was considered a prophet; and he thought a great injury had been done to him because people judged that he had foretold the outcomes of diseases from some more divinatory art rather than from the precepts and rules of medicine.

ERASTUS. Those who surpass others in their art are most worthy of praise. The reason he seemed to divine was that the physicians of that time did not know that the things he foretold to the sick could be foreseen by art. But he himself constantly denies that he predicted anything in the manner of a prophet or diviner; indeed he affirmatively asserts that he never heard the Roman seers say true things about the sick, whereas he himself never erred in foretelling. He denies that he is a diviner because in all ages this was admitted among the learned: that divination is concerned only with those things which cannot be understood by nature, art, practice, and conjecture, and which are properly called future. For those things already exist, or at least possess some beginning of their generation, and therefore are already actually produced by a defined and determinate cause. Hence they are known either in their causes or in themselves, not as future but as present. If someone who declares and knows such things were rightly and properly said to predict and foreknow the future, Scripture would not say that this belongs to God alone. Nor would all theologians affirm from Holy Scripture that only the immortal God knows future things. For human beings foresee very many such things, and demons know far more than these. But Holy Scripture, with all theologians agreeing and testifying, openly teaches, inculcates, repeats, and insists that demons are ignorant of future things. From these points it is clearer than midday that divination is not concerned with those things which are already known to be coming into being, but with those things which are truly future and have not yet begun to exist. Hence it is aptly defined by some theologians as the vision of things which are far removed from the common knowledge of mortals.

Thus, then, let us conclude this matter: divination is the foreknowledge of future things. But future things are particulars. For what is generated and perishes is particular. Moreover, every particular, insofar as it is particular, not insofar as it shares in the nature of the species, is fortuitous, as I partly explained just now and partly demonstrated at length in the place already cited. It is agreed from the opinion of all human beings that things which cannot be comprehended by art, science, and reason, but fall blindly and by chance, cannot be foreseen by art and reason. But whatever things come into being, when they previously did not exist, all those things, insofar as they come into being, for they do not come into being insofar as they share in a common nature, or at least no one wishes to foreknow them insofar as they come into being in that way, cannot be comprehended by art, science, and reason, and therefore come into being fortuitously. Therefore they cannot be understood beforehand by any art and reason. Thus the things that cannot be understood by art or reason surpass the powers of human intelligence. Future things, therefore, insofar as they are future, cannot be foreseen by human intelligence. But if they cannot be foreknown by anyone through the powers of nature, those who arrogate to themselves foreknowledge of them must receive knowledge of them from elsewhere. They do not receive it from God and His holy angels. For God does not reveal future things through arts. Therefore they are suggested by demons. They suggest them to those who learn and practice those arts because of the pact which they entered into with some people when they first handed such arts over to them. Therefore, even if those who now learn them are perhaps ignorant of the pact, it is certain that a tacit pact intervenes, especially if they sometimes happen to hit the mark. For since the things which those arts command to be done have in themselves no force and power to reveal hidden things, it is absolutely necessary that some demon has revealed them, and indeed because of an intervening pact.

FURNIUS. If demons do not know future things, how do they disclose them to others?

ERASTUS. Sometimes God, by His just judgment, either reveals something to him, or permits him to carry out what he desires, in order thus to punish the superstitious, who prefer to cling to the Devil and to falsehood rather than to God and truth. Moreover, he knows many things that human beings do not know, and sees many things before others see them, because of the sharpness of his intelligence and the astonishing acuteness of his judgment. These are increased and sharpened by his thoughts, by the infinite experience of so many ages, by the agility and mobility of his substance, and by the innumerable multitude of his companions, who announce all things to one another from every place. They also conjecture many things from Scripture, many from the words and deeds of human beings; and not infrequently they see, at least obscurely and from afar, some of God’s plans, when God permits it.

FURNIUS. I desire nothing more here. But I am greatly surprised that astrology is numbered by you among the forbidden arts.

ERASTUS. Before we discuss this matter, I should like to hear from you what that profane scoundrel of yours thought about foreknowledge of future things.

FURNIUS. Certainly when I first read his writings, I did not pay attention to these things before, warned by you, I began to observe them; I looked only for medical matters. Afterwards I noticed that he rashly affirms many things, as when in the Paragranum he openly approves augury, which God condemns in clear and explicit words. In the same place he says that prophecy and prodigies come from heaven, which he asserts both causes and indicates wars, diseases, and so forth. In the writing To the Athenians he derives prophecy from the Evestra and the “great crowd,” which he falsely writes was worshiped by the ancients as God. In the Presages he affirms that demons know all things which human beings and nature will do until the end. He records many other things to this effect, which there is no need to recount. For I now sufficiently perceive that he deviates from piety.

ERASTUS. If it were not fated for this beast to contradict himself, I would often try to excuse him. In the Presages he writes that man knows nothing of the future from himself, nor was he created to know or investigate such things, whereas elsewhere he says something entirely different. He approves and praises all the emptiest divinatory arts, which not even the Gentiles who had some sense ever approved: geomancy, pyromancy, and others like them. For I pass over the fact that he wonderfully praises necromancy and similar blasphemous arts, which are insulting to God, because we spoke of these above. Now with a single word, by the example of geomancy, I shall refute them all.

If figures arranged from points foretell future things, they do so either naturally or artificially. They can do it in neither way. Therefore they cannot even indicate them, since no other lawful mode can be devised. They cannot do it artificially in any way, because they possess no art. Nor can they be said to do it artfully in the sense in which Zeno called nature an artful fire. For artificial figures are something mathematical and lack all powers of action. But if one were pleased to ascribe action to them, no action could be attributed except such as flows from art. But no art can produce natural things. The figures of artisans, such as painters and sculptors, can indeed represent some natural things, but not in such a way that conjecture about future things may be taken from them. Therefore they do not artificially indicate beforehand things that are going to happen naturally. It is certain that neither an artificial nor a natural effect is more excellent and noble than its cause. Therefore an artificial figure too will not be more excellent than the artisan or art by which it was fashioned. [p. 229] Moreover, such figures are for the most part constructed by ignorant and unskilled little men. Hence they cannot do more than the human being whose effects they are.

That they do not signify beforehand naturally is clear from this: they have no nature other than an artificial disposition. Moreover, the things that naturally disclose future things are either causes of those future things, or effects, or productions of the same cause by which the future things signified arise. That figures are not causes of future things is clear from what has been said. That they are not effects is self-evident. For the things that are future do not yet exist. How could things that do not yet exist either signify or effect anything else? This would be just as if we said that a son exists when the father has not yet been born. Now it is clear that they are not offspring of the same cause from which the future things are brought forth. For a human being makes the figures, and he can in no way effect the things signified by them. Therefore figures composed of points cannot naturally effect or signify future things. If, therefore, they signify beforehand by turns beyond their nature, they obtain this faculty from elsewhere; that is, they are signs of future things in some other way, since they can neither be nor become causes or effects. But they are not from God and the good angels, who nowhere depart from the will of God. Therefore they are sacraments, or mysteries, or certain tacit signs of condemned spirits. What I say about these figures must be understood of all other things from which human beings try to divine, since the reasoning for all is the same.

FURNIUS. I do not doubt that these things are truly said about those arts which, for the foreknowledge of future things, use things that cannot indicate them. But I do not see how the same can be said about astrology, since the heavens and stars manifestly alter, effect, and change the things of the sublunary world.

ERASTUS. Ennius certainly long ago, like all others who were wise, did not separate astrology from the other arts of divining. Since his verses are elegant, I am pleased to adduce them here: “I do not regard village haruspices, astrologers from the circus, Isiac conjecturers, interpreters of dreams. For these are not diviners by science or art, but superstitious prophets and shameless soothsayers, either idle or insane, or those whom poverty commands. They do not know the path for themselves, yet show the way to another. They promise riches to those from whom they themselves ask a drachma.”

But to the matter. If divinatory astrology prophesied in the way physicians, sailors, and farmers predict certain things, it could be tolerated along with its professors. But when they boast of foreseeing things that will occur many years later, they make themselves intolerable. For this has been shown above to be the office of God alone. And they are certainly very unjust, not to say blasphemous against God, when they say that by art they can know many years before they happen the things which all learned human beings of all nations and ages assigned to their gods. Thus in this respect some Christians think much more basely, shameful to say, about the true God than prudent heathens thought about their gods, that is, about demons.

I know besides that this augury from heaven is so much more wicked and more hateful to God than other soothsayings, the more harmful it is than the others. For it has become the foundation of almost all superstitions and magical arts, so that it has rightly been called their key. The ancients thought that birds were moved by the gods, that entrails were presented under a definite arrangement, that the hands of geomancers and other such diviners were moved; later ages attributed all these things to the stars, as can be understood from Albertus, the Conciliator, Pomponatius, and others. Indeed, the Platonists attributed much to the stars, but they in no way indicated that powers as great as our astrologers believe to be present in them are found there, as can very easily be proved from Plato, Plotinus, Iamblichus, and Porphyry.

Above I taught what power the heavens have over these things of ours. I had resolved to explain more fully in this place the things which I have already explained clearly enough elsewhere, as you wished. The sum is this: as the heavens contain all bodies in their embrace, so they govern all things by their quality and power. At one and the same time they infuse the same powers into all these things, and communicate special powers to none. Thus the nature of things required that singular things be made by singular causes, so that cause always corresponds to effect. For a singular effect is produced by a singular cause, and a common effect by a common cause, as Aristotle teaches most learnedly in Physics 2, chapter 3. The Paracelsians may despise his doctrine and intellect, but none of them has ever been able to equal him, much less surpass him. Besides, it is self-evident that nothing is generated or corrupted in this world except singular things. From this it follows that all things which arise and perish here are made by particular causes, and nothing by heaven unless a particular cause concurs with the powers of heaven. As this is very well known to anyone trained in the first elements of philosophy, so it is more unknown than India itself to the Paracelsians.

The same thing Holy Scripture teaches excellently, since God, the best and greatest, ascribes to the stars no power except that of light and heat, by which nights and days are distinguished, and the seasons of the whole year are marked off. Indeed, God, wishing to guard against the madness of astrologers, created plants and whatever the earth can produce by itself before the stars were created. Animals, which cannot be born without seed, He did indeed create after the stars, but He did not command them to be marked by the stars with their proper powers; rather, He Himself inserted into each species the powers He willed. Things that come from putrefaction have in this respect the character of plants. I shall say it in summary: God did not assign to heaven the office either of creating anything or of bestowing powers on created things, but commanded only this: that by its motion, light, and heat it should divide day and night and the year into its seasons. Aristotle followed this, and all who philosophize rightly without superstition have rightly imitated it. What madness and insanity, then, is it to think that a cause common [p. 232] to all things existing under the moon spits particular faculties into individual things?

FURNIUS. Yet very many things evidently prove this, whatever may be said: the flesh of crabs and the tides of the sea, to pass over the rest for now.

ERASTUS. No one doubts that one temperature of the air is more or less suited to some things than to others. For there are animals which thrive and flourish more in winter, others in summer, others at other times. Thus crabs grow fat, both because the light of the moon is more suitable to them than the light of the sun, and because at that time they obtain more abundant food. What we were denying was that the moon gives crabs powers other than those it gives to all other things. If other things do not in this way conceive a more abundant dryness, this must not be attributed to the moon, but to their own nature, by reason of which each thing receives heavenly powers in the way it is fit to receive them.

The same reasoning applies to the tide of the sea. For some seas do not swell because they receive from the moon a power which other things do not receive; rather, although all other things receive the same, not all are moved in the same way, because their natures are different. This therefore always remains true: the heavenly bodies at every moment move all things by one faculty of their own in such a way that each is fit to be moved. Thus they are universal and common causes, not particular and proper ones. What of the fact that not all seas advance and recede in the same way? For some are tidal at one time, some in no way. Several people have told me that this difference exists in the Hamburg and Lübeck seas, or the Ocean and the Baltic, of which the former is tidal, the latter not, divided only by Holstein. Either, then, heaven does not give this motion to the seas, or it does not give it to all in the same way, nor to the seas alone; rather, the seas are moved according as they are fit to be moved, and other things in the same way. And so this universal power of the moon or heaven also remains: it moves all things in such a way that each can be moved according to its own nature.

If you wish to hear more about the vanity and impiety of astrology, read both our defense and the most learned books of Giovanni Pico della Mirandola. May I perish if those who dare despise these books are not worthy to be counted among the disciples of Paracelsus.

[10 On the power and efficacy of heaven and the stars]

FURNIUS. I have never thought highly of this art, because I have observed that it has been mocked by philosophers, rejected by theologians, cursed by Holy Scripture, condemned by emperors, and neglected by all intelligent people. Our Theophrastus too often criticizes it, and, as it seems, never fully learned it. For he recommends a different astrology from the Greek or Ptolemaic kind. Certainly in the Paragranum he threatens that astronomy and the art of calendars must be rejected. “The stars of heaven,” he writes in the same place, “do not impress anything upon man; rather, God made the stars of man so that they might imitate the heavenly stars.” Elsewhere he denies that reason and prudence, which heaven governs in us, come from God, because reason created by God is not subject to heaven, but rules over it. I remember also that above I cited the passage from the book On Fools, in which he affirms that it is uncertain and imperceptible. Likewise in On Lunatics: “From these things,” he says, “the falsity of astrology is evident, and of those who judge from the nativity.” In the Presages he denies that vices should be attributed to the stars. “Has not the Devil subtly insinuated himself into astronomy, so that he may sell himself in place of the stars, and judgments may be founded on him? He knows how to hide so craftily that up to now he has been held in the highest esteem; persuading the wise, he has inspired them so secretly that they have attributed matters to heaven, houses, aspects, and conjunctions.” These and similar passages, I say, prove that he does not attribute as much to astrology as most people think.

ERASTUS. If he had persisted in this opinion, we would praise him. But I tell you that there is scarcely any opinion in him which he has not shamefully and impudently contradicted. In the present matter I shall show this by producing a few passages, so that you may understand that no trust should be placed in a man who everywhere most wickedly accuses himself of falsehood in everything.

For in the same book he fully establishes astrology; only, he contends that beside the stars there are spirits which attach themselves as companions to the newborn child and lead him where they wish. Therefore, he says, the astrologer must join these spirits with the figure of the nativity if he is to divine rightly. He seems to have read the detestable fictions of Iamblichus and the blasphemies of other Platonists, and to have sucked the dregs from them. Accordingly he lays down five parts or species of astronomy, among which he places magic and necromancy, and calls them all natural, lawful, and true; and then, on the very next page, he expressly says that they are fulfilled only through infernal spirits. Has there ever existed from the creation of the world anyone more thoroughly possessed by an unclean spirit of dizziness?

Now he says that heaven merely inclines, soon after that it compels; now that it does not kill but only brings disgrace, shortly afterwards that it is lord and ruler of life and death, that it kills and brings on plague. In the houses of the planets, he says, there are craftsmen by whom all arts are taught, except justice and theology. Elsewhere he says that the stars use reason, build, and practice other arts. In the book On Plague, he says that heaven is angry, hates, loves like human beings, and never harms unless offended. We have already spoken above about the craftsmen of fools. Elsewhere he says that he was made a physician by God, not by heaven, since art is from God, not from heaven; elsewhere, on the contrary, he asserts that he was taught by the stars. In some places he even acknowledges devils as his teachers.

For my part, I would rather do anything than transcribe his absurdities. I do not think there is anyone under heaven so patient that he would not be indignant when he repeatedly encounters such monstrous and prodigious contradictions. So let that profane scoundrel go with his astrology, and let him pour these poisons, bringing eternal death, for his own disciples; let him offer them to no pious person.

But since this first skirmish has lasted longer than I expected, it is now entirely time for us to sound the retreat. What I undertook to explain has been explained: that God alone is the creator of the universe; and that all created things, by all created faculties both universal and particular, cannot be changed otherwise than according to the potentiality of the matter which was implanted in creation. This potentiality, which others call the seminal principle, although it is not single in each thing, and therefore individual things are affected and changed differently by different agents, cannot be brought into actuality or transformed without motion and alteration by any created power, as I have clearly demonstrated. For I have taught that whatever happens either beyond the potentiality implanted in matter, or suddenly without motion and succession, is miraculous. And I have shown that miracles are produced only by that power which can insert new potentialities into matter, that is, which can create.

After this I also proved that miracles can be produced neither by natural property, nor by the power of the stars, nor by the powers of the soul or imagination, nor by the diabolical Evestra born among the Tartars, nor by the work of medical art, nor by the power of any magic. From these things the reason for which the present disputation was first undertaken becomes clear: all remedies which act, or promise anything, above the proper and congenital faculties of their own nature are vain, false, superstitious, impious, to be avoided and execrated.

Therefore, whether collected under a certain position of the stars, or by the murmuring of words known or unknown, or by the use of certain ceremonies; whether prepared, shaped, painted, fashioned, carved, written, hung on, suspended, buried, cast away, applied, taken into the body, or arranged and used in any other way: all these things, I say, if they are believed by these methods to acquire some power, or are thought to effect anything more than they accomplish by their own nature, most gravely wound the conscience, undermine piety, adulterate and defame the good creatures of God, are insulting to God, and therefore must be shunned, avoided, spat upon, and detested by all the pious as diabolical, and left to Paracelsus and to the disciples who approve such things.

It has clearly appeared that words, voices, signs, characters, figures, and images, if they are supposed to increase the powers of things or to work wonders by themselves, are signs of a pact entered into with demons and of a society contracted with them. Invited by such things, they do what they can, so that they may hurl those who pursue such things into eternal destruction.

[11 Some Remarks on the Life and Morals of Paracelsus]

The very handling of the subject has compelled us, here and there, to uncover the incredible impiety, the dreadful blasphemies, and the monstrous rashness of that most slanderous creature of darkness, who assails with unheard-of fury all things good, true, and holy, and strives to tear them down, so that the less cautious may more easily beware of the most pestilential of all mortals. That he was a most mendacious and shameless impostor is attested by all his books, and, moreover, by all persons to whom he was even moderately well known.

Indeed, with such epithets, and for just reasons, the excellent Emperor Ferdinand, a man wholly alien to slander, was accustomed to describe him, as was reported to me by Herr Johannes Crato, physician to His Imperial Majesty, a man adorned with the highest learning and piety. In accordance with his principles and teachers he introduced “Tartar” into diseases, since almost everything he wrote is “Tartarean” and seems, as it were, to have been dug up and brought forth from the lowest Tartarus. A proof of this is that, while dictating, he was accustomed, as if goaded by a gadfly and driven by the Furies, to blaze up and shout like some Pythian prophetess, the demon, no doubt, suggesting to him those cartloads of abuse and that monstrous insanity of invective which no sane man could ever have devised.

These things were often reported by Herr Oporinus, a most trustworthy man, who was his amanuensis for two years. He also often stated explicitly that Paracelsus never approached the exposition of his mysteries unless he had drunk well; and that, standing in the middle of a heated room by a column, “puffed up,” and thus full of his divinity, with his hands grasping the hilt of his sword, because its hollow cavity provided lodging for that spirit which was accustomed to give responses to men fascinated by the uncultivated fellow, he used to belch forth his imaginings.

In inconstancy, shamelessness, rashness, and monstrous impiety he surpassed the Arians, Photinians, Mohammedans, and indeed all Tartarean heretics. Will you, then, still think that this man, on account of his piety, is to be preferred to the sober authors Galen and Hippocrates, who were pagans and therefore ignorant of true piety? They erred because they had been instructed by no one. But this man, though rightly instructed, willingly, knowingly, deliberately, and from sheer insolence and lust for novelty, taught, wrote, and inculcated things which they would scarcely have dared even to think, had they possessed even a spark of this divine light. But I shall stop, so that we may proceed to what follows, and consider with equal care how elegantly and excellently he philosophized.

FURNIUS. I beg you most earnestly to add, as a kind of supplement to what has already been said about the man’s life, whatever else you may know. For I suspect that you know something, since both of you were born in almost the same country.

ERASTUS. I can say nothing good, much that is bad. I shall recount later, in their proper place, the cures of his which I have received from men entirely worthy of trust and beyond exception. For now I shall touch on some matters that pertain more closely to this point.

I scarcely believe that he was Swiss. For that region would hardly have produced such a monster. If it did produce him, it did not nurture him for long. Certainly there is not a single person to be found in all Switzerland who was connected with him either by kinship or by any other relationship. He seems to have been a son of the earth, or of Tartarus, like some Merlin. He calls himself “Eremita” and wants to appear noble. But in the Swiss Einsiedeln there are no Paracelsi, no Hohenheims, no Bombasts, and finally no nobles or commoners who acknowledge him as joined to them by blood.

I have heard that a schoolmaster, a foreigner, once lived there, and that Paracelsus was born in the place where he lived, which is called the High Nest. It must then have been a very bad nest from which so bad a bird came forth. Perhaps for this reason he called himself Paracelsus. As the composition of this name is remarkable, so too is its author remarkable. Somewhere he writes that his father lived for fourteen years in Carinthia or in the neighboring regions. I have been told that there, while he was tending geese, his testicles were taken from him by a soldier. Later, when he had grown somewhat older, he went to Spain, and there, after first being initiated into magical practices, learned chymistry. When he noticed that he was wasting his labor and oil in pursuing it, he leapt over to medicine.

That he was a eunuch is indicated by many things, among them his face, and the fact that, according to Oporinus’ testimony, he utterly despised women. He also admits somewhere in a preface that he had been a brawler, and that several times on this account, or even on account of other matters, he had been thrown into prison.

If you examine what Herr Johannes Oporinus, a man of the highest reputation in everyone’s judgment, saw in him during the two years in which he followed him, having left his wife at home, in order to become a participant in that admirable learning which Paracelsus boasted of possessing, for he had persuaded him that within six months he would hand over to him the whole art of medicine perfectly, you will know very well what sort of character he had. Oporinus says: “Apart from a remarkable readiness and success in practicing medicine, I could observe in him neither piety nor learning.” And shortly afterward: “During the whole two years, almost, in which I lived familiarly with him, he was so given over day and night to drunkenness and gluttony that one could scarcely find him sober for even one or two hours.” Likewise: “Although at first he had been abstinent, he later learned to drink wine in such a way that he dared to challenge peasants through whole nights by pledging full bottles to them. By merely inserting a finger into his throat he freed himself from his debauch, and then again, as though he had never swallowed even a drop, indulged in drinking.”

Likewise: “At night, during the whole time I lived with him, he never undressed; this I attributed to drunkenness. For most often he went home to bed only drunk, at the very end of the night, and, dressed just as he was, with his sword beside him, which he boasted had belonged to some executioner, he threw himself onto the bed. Often, rising in the middle of the night, he raged through the room with drawn sword, striking the floor and walls with such frequent blows that more than once I feared my head would be cut off.” Likewise: “He was often so destitute of money that I knew he had not even an obol left; then, immediately the next day, he would display a purse well furnished, so that I often wondered whence it had been supplied to him.” Likewise: “I never saw or heard him pray; nor did he care for church services. Paying little attention to the evangelical doctrine which was then beginning to be cultivated among us and was earnestly urged by our preachers, he would sometimes threaten that he would bring Luther and the Pope into order no less than he was now bringing Galen and Hippocrates into order. For none of those who had hitherto written on Holy Scripture, whether ancients or moderns, had, according to him, rightly extracted the kernel of Scripture; they had merely clung to the bark, as it were, and the outer membrane.”

These things I have thought fit partly to excerpt from Oporinus’ letters and partly to note from his conversations. Matters pertaining to the preparation of drugs and to cures will be reported later in their proper place.

Herr Heinrich Bullinger, a man most distinguished for piety and learning, wrote to me almost the same things; he had known him at Zurich, where Paracelsus lived for some time. So that one may see that he was everywhere like himself, I shall add something also from the letter of this man, who can never be sufficiently praised. “I conversed with him,” he says, “once and again about various matters, also theological or religious matters. But from all his conversations one could gather nothing of piety, and a great deal of magic, which he imagined to be something or other. If you had seen him, you would not have called him a physician, but a wagon-driver; and he was wonderfully delighted with the company of wagon-drivers. Therefore, while he was living here in the inn of the Stork, he would watch for wagon-drivers arriving at this hostelry; with these men the filthy fellow would gorge and drink, and sometimes he was so overcome by wine that he would lay himself down on the nearest bench and sleep off his foul drunkenness.”

Then, after saying certain things about his dress and clothing, things which Oporinus also has, he concludes thus: “In short, he was filthy in every respect and a foul man. Rarely or never did he enter sacred assemblies, and he seemed to care little for God and divine matters.”

If these things are not sufficient for you, read his Defenses, which will give you occasion to think of more. If you shrink even from this labor, consider only the titles with which he adorned himself. For by that very thing he abundantly revealed his character. Although he was called Philipp, the family name, if he had any, I suspect was Bombast, he later called himself Theophrastus, Paracelsus, deriving this, I think, from the place where he was born, Hohenheim, which likewise seems to have been fashioned by him from the same occasion, Aureolus, Prince and Monarch of all sciences and arts.

More than once he adorns himself with this name in the book On Tincture. And in the Paragranum he says: “I am, and shall be, the Monarch. You are forced to follow me, Avicenna, Galen, you Parisians, Montpellier men, Swabians, Meisseners, Cologne men, Viennese, the sea-coasts, the islands, Italy, Dalmatia, Sarmatia, Greece, Athens, Arabs, Jews,” and it is a wonder that he does not add the Garamantes, Indians, English, Swedes, and Danes, “but I am not bound to follow you. The straps or rings of my shoes know more of the art of medicine than Galen.” “Aristotle and those who follow him are like foam on good beer: it savors of nature’s scum, but belongs to cats and dogs.”

But let us grant that he was a physician and surgeon more successful than many others. Was he for that reason obliged to condemn men whom he never understood? And how could a drunken man, spending the day and the greater part of the night drinking with peasants, wagon-drivers, and other ignoramuses, spending the rest of the night fighting with ghosts and demons, rising very late the next day burdened with yesterday’s drunkenness, understand the writings of those men, and extract their hidden meanings, which all others, searching them out with the most intent care, perpetual labor, and continuous study, have scarcely been able to find and recognize?

What reason, I ask, moved him to call himself Theophrastus? Either he wished to be so named because of elegance and purity of speech, which befell that other Theophrastus, Aristotle’s pupil, or certainly because of his knowledge of divine matters and his skill in discoursing on them. No one will be able to affirm this, unless by “God” he understands the Tartarean god, whose cause Paracelsus indeed pursued with the greatest zeal. As for his speech, he was utterly unversed and ignorant in the Greek language; of Latin he scarcely knew the first rudiments; the language which he ought to have sucked from his mother’s breasts he did not sufficiently possess. For he wrote so disorderly, so barbarously, so confusedly, so unskillfully, so absurdly, that I do not think there exists any German writer whose ignorance and childishness he did not surpass in infinite ways.

Let him therefore remain “Cacophrastus,” as he calls himself in his Paragranum. Let him remain “Ferreolus,” “Plumbecolus,” “Lutulentulus,” “Tartareolus”; let his disciples be sane, prudent, golden, silver, leaden, only let them not contaminate, pollute, and defile, and render execrable to us, the art given and granted from heaven.

FURNIUS. I shall henceforth easily beware of Paracelsus’ theology. Nor shall I hereafter allow myself to be deceived by superstitious remedies and magical cures. For I now see that it is impious when he repeatedly orders diseases born from incantation and superstition, even if they could be born in that way, to be cured by a contrary incantation and superstition.

26 March, 1571.

To God alone be glory.

[Appendix]

[p. 243] APPENDIX

FURNIUS. I return to you before the appointed day.

ERASTUS. Perhaps because you have seen the recently published book of Paracelsus.

FURNIUS. That is so. I read it eagerly when it was offered to me, and I understood most things more correctly than before. Yet since there are some matters on which I wish to hear your opinion, I earnestly ask you not to take this boldness of mine amiss.

ERASTUS. If you have found in it anything pertaining to our first skirmish which you think has not been sufficiently explained and refuted, put it forward; I shall gladly answer you.

FURNIUS. He says that man is composed of two bodies, one compounded from the elements, the other fashioned from the stars.

ERASTUS. These and other matters of this kind we shall weigh in our next conversation; for now only those things must be examined which pertain to piety and religion.

FURNIUS. In the preface he says that his astronomy is the principle and element of religion and heavenly wisdom.

ERASTUS. It would take too long to answer all his absurdities. Therefore put forward the more important points, although even this could not have been said without manifest blasphemy. For the foundation of religion is God alone. But he is a companion of Pomponazzi.

FURNIUS. I am well aware that it is absurd when he says that swine, asses, and lions are generated from the stars. For in the book On Lunatics he says that the Pharisees were essentially wolves, not merely by resemblance of character, as the apostles were called sheep by Christ. In the book On Homunculi he seems to have wished to hand down the causes and manner of generation of such beings. [p. 244] In this book, chapter 6, he asserts that men are truly transformed by the heavens into wolves, although a little earlier, in chapter 3, he attributed the cause to the nature of the seed; this has often been refuted above. I still remember very clearly what you set forth about the efficacy of the heavens. Yet he refutes himself a little later, when he openly denies, and more than once, that the heavens produce lechery, greed, and other impurities, and maintains that they produce only arts together with wisdom. I admit I favor the man, but I do not approve such open contradictions. He writes several times that the heavens compel men to do both good and evil. Not much later he asserts that it is within man’s power to follow or not follow celestial inclinations. Indeed, elsewhere he has this: “Propensities to theft, robbery, fornication are not inclinations of the stars, but come from a certain spirit existing in man beyond and outside the order of nature.” And a little later he again affirms that morals are born in us from the inclination of the stars: “Man is compelled to obey the stars,” he says, “and there is no freedom here.”

ERASTUS. I have often already warned that it is Paracelsus’ fate always and everywhere to fight most shamefully with himself. Indeed, I have become so accustomed to his contradictions that I am greatly surprised when I find him consistent with himself for a little while. He dares to write that by logic or dialectic the natural light has been extinguished and divine wisdom obscured, which perhaps, he says, is the sin against the Holy Spirit, which will be forgiven neither in this world nor in the next. With the same rashness he asserts in two places that the men of the newly discovered islands and lands are not of the same noble nature as we are, nor do they have their origin from Adam, from whom we have drawn ours, but that they were born from another Adam.

In every way intolerable is the fact that that fanatical man attempted to undermine the resurrection of the flesh and call it into doubt. For since he posits three parts in man, the elemental, the celestial, and the divine, he maintains that the first two will utterly perish and never reach heaven, and that only the third part, which has come forth from God, returns to him and possesses heaven. “Observe,” he says, “why God ordained death, namely, to separate the flesh, which is useless, from the spirit. For nothing will reach God or heaven except what has proceeded from God. But only the spirit, in which the image of God is, is from God. This alone, therefore, returns to God, which descended from heaven; but the flesh is from the earth, and therefore returns into the earth.” Likewise: “Neither the elemental nor the sidereal body will possess heaven, but only the spirit-man, who was breathed in by God.” Likewise: “This must be held, that none of the things we received from earth rises again, but only that which is from God. Therefore we shall rise in Christ. If we are not in him, we shall rise, but not in Christ, not in nature, but in the spirit of the saints.” Likewise: “What is from earth does not share in the inheritance of the kingdom of God, because it is earth, which will not penetrate to heaven.” Likewise: “It has been sufficiently shown above that flesh and blood, which men received from Adam, will not enter the kingdom of God. For nothing enters heaven except that which has arisen from heaven. But Adam’s flesh is from earth, and therefore does not reach heaven, but returns into the earth. For it is mortal and subject to death; but nothing mortal will possess heaven. Earthly flesh also cannot reach heaven, because it profits nothing, is useless for all things, and is full of filth, vices, and wickedness. Nor can it be purified from its defilement by any fire, so that it might become capable of heaven. For it undergoes no fire, no glorification, but the whole must be separated from man, that is, from the soul; this is done by death, which divides man from his flesh. Therefore we must know that the flesh which has arisen from Adam’s seed is altogether mortal and useless.”

He repeats these and other things of this kind so often in this book that he compels all the pious to wonder that such great and impious boldness could have fallen upon a man. Nor is what he wrote in the third book To the Athenians dissimilar, though he touched on it more obscurely and briefly. He had said the same somewhat more clearly in the second book, text 23. In his Paramirum he almost casts doubt on the life of the soul. For he writes as follows: “There is another body in man which is not made from the three,” understand Mercury, Sulphur, and Salt, “nor from the limbus, whence it is not subject to the physician. It has its origin from the breath of God. Therefore, since we shall rise, namely to render account of deeds done well and badly, but not of the health and diseases which the visible body suffers, it is probable that the invisible body will rise together with it.” In this place he calls the soul the invisible body. For this alone in man exists by divine inspiration and is not made from the matter of the elements. Here, therefore, he calls it body; in the passages cited above he more correctly calls it spirit.

But although these things are monstrously impious, he was not content with them; he added still other blasphemies. For in the second book he openly denies four times that the Virgin Mary, the Mother of God, was born from Adam. His words in chapter 2 are these: “From this it follows that the Virgin, from whom the new creature came forth, was the daughter of Abraham according to the promise, but not from Adam; that is, before Abraham she was born without male seed, in the power of the promise, without any mortal nature, from a virgin: in this way she is not from Adam, nor from his seed; only from her flesh was Christ born, conceived by the Holy Spirit and incarnate from holy flesh.” Likewise in chapter 3: “Scripture says nothing about Adam’s flesh, but about the figured body of the second birth, to which nothing corporeal from Adam adheres. For the Virgin Mary, our mother, was pure, without the flesh and blood of Adam and Eve, just as we also must be.” Likewise: “It was destined that the Virgin, from whom Christ was born, should have her origin from Abraham, [p. 247] not from Adam.” Likewise: “Christ was born from the Virgin, who derived her origin not from Adam but from Abraham, not from the flesh of Adam but from the flesh of the promise, from which nothing impure is born.”

What of the fact that he denies Christ was born from the substance of the Virgin? Surely he did not believe his flesh to be true human flesh propagated from Adam, and therefore he by no means thought him to be true man. For if Mary did not arise from Adam’s lineage, neither did Christ, assuming flesh from her, take his origin from Adam. But if he did not even assume flesh from the Virgin, he had flesh far different from our flesh. His words on this matter are these: “Christ was conceived by the Holy Spirit and incarnate from holy flesh, not according to the order of mortal flesh, but according to the new birth, which proceeds from the Holy Spirit. In this understand that there is nothing from Adam’s flesh except what you can perceive from wine that is poured into some vessel. This is said to be from the vessel, but not of the vessel,” that is, not from the very substance of the vessel. Such are his words.

What do you say to these things? Does he not seem to you worthy of having written on the front of this book, which contains nothing besides monstrous opinions, shameful lies, and dreadful blasphemies, that he was excellently illuminated by God? Either those who are not ashamed to commend such things do not know what they are doing, or they are the most unfortunate of all men.

FURNIUS. How unlike are men’s thoughts! How different their affections! I read these same things and indeed thought they were spoken obscurely, but I did not interpret them in the way you explain them. For I think that what you have brought forward from him against the resurrection of the dead has a meaning that is not evil. I believe he meant what Paul said in 1 Corinthians 15, that flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom, nor can corruption inherit incorruption. Thus he denies that the impious rise again, not because he denies that they will live again and doubts that they will be carried away to eternal punishment, but because by this manner of speaking he indicates that they will not ascend into heaven. Therefore he thought that the flesh which we received from our parent Adam would not possess the heavenly inheritance before it had been regenerated from above, which we all affirm with Holy Scripture. The things you brought forward from the Paramirum prove this very clearly, where he affirms that the invisible body too will rise together with the visible body, which we say is compounded from the elements.

ERASTUS. I too at first believed that he had thought this, and I would very much wish that this had been his meaning. But he says too many things which compel us to think otherwise. I do not now wish to say more about his contradictions, which are so familiar and customary to him, as I have already noted several times, that he has held almost no true opinion consistently everywhere, while his false and monstrous opinions he has varied, inverted, amplified, and disfigured in various ways. For this reason I have ceased to marvel at the man’s madness in this matter, and have noted only the more serious points.

In this book he stresses nothing more often than that what has arisen from God returns to God, but what has arisen from earth is again turned into earth; and therefore the soul cannot die. In the Paramirum he only thinks it likely that the soul will come forth from the tomb together with the visible body. He is moved by this argument, that we are to render account of deeds well and badly done, which do not pertain to this visible body. For this is the subject of disease and health, of which God will demand no account from us. In this book he diligently urges the opposite, that the body sins in such a way that the soul is not polluted by it. “The flesh,” he says, “ought to have been free, so that it might do what it wished without harm to the soul; but this could not be, because divine laws were imposed upon the flesh, taking away all freedom, so that there is nothing free in it; and in the flesh he is free in such a way that in it he can visibly do evil and good without damage to the soul.”

FURNIUS. Indeed he denies that the flesh is free, since he says that divine commandments were imposed upon it.

ERASTUS. I am not concerned with that here, since I principally wish to show you how disgraceful Paracelsus’ discourse is, and how shamefully he contradicts himself in so few verses. But if you intend to defend him, read what follows in this chapter, and then what that swine grunts about free will in the same book, book 2, chapter 3. When you think you have found something with which to excuse him, you will feel yourself much more frustrated. This cannot be denied: he says that the flesh ought to have been free, so that it could do whatever it pleased, but that it is not; and immediately afterward he affirms that in the flesh there is freedom, so that it can act badly and well without inconvenience to the soul.

FURNIUS. Since not so much depends on this point, let us return to our matter.

ERASTUS. My purpose was to show that his words cannot be understood in the way in which those of the apostle Paul have always been understood by all sane men, and are still understood today. For the apostle wished only to teach that our bodies cannot attain the heavenly dwelling so long as they remain subject to corruption; he does not deny that these very bodies of ours, which we carry about in this mortal life, after they have been changed and glorified, will live forever in heaven with Christ and all God’s elect. Therefore, when asked what will happen to those whom the last day will overtake living on this earth, he answers that they will be changed in the blink of an eye. For, he says, “this corruptible,” to phtharton touto, this body subject to corruption, must put on incorruption, “and this mortal,” kai to thnēton touto, must put on immortality. From this it is most clearly perceived that no bodies other in substance than these very ones which we received from our parents will live again and reign in heaven with Christ their redeemer. The substance will not be changed, but qualities, such as heaviness, corruption, mortality, and others of this kind, will be taken away from them. So far was Paul from thinking that, while we live in this world, we have an immortal body that he affirms that all must put off mortality, even those whom the last day finds on earth. It is contradictory for our body to be actually at the same time both mortal and immortal.

Not so Paracelsus. For although he says that men must rise in the flesh, so that they may remain distinct from angels, he imagines another body different from this earthly one which was propagated from Adam.

FURNIUS. I think you interpret his words unfairly. For he does not mean another substance which will possess the heavenly kingdom, but this very one, changed, however, as you have taught from the apostle. For with Scripture he says that this renewal is born from water and spirit. Even if he sometimes seems to have spoken otherwise, his words should nevertheless be taken in the better sense. For he is sometimes accustomed to speak rather obscurely and to create in the reader the suspicion of an absurd opinion, while he is thinking nothing foolish in his mind.

ERASTUS. I dare truly say that no one has ever existed, at least so far as I have been able to see, who wrote so disorderly, barbarously, confusedly, and improperly in our language. Hence it happens that from one passage it is usually difficult to perceive his meaning. The frequent and monstrous contradictions increase the difficulty. Indeed, in this very matter he speaks so confusedly, obscurely, and variously that you cannot extract a definite opinion until you have compared all the passages with one another. From this comparison you will perceive that he rather often affirms what I said before, namely, that this earthly body of ours is not made immortal and does not attain heavenly life, but rather some other body sent down from heaven does; of this there are many arguments.

Let the first be this: that in this book he affirms six hundred times that the body propagated from Adam will not possess the inheritance of heaven, but that only this returns to God which proceeded from God, namely the soul inspired by God. He constantly affirms that both bodies, the elemental and the sidereal, are dissolved by death, so that the former is returned to the elements, the latter restored to heaven and the stars. But he is speaking of the very substance or essence of the bodies, not of qualities; this it is sufficient to prove here by a single testimony from the preface, in addition to those we cited above. “God,” he says, “made two essences in man, an earthly and an eternal, which remain joined until the resurrection; at that time the earthly will be returned to earth, the eternal to the kingdom of God.” I do not now wish to warn you to consider how false it is when he says that souls remain joined with bodies until the resurrection, since it is clear that they are separated by death. But I bid you note this, how he speaks inconsistently with Scripture, which teaches that at the last judgment souls are to be joined again with bodies, while he writes that they are then to be separated. Since he did this chiefly in order to show that the essence of the body derived from Adam does not enter heaven but is dissolved into earth, it is very clear that he speaks not of qualities but of substance. For at the time of the resurrection the qualities of this world are no longer present in bodies.

Second, he no less frequently asserts that bodies which were taken and made from earth will not ascend to heaven, but are to be dissolved into earth. But it is clear that our bodies were fashioned and made from earth. Therefore, according to his opinion, they will not possess heaven. From this it is again plain that he speaks of another body. His words in book 2, chapter 2, are these: “There are two kinds of flesh: one of Adam, which is useful for nothing; the other of the spirit, which gives life. For it is incarnated from above, whence it also returns into heaven.” And later: “God wished man to be immortal, but the flesh taken from earth could not be made immortal. For nothing is immortal except what comes from heaven.” Likewise: “The soul is flesh and blood, and is compelled to be in these. But there are two differences of flesh, mortal and immortal: the former receives its essence from mortal flesh; the latter is perfect flesh ordained for eternal life.” This flesh he very often calls flesh incarnated by the Holy Spirit.

Third, he equally often inculcates this point, that it is impossible for a mortal body to become immortal. The testimonies cited above prove this so openly that there is no need to produce more. For everywhere he constantly asserts that no mortal thing will ascend to heaven, but only immortal and divine things will return to God. “Immortal flesh,” he says, “must have absolutely nothing of the flesh of old Adam in itself.” If absolutely nothing, then not even its substance. But our bodies, even if we did not know that they are subject to death and corruption, we would very easily know this from the testimonies of Scripture. Therefore he did not believe that these mortal bodies of ours can put on immortality.

Fourth, he maintains that only that body will enter heaven which is of the same substance as Christ’s body, and was born in the same or at least a similar way, not propagated by natural generation. He openly writes that Christ took his flesh from the Virgin in such a way, but not of the Virgin, as one who draws wine from some vessel receives it from the vessel, but does not take it of the vessel. For the wine is not of the substance of the vessel, but is merely contained in it. That impure creature of darkness renews the error of ancient heretics and of certain recent ones, who babble that Christ passed from heaven through the Virgin as through a channel and assumed nothing of her substance. His words are as follows: “Understand that Christ was born of Adam’s flesh in no other way than you can understand wine that is stored in a vessel. This is indeed from the vessel, but not of the vessel. Now it also follows that what was incarnated by the spirit is from heaven and returns to heaven; but what was not incarnated by the spirit also does not reach heaven. Just as Christ was born from the Virgin and was incarnated in her by the Holy Spirit without Adam’s male seed, so we men who wish to be saved must put off mortal flesh and be born again by the Holy Spirit. For since man must be furnished with flesh and blood forever, there are two kinds of flesh: one of Adam, which profits nothing; the other of the Holy Spirit, which gives life. For he himself incarnates from above, and therefore his incarnation returns through us into heaven.”

In sum, he imagines that in baptism flesh is fashioned for us by the Holy Spirit, flesh which was not born from Adam’s progeny, just as he formed Christ’s flesh in the womb of the Virgin. But if he did not grant that the Virgin’s flesh was like ours, how would he grant that Christ’s flesh was truly human flesh like ours, which he maintains only came forth from the Virgin but was not taken from her substance? If you add to these things what he wrote in these words, “This flesh,” which is to ascend into heaven, “must be of the flesh and blood of Christ, which descended from heaven; and we too, through the new generation, must come from heaven into a body formed by the Holy Spirit,” if, I say, you attach these words to what has been said above, you will easily see what follows, namely that the body in which we are to live in heaven is different from the body in which we walk about here. For “purity,” he says, which belongs to heavenly flesh, “cannot exist in the flesh propagated from Adam, but exists in another flesh, which has its origin from the other Adam, Christ.”

Fifth, when he says that in this life we carry about both bodies, mortal and immortal, he plainly demonstrates that he is not speaking of the qualities of our bodies but of substance. For no one is so unskilled as to think that our bodies, which are subject to corruption while we pass through this life, are immortal. Yet Paracelsus was not afraid to affirm this. Therefore he thought that two bodies are in us at once, one mortal, the other immortal. In the second book On the Generated, he clearly writes: “The blessed have two bodies, mortal and immortal.” This body, he says, is not nourished from the elements, but by heavenly things, such as manna and the water flowing from the rock. Elsewhere he writes that the apostles performed miracles not through the old body, but through the new. “In this,” he says, “are the powers and forces, and from this they proceed. And although the old body is still present, it is nevertheless not used.” Here you openly hear that two bodies, old and new, are in the same man at the same time. “You know,” he writes elsewhere, “about the eternal body: that it is in Hebron,” this is what he calls paradise, “after separation,” namely when it has been separated from the earthly body by death. If they are separated from each other in death, it is altogether necessary that they were previously united.

If you ask what sort of body he thought this was, he himself will answer you at the end of chapter 1 of book 2: the bodies of the blessed will be such as were those of the angels who appeared to Abraham and Lot, and such as the Holy Spirit assumed when he sat above Christ in the image of a dove; unless perhaps you prefer him to have understood such bodies as he attributes to nymphs, wild men, giants, and the like, or even to the men of the newly discovered islands, all of whom he denies were propagated and born from Adam.

Finally, he constantly affirms and often repeats that the body made from earth by God the Father in the first creation will not see heaven, but some other body created by the Son, or incarnated by the Holy Spirit, will. From many testimonies I shall bring forward here a single one from the second chapter of the second book: “Since mortal flesh does not allow us to ascend to heaven, Christ gave new flesh and blood in which man should exist. This creature in which he ascends to heaven was created by the Son, not by the Father,” when he speaks of the body. “For mortal flesh is from the Father, just like Adam and his descendants, who are again dissolved into that from which they were made. But the Son gave a new body in which men must rise.”

Who would not be utterly astonished at the madness of the man, who tacitly detracts from God the Father the force and power of producing immortal creatures? If he did not wish to remember the state in which Adam was before the fall, he should at least have understood from the duration and immutability of the heavens that God could have created all things immutable. Yet he himself makes heaven mutable like sublunary things, when he repeatedly says that the sidereal part of men is dissolved into the stars just as the elemental part is dissolved into the elements.

From all these things you clearly discern how unchristian and impious were his thoughts concerning the resurrection of our bodies. Most impure are the blasphemies which that impious buffoon belched forth in this book. According to his doctrine, Christ is not true man. For he did not assume Adam’s flesh. Therefore, for the Paracelsians, the article of our faith by which Christ is said to have become man will be false. Second, he did not have mortal flesh, and therefore he did not truly die for us. Certainly he everywhere calls Christ’s flesh immortal flesh. Indeed, he makes the flesh of all others immortal too, I mean of those who will obtain the inheritance of the heavenly kingdom. He writes that this flesh is merely separated from earthly and mortal flesh by death. Thus he overturns the whole foundation of our salvation by denying that Christ died for us.

Third, he denies that the Virgin’s flesh was derived from Adam, though he grants that it came from Abraham, as if Abraham had not been propagated from Adam. He ought at least to have remembered from Luke 3 that Christ arose from Adam’s progeny. Was David not born from Adam’s seed? Was Christ not the son of David? But he dreams that the Virgin was miraculously born not from Adam’s flesh but from the promise. Fourth, he calls into doubt the resurrection of bodies, which the apostle defends so strongly together with all Scripture. Fifth, he affirms that the souls of the disgraceful and impious will be with God no less than those of the pious, writing as follows: “God made man from earth and heaven, so that in the body he might meditate on heavenly things and behold his redeemer in it. If he has done otherwise, the spirit returns to God, but man goes where God commands him to go.” I now omit the lighter errors and those which do not so directly shake and even overturn the foundation of our salvation, although the denial of omnipotence in the Father also belongs here.

FURNIUS. The errors you have so far recited can all be excused if by mortal and immortal flesh he is said to have meant what the apostle meant and taught. Indeed, you cannot deny that at least sometimes he spoke rightly about this matter, especially since he approves Job’s testimony.

ERASTUS. I should certainly wish nothing more than that all his writings could be piously explained. But he does not allow us to do what we desire. I shall not deny that he sometimes speaks in such a way that he could be judged to have thought rightly, if he did not so often repeat the contrary. Surely we judge the opinion of any writer to be the one that we see repeated, inculcated, urged, and asserted more frequently. If Paracelsus once said something on this matter that could receive a pious meaning, he asserted the contrary ten times and tried to prove it with arguments. I say nothing of the fact that, generally, when he seems to say something correct, he is so obscure that you cannot perceive what he meant unless you hunt out his thoughts from other opinions. Therefore, since he affirms false and impious things more frequently, more openly, and with a greater force of words and arguments, we are compelled to believe that, overcome by truth and conscience, he sometimes wished to write more correctly, but could not.

I have already said rather often that it was his fate never to remain in one opinion, but to contradict himself disgracefully. If you think that judgment concerning the man’s mind must be made from a true opinion that perhaps once slipped out through carelessness, while he was not attending sufficiently to his hypotheses, then every opportunity for disputing with him is cut off from us. For I freely undertake to demonstrate this, and under this condition, that if I do not accomplish it, I will suffer anything: he reprehended nothing in others that he himself did not at some time affirm. Therefore, if this is to count, he ceased to be the inventor of a new medicine, or the restorer of one long unknown. If you do not want this to count, what remains except that we confess that he thought what he asserted more often and more consistently? This being posited, he has truly been accused by us of those crimes and blasphemies which we recently enumerated and now have also indicated.

He admits Job’s testimony in such a way that he thinks Job understood it of another flesh to be placed around him by the Son, which is not of the substance of Adam’s flesh or earth. For in a certain passage cited above you heard him affirm that this flesh of ours receives no purification and is not capable of glorification. Therefore he does not concede what you think, and what the apostle urges: “this corruptible,” “this mortal.” For he does not want this mortal flesh to be made immortal, but imagines another kind of flesh. For this reason he says that in death this flesh must be separated from that one, and that the pious possess both at the same time. “Job’s prophecy,” he says, “does not speak of flesh made from the mud of the earth, but of the future flesh of the new generation conceived from the Holy Spirit.” Likewise: “Job speaks of the flesh of life, not of the flesh of death which was propagated from Adam.”

What, moreover, will you say if I show that he posits the rational soul as mortal?

FURNIUS. I do not believe you.

ERASTUS. Does he not say countless times throughout this book that man was created by God in such a way that in him he joined two bodies, one of which he compounded from the elements, the other from the stars? “Man,” he says, “was not made from mud, but from the fifth essences of the elements and of the stars.” He then writes that God breathed into this composite the spirit of life, so that man is compacted from two bodies and the spirit of life. But by death, does he not so often assert that the earthly body will return into earth and the sidereal into the stars? Does he not constantly affirm that both these bodies are mortal?

FURNIUS. I admit it. But what will you conclude from this?

ERASTUS. What I said: that the human mind is mortal.

FURNIUS. A remarkable inference.

ERASTUS. For Paracelsus, the body made from the stars is nothing other than the sense, reason, and intelligence which are in man; nor does he posit in man any other human reason. But these are nothing other than the soul. Therefore, when he makes the sidereal body dissoluble, which is the human soul, he makes the soul itself mortal.

FURNIUS. How do you say that the sidereal body is the intellect?

ERASTUS. Your Paracelsus has these words in the book On Astronomical Science and in the first book of the present work, chapter 2: “God fashioned man thus. He extracted the essence from the four elements and, besides this, from the stars the essence of wisdom, knowledge, intellect. Both these essences, of the elements and of the stars, he reduced into one mass, which Scripture calls the mud of the earth.” And after inserting some remarks he adds: “One must know that man consists of two parts: from the elements one part was made flesh and blood; the other part was taken from the stars, namely sense and thoughts.” Likewise: “From father and mother nothing of intelligent substance is generated, but it flows from the firmament alone.” Likewise in the second book, chapter 1: “The spirit of the stars, which comes from heaven, is in man earthly reason and wisdom, sharing nothing in earthly flesh and blood, but proceeding from the firmament. It is in man like a spirit without body, yet in the figure of the human image. Therefore there is a threefold wisdom in man: brute or carnal wisdom; sidereal wisdom, that is, art and intelligence or human reason; and divine wisdom, which God gives to man in conception.”

Thus in the first Archidoxis he says that man consists of two bodies: the natural, which is flesh and blood, and the spiritual, which in this passage he writes is eternal, which provides man with hearing, taste, and the other senses. In the book On Astronomical Science he contradicts this passage, namely that the celestial body is eternal, writing thus: “The sidereal body of man must finally also putrefy and die.” If you want more, you will find him affirming as often as you please that all arts, sciences, all wisdom and knowledge come into man from the stars. In the fragment On Sense and the Instruments he has these words: “Therefore sense is man, and man is sense.” Indeed, he derives even Solomon’s wisdom from the stars when speaking of inclination, although in the preface to the fourth book he admits that it was given by God, so that he is nowhere consistent with himself. In a certain passage in the first book he writes thus: “Just as food nourishes the body, refreshing it and supplying blood together with flesh, so the exterior world supplies man with all reason, art, and wisdom; and none of these proceeds from a special gift of God, but from the light of nature.” And shortly after: “If someone contends that there is no wisdom in the stars, but that it flows from the image of God, I shall not deny it concerning the wisdom by which eternal life is prepared for us. But human or animal wisdom is present from nature.”

Do you see what follows from the mad doctrine of a madman, which you people impiously strive to raise to heaven with praises?

FURNIUS. It is a strange thing. So often he posits the soul as immortal and infused by God, and nevertheless, leaving these things aside, you seize upon what you can blame.

ERASTUS. I do it for your sake, so that you may not fall into error, but may see how nothing sound existed in this man. For he is always fighting with himself: for the most part openly, sometimes obscurely, he teaches the opposite of what he affirms [p. 260] in words. I now pass over the incredible confusion of words and things, unheard of in any age. See, I ask you, how changeable he is in this very matter. He composes man from three things, the elemental body, the sidereal body, and the soul. Then he says that two additional spirits are in him. Not content with these, he adds a third, so that there are in him an earthly, a sidereal, and an animal spirit. For although almost everywhere he treats spirit and soul as the same things, elsewhere he explicitly says that spirit is one thing, soul another. Sometimes he asserts that the latter, at other times the former, was breathed in by God and returns to God. This spirit he sometimes says is a body, as at the end of chapter 1, book 1: “We nourish two bodies, one taken from earth, the other from Christ; the former from the Father, the latter from the Son,” unless perhaps he is speaking of the immortal body.

And although everywhere he calls the sidereal spirit a body, in the passage cited a little earlier he says that it is without body and only retains the appearance of a human figure; the absurdity of this opinion is so great that a greater can scarcely be devised. This spirit, which he here said to be reason, intellect, and human wisdom, he elsewhere calls the Evestrum, and in this book he writes that it appears after death and teaches men marvels. If you desire to see more things about these very spectres of the dead, and indeed things expressly conflicting with the words of Moses and Christ, read the little book he wrote On Souls Appearing after Death. “The soul,” he says, “is flesh and blood, and is compelled to be in these.” Likewise: “The soul is in the heart of man, and the soul is the very heart of man.” Thus elsewhere: “Life is the soul, not flesh, nor is it in flesh; but it is the soul and is in the soul; and the soul is life itself.” Such forms of speech are very frequent in him.

Indeed, he even posits two souls in man, in chapter 3, with these words: “It must further be noted that there are two souls in man, the eternal and the natural or vital, of which the latter is subject to death, the former remains immortal.” If you add to these the immortal flesh, man who is to possess heaven will consist of three bodies, elemental, sidereal, and heavenly; of two souls, eternal and vital; and of four spirits, earthly, sidereal, animal, and divine. Thus you will have a three-bodied monster of a man composed of nine parts.

FURNIUS. I do not wish to hear more about these things. Let us proceed to what follows.

ERASTUS. I do not know what to say. I do not believe that since the creation of the world there has existed anyone who has confused everything so wickedly. Contrary to every opinion of all ages and men, he divides astrology into four parts, in which he treats theology, imagination and faith, as he calls it, and demonic matters or things pertaining to the infernal regions. Who ever lived under this sun who was not mad and yet subjected the consideration of matters so utterly different to one art? But he is not even consistent with himself. For elsewhere he makes five species of astrology, distinguishing divinatory astrology from these four. And while elsewhere he posits seven species of what he calls human astrology, here he posits nine. So elsewhere he enumerates five species of magic, here four; likewise he lists only four parts of necromancy, while here he posits five. “Nectromancy,” a name hitherto unheard of, unless he meant to say “necyomancy,” he elsewhere omitted entirely; here he divides it into fourteen species. To divinatory astrology he elsewhere attributes three species, here he divides it into thirteen. But I am weary of recalling the rest.

I wish only briefly to review the arguments by which that most vain man thought he could prove to us magic with its species, if indeed he was so mad as to believe that he was proving it, and did not rather have a settled plan to overthrow all truth and piety. That he wrote that the Apocalypse and the signs that will appear in the sun and moon can be understood by none except magi is unworthy of refutation by us.

FURNIUS. He is not speaking of magi generated by the natural stars, but of those whom the supernatural heaven has generated.

ERASTUS. He did not dare say what he wished without this correction. It is certain that he understood it of the magic which he hands down in this book, by the power of which he also says the secret thoughts of souls are known. But to the matter. He lays down this as the foundation on which he builds everything: that there is nothing hidden which is not to be revealed. From this that most acute and most pestilential man concludes that magic, necromancy, all divinatory arts, and whatever impious and superstitious things the evil demons have devised anywhere, have been granted and permitted by God to mortals. And what pious man could bear with calm mind this criminal boldness in expounding divine oracles? I, certainly, am sometimes so moved when reading such things that I have persuaded myself I cannot review many of them without sin.

His argument is this: Christ said that all hidden things are to be revealed. Therefore all those arts which serve the manifestation of hidden things are lawful and praiseworthy. But all these arts are useful for the disclosure and investigation of hidden things: magic, necromancy, sciomancy, auguries, astrology, geomancy, the seeing and interpretation of dreams, lots, and six hundred others of this kind. Therefore God approves them all. And therefore theologians and others who censure them as evil and illicit are mad. Thus, what Christ said about the preaching of his saving word and the manifestation of our hearts and sins, that impure buffoon twists to establish diabolical arts against the manifest word of God. He brings forward no other proof than the one just expounded, which you will find inculcated several times in this book, not indeed in this form, but in these words.

But he defines magic thus: that it is the art of drawing the powers of the stars into certain things, such as seals, words, characters, images, figures, and so on, through which the magus then performs marvels. For he posits that in the stars there are powers of every kind of miracle, which we refuted above.

FURNIUS. I do not know whether you observed the method of drawing them down.

ERASTUS. He explains it by the example of crystals and concave mirrors, in which the rays of the sun are so concentrated that they set alight tinder placed nearby.

FURNIUS. I have understood that the heavens lack these powers. Yet even if I did not know this to be true, this explanation would not satisfy me. For such a mirror does not harm or burn except those things toward which the rays are directed. And this line changes almost every moment according to the movement of the sun. Likewise, if some object is interposed, it does nothing. Likewise, the mirror cannot be turned in any direction whatsoever so as to be endowed with that force, but must be opposed to the rays shot out from the body of the sun. Add that a man cannot know when he rightly turns an image, figure, or character toward the stars whose powers he wishes to receive. In the case of the sun we can judge by eyes and touch; in the rays of the other stars there is nothing sensible. Finally, this power would scarcely last a moment, just as, when the mirror is moved a little or the sun advances, the same part is not struck by the concentrated rays. Therefore they would nevertheless be trifles. Indeed, from our conversation I have learned that there is nothing true in these matters. Yet I should still like to hear by what arguments he establishes magic in particular, that is, how he proves that magi accomplish true transmutations of things and perform other miracles.

ERASTUS. He brings forward arguments worthy of himself, namely these: an artisan can shape wood in various ways; therefore the magus too is able to transmute the natures of things according to his own pleasure. The potter shapes and reshapes clay as he wishes. But God has the same relation to created things as the potter has to mud or clay. The magus, however, is God’s deputy sitting at this wheel. Therefore he transforms things according to his pleasure. Nature has adorned herbs, stones, and other things with excellent powers. The magus takes the place of Nature, which cannot everywhere produce herbs, stones, and every sort of thing. Therefore, so that the powers of all things might exist everywhere, she wished the magus to place the same powers into words, figures, characters, and so on. The earth imparts admirable powers to plants. Therefore heaven has the same powers. Therefore the magus, being more powerful than heaven and able to draw them down into words and images, will accomplish the same things. That man can command the stars he proves from this passage of Scripture: “You are gods,” and so on.

Whatever the elemental body can do, the spiritual body can also do, and indeed much more easily, more readily, and more swiftly. But the elemental body can traverse many miles in one day; it can inform a friend of its thoughts through letters, though he be far away; a bird can fly through the air wherever it wishes, and so on. Therefore the spiritual body too can fly through the air without wings, signify to a friend what it wishes without letters, and traverse a very long space in a very short time. For the magus, through the spiritual body, or by imagining, can give to any things whatever the powers that he has formed in his imagination. Indeed, thoughts have more power than the stars and elements: they fabricate a new heaven, a new firmament, new powers, from which new arts arise.

Here too he calls magi saints, natural saints, since through the powers of nature they perform what holy men of God performed by divine power. He smears on the blasphemy recited above concerning the power of the disciples surpassing the power of Christ, if they have faith. He constantly denies that magic can be taught by man, and asserts that it is learned from the stars alone; a little later he asserts that a magus can beget another most perfect magus through his own knowledge. He bitterly inveighs against theologians who condemn these arts as diabolical. He says that the secrets of the heart are known by these same arts, so that he also makes magi searchers of hearts, lest God alone henceforth be believed to be kardiognōstēs, knower of hearts.

That profane scoundrel also says that the fig tree which Christ cursed withered magically, that is, by magical force. In his judgment it was also magical that God stopped the sun in Joshua 10. No less impiously he thinks that we can learn from the dead, contrary to the explicit command of God in Deuteronomy 18. At the end of the second book he dares also to affirm that God is a magus, that is, that he makes others magi; likewise, that he is a necromancer, because he proposes or creates the subject of necromancy. In sum, there is nothing sound or good in the whole writing. If elsewhere he made an effort to go mad, here he feigned madness, or was truly mad.

In the final book he brings forward many foolish things; among others he says that the whole globe illuminated by this sun is hell. He affirms that evil spirits know the simples from which, when compounded, they produce hail, thunder, and storms. For just as a builder or mason knows from what things he may construct a wall, so they, on Paracelsus’ authority, know how all kinds of storms are to be stirred up. Jeremiah speaks far otherwise when he says: “Are there among the vanities of the other nations,” that is, among vain gods, “any who cause rain and make the heaven give showers? Are you not he, Jehovah our God, in whom, as the author of all these things, we have hope?” I ask you, who has ever been so mad as to think that storms can be stirred up and heaven compelled by the powers of medicaments? Many witches now, in the present dryness of the air, have been waiting for rains for their fields. Why then does he not teach them by what herbs they can be procured?

It is ridiculous that he affirms that the same spirits construct the figure of the nativity for those being born, perhaps with an astrolabe or quadrant applied. That he makes heaven the author of miracles and divinations has already been refuted. Indeed, he himself also says that God alone knows the future. But lest he remain in the truth, he immediately adds that God gave arts by which men can foreknow the same things. What could be said more absurdly? In this way we shall say that God alone possesses the art of making things, and that there is no craftsman except God, apart from those who have thoroughly learned the art. “Because,” he says, “there is nothing hidden which must not be revealed, and whatever is future is most hidden, there are two ways of foreseeing such things: one natural, through astronomy; the other more sublime, through powers greater than natural powers.” If there are two ways, then not God alone has disclosed things, but the arts together with God.

What of the fact that he says the origin and cause of divination is the sidereal body, which, freed from the elemental body, converses with the stars and draws from them foreknowledge of the future? He criminally affirms that it is pleasing to God that we delight in the divinatory arts, catch at dreams, observe auguries, mark auspices, and cultivate the rest of the soothsaying arts. For God has forbidden this with such severity, by a command so often repeated, that I scarcely believe the evil demon himself would dare deny it. Yet he found a beast which is ashamed of nothing and asserts this. He also found men who approve the same things, receive them with applause, praise them, raise them to heaven, proclaim them divine, force them upon others, and publish them publicly; indeed, who declaim that the architect of these blasphemies was excellently illuminated by God, was the glory of Germany, and almost a god.

In the epilogue of the first book he enumerates four methods of healing: the natural, the divine, by faith, which he makes twofold, insofar as it is directed either toward God or toward the devil, and by devils. Who has seen, read, heard, or dreamed things more dreadful, being born among Christians and educated in the clear light of the restored Gospel?

FURNIUS. We have heard enough about these things.

ERASTUS. The things that remain in this monstrous offspring, may God grant that it be the last among those in which discussions of religion have been inserted, concerning the elements, meteors, the nature and parts of man, and the origin and teachers of the arts, we shall examine in the next conversation. I have now recited these things so verbosely for no other reason than that those who will one day read these pages may perceive that neither the blasphemies nor those monstrous errors ever pleased us. Let those who strive to propagate these things consider what answer they will one day give both to men and to God.

THE END